THE MAN LENIN



VLADIMIR ILYTCH ULIANOV (N. LENIN)

THE MAN LENIN

BY

ISAAC DON LEVINE

NEW YORK
THOMAS SELTZER
1924

Copyright, 1924, by
THOMAS SELTZER, Inc.

All rights reserved

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

CONTENTS

CHAPTER		PAGE
I	From Child to Man	1
II	Exile and Emigrant	12
III	The World War	27
IV	"The Sealed Car"	40
V	Lenin Arrives	48
VI	The Three Temptations	59
VII	The Mystery Man	79
VIII	The Conspiracy	91
IX	At the Helm	108
X	Brest-Litovsk	131
XI	Play and Work	156
XII	Mind and Temper	172
XIII	Leninism: A Critical Study	191
	Index	209

ILLUSTRATIONS

Vladimir Ilytch Ulianov (N. Lenin) *Frontispiece*

A Page from a Lenin Manuscript 36

Lenin's Forged Passport 84

Lenin Talking to Trotzky and Kamenev . . 132

Lenin in the Kremlin 180

THE MAN LENIN

CHAPTER I

FROM CHILD TO MAN

ON the banks of the "Mother" Volga, the cradle of the savage peasant rebellions led by Razin and Putatchev in the 17th and 18th centuries against the Czars of Muscovy, stands the city of Simbirsk which gave birth to Russia's greatest rebel, Lenin.

In the month of February, 1923, when it was thought in Moscow that the Bolshevist Revolution was over the rapids and that the time for history was come, a man by the name of A. Petrov dropped into Simbirsk to locate the house where the founder of the Soviet State was born. But Simbirsk was still living the Revolution against all the old sacred institutions and had not yet reached the stage of dedicating new monuments. So Mr. Petrov spent several hours searching for the house where Lenin first surveyed this enthralled world.

The queer explorer was in the beginning directed by kindly people to the police. There, he was told, they knew all the Lenins in town. Finally he was led to a dingy little house with peeling plaster and dilapidated cornices. There was not even a tablet on it to commemo-

rate the birthplace of the Bolshevist generalissimo. The yard was filthy and piled high with rubbish and hay. And the occupants of the house knew nothing about the life of their illustrious predecessor. But Mr. Petrov was persistent. He wanted to know more about the early life of Lenin. And naturally he wended his way to the bureau of the Simbirsk Soviet, where he applied to the Secretary for the desired information.

"Lenin is employed in the Department of Education, look for him there!" the Secretary of the Simbirsk Soviet informed the investigator. As soon as the latter recovered his wits, he pointed to a portrait on the wall and explained that that was the Lenin he was inquiring about and interested in, and not the official of the Department of Education.

The indefatigable historian then called upon the president of the Simbirsk Soviet himself and attempted to point out the necessity of preserving such an important monument as the house in which the leader and pride of the Bolshevist cause was born. But the president of the Soviet was hurrying to dinner. Besides, he was apparently an old-fashioned Bolshevik of the 1917 and not the 1923 model, and therefore remarked that he had no time for such nonsense which really concerned the Department of Real Estate.

"And if it interests you to know," added the yet uncivilized Bolshevik president, "the kind of stone and plaster

used in the construction of the house, apply to the editor of the local paper, and he will tell you all about it."

Up to recently the exact origin of Lenin has been a matter of dispute. Even leading Bolsheviks published contradictory and inaccurate statements of Lenin's life. Madame Elizarova, a sister of Lenin's, was asked to outline the facts of her family's origin. From her memorandum we learn that Lenin's father, Ilia Ulianov, was born in Astrakhan of poor middle class parents. Astrakhan is on the Caspian Sea, and Lenin's somewhat Mongol features are probably due to a strain of Asiatic blood in the family. Ilia Ulianov received a good education, thanks to the support of an elder brother, and after graduating from the University of Kazan, now the capital of the Tartar Republic, became a teacher of mathematics and physics.

"In 1869," Lenin's sister narrates, their father "was appointed inspector of the rural schools of the Simbirsk Government. This was a new function at the time. Rural schools were just being introduced then and Ilia, out of idealism, followed the path of spreading education among the people. It was hard work, requiring organizing ability far removed from the bureaucratic character which it assumed later. Ilia immersed himself in it very earnestly, driving about from one district to another along the impossible country roads in all seasons of the year.

"As the work grew and demanded help, Ilia Ulianov

was raised to the rank of director and several inspectors were appointed as his assistants. Being in the government service, he continually received decorations and ranks. The last decoration of St. Vladimir raised him to the rank of hereditary nobleman. Therefore it is true that Lenin is of noble birth, not by origin but through the service of his father. Such noblemen always remained outside the sphere of the illustrious nobility. Ilia was a democrat by nature, and remained all his life very modest in spite of the high ranks he received. He died at the age of 54 as a result of overwork."

Vladimir Ilyitch Ulianov, the real name of the man who subsequently became world famous as Lenin, was born on April 10, 1870, in Simbirsk. He had two brothers and three sisters.

Lenin's childhood was spent partly in the village of Kukushkino, near Kazan, where his parents had their summer home. There the older peasants still remember the Ulianovs well and proudly share their reminiscences. Lenin's mother distributed medicines free among the inhabitants, and was regarded by them as learned in the art of healing. The village library is now named after her.

Little Vladimir, or Volodia, as he was called for short, used to come to the village to play with the common boys. Both he and his brother Alexander considered themselves the heroes of the minor community, the protectors of the

poor peasant children. Whenever they arrived from the city, there was a feast in the village, for they brought sweets for all their playmates.

Volodia was a normal boy and extremely fond of games and adventure. From the city he would bring a lot of "bones" of different colors and arrange games. His former playmates recall that he would make use of a bone filled with lead and, to their great annoyance, seldom lose a game. He early made himself a cross-bow and like all the other boys tried to shoot birds.

Volodia more than once attempted to persuade the youths of the village to take him with them to the woods where they would often camp for the night around a big fire. "Take me along," the future Lenin pleaded, "I have tea and sugar. I will build the fire and chop the wood."

But the adults would seek to frighten him with stories of bears and witches infesting the woods. However, little Volodia would pluck up courage and trail alone at a distance after the party into the deep forest.

As a school-boy Lenin was studious and serious. He was a model student. From the recently discovered records of the high school which Lenin attended, it appears that he was punctual, diligent and of excellent behavior. His teachers held the highest opinions of him. In one of the reports of the school authorities it is put down of Lenin: "Punctuality—perfect. Preparation of lessons —perfect. Attention—perfect. Written exercise—very

assiduous. Interest for study—very great, especially for ancient languages."

Lenin received the highest mark, Five, standing for "excellent," in Religion, Greek, Latin, French, German, Russian, Mathematics, Physics and History, and only in one subject, Logic, did he get Four, meaning "good." Out of a graduating class of twenty-nine boys only two were honored by special notice, and of these two Lenin was the first, "as giving great hopes for further progress in the sciences."

The headmaster of the classical high school from which Lenin was graduated added the following note to his record upon his passing the examinations for entrance into the university.

"Very gifted, always punctual and diligent, Ulianov was first in all the classes and received a gold medal upon the conclusion of his studies, as the most deserving of all the students in progress, development and conduct. Neither in school nor outside of it has there ever been registered a case in which the school authorities had occasion to censure him. His parents always followed carefully his studies and moral development and from 1886, after his father's death, his mother all alone concentrated her efforts on the education of her children. Religion and prudent discipline were the basis of this education. The good fruits of it were evident in Ulianov's perfect behavior. Examining more closely the life which

he led at home, and his character, I could not fail to notice an excessive reserve and gruffness, even with his acquaintances and also with his comrades at school."

At the very time when Lenin was distinguishing himself as a brilliant student winning the highest commendation of the authorities, his elder brother Alexander was plotting the assassination of Czar Alexander III. This plot, in which Alexander Ulianov was the ringleader, was scheduled to be carried into effect on March 1, 1887, the sixth anniversary of the assassination of Alexander II.

At the last moment the conspiracy was discovered and frustrated. Lenin's brother and his accomplices were arrested and later executed by hanging. Lenin was then seventeen years of age. The execution of his brother shook the youth to his innermost depths.

In 1918 there was a legend current in Russia that Lenin had once vowed he would avenge the hanging of his brother and that he had amply vindicated his brother's execution when the Czar and his whole family were put to death by the Ekaterinburg Soviet. According to one who had known the unfortunate Alexander Ulianov, Russia lost in him a genius in mathematics who promised to develop into a great inventor. The executed brother of Lenin's was a pale-looking university student, shabbily dressed, shy and reserved.

Lenin's revolutionary career began immediately after the execution of his brother. As soon as he entered the

Law School of the Kazan University, in 1887, Lenin affiliated himself with a secret revolutionary circle. A memorandum prepared by the Czar's espionage service on Lenin's activities and discovered after the revolution in the archives of the "Okhrana" (secret police) reviews his early life as follows:

"In December, 1887, he was expelled from the University for participating in student riots, was forbidden to live in Kazan, and put under the secret surveillance of the police.

"In July, 1888, Ulianov's mother asked that her son Vladimir be readmitted into the University in September of the same year. Ulianov himself asked for permission to go abroad to complete his education in one of the foreign universities. Both applications were denied.

"In May, 1889, the Governor of Kazan presented an application by Ulianov to be permitted to go abroad for his health, but His Excellency, the Director of the Police Department, declined the request on the ground that Ulianov could go to the Caucasus to be treated for the illness mentioned in the medical certificate.

"Upon orders from the Governor General of Moscow Ulianov was forbidden to reside in the city and government of Moscow. In 1889 special attention was called to Ulianov, as Kazan was found to be the refuge of the particularly notorious workers of the revolutionary movement in Russia after the famous explosion which occurred in Zurich at the time.

"In the same year Ulianov asked to be allowed to pass the examinations for admission to the bar. It was then learned from his residence place, Samara, that he continued to circulate literature of a pernicious character from the political point of view.

"In October, 1891, Ulianov's application for permission to go abroad was again denied. In June of the following year he asked to be admitted to the bar in Samara. In July, 1892, the president of the Samara District Court was informed that there was no obstacle to the admission of Ulianov to practice law."

Lenin had passed successfully the examinations in the Law School of the St. Petersburg University in 1891. For a while Lenin was a lawyer, but his heart was in the revolutionary movement and his mind was in the study of Karl Marx. From Samara he moved to St. Petersburg and there proceeded to form an organization bearing the name of "The Union of Fight for the Freedom of the Working Class." Lenin was the first revolutionary in Russia to devote himself to the enlightenment of the industrial workers then just beginning to appear in Russia. The revolutionary parties of the time based themselves on the peasant, regarding him as the main force in the movement against Czarism. Lenin, having completely assimilated Marxism, built his theories of the coming revolution on the Russian workingman.

As an active socialist agitator among the growing labor element in Petrograd Lenin was a pioneer in the Russian

revolutionary movement. He spent days and nights in the workingmen's quarter of the city, devoting all his energy and time to the education of the less ignorant workers. He tried to lend to the spontaneous economic strikes a political character. He wrote manifestoes and multiplied them on a hectograph for distribution in factories and shops.

In 1894 Lenin wrote a pamphlet entitled *Who Are the Real Friends of the People?* This manuscript was lost, and for thirty years remained unknown until discovered early in 1923. Its proper place is in a complete edition of Lenin's works, but its philosophy testifies to a striking quality in Lenin's character. It reveals that Lenin at the age of 24 had already perfectly crystallized the faith which he professed a quarter of a century later and in the name of which he led the Bolshevist Revolution.

"The workingman cannot help seeing already," wrote Lenin in 1894, "that it is capital which is oppressing him, that a fight must be waged against the bourgeoisie as a class. And this fight for the most elementary economic needs, for the improvement of his material condition, inevitably demands organization from the workingman, inevitably becomes a war not against persons but against the class, the very class which not alone in the factories and shops but everywhere is yoking and exploiting the toiler. . . .

"When the advanced representatives of the working class have mastered the idea of scientific socialism, the idea of the historic rôle of the Russian workingman, when these ideas obtain wide circulation and powerful organizations arise transforming the present divided economic war of the workers into an intelligent class struggle, then the Russian workingman, rising at the head of all the democrats, will overthrow the autocracy and will lead the Russian proletariat, along with the proletariats of the other countries, by the direct road of open political struggle to the victorious communist revolution."

Was Lenin a profound prophet or a hidebound fanatic? Leading Bolsheviks have hailed this document as proof of Lenin's brilliant vision, paying another tribute to their master's genius. But his critics have argued that it was evidence of a limited mental horizon, of a Jesuit catholicism of thirty years without growth.

CHAPTER II

EXILE AND EMIGRANT

IN April, 1895, Lenin finally succeeded in securing a passport to go abroad. While in France, he called on the Socialist leader, Lafargue. The latter was curious to know what the Russian Socialists were doing. Lenin answered that the more intelligent workingmen were studying Marx.

"Studying Marx?" asked Lafargue, surprised.

"Yes," replied Lenin.

"And do they understand him?"

"Yes, they do."

"Pooh—pooh!" retorted the Frenchman, "they understand nothing. Nobody understands Marx here, and we have had a Socialist movement for twenty years."

Lenin learned this lesson in later years and would tell the story with a laugh. But at first he was of a scholastic turn of mind, and his idea of propaganda was highly amusing. Thus when his group started an illegal revolutionary newspaper Lenin suggested that it publish some scientific theses, but his proposal was met with derision by his comrades. In those days Lenin was associated with Ludwig Martens, who later became Soviet Ambassador to the United States. Lenin was then the leader of his circle

and in spite of his youth was already nicknamed "the old man" and "Liapkin-Tiapkin," the latter describing one who gets to the bottom of everything. He assumed at first the pseudonyms of Tulin, Ilin and Ilyitch, and later that of N. Lenin. However, the "N" did not stand for Nicholas and Lenin has always been called Vladimir Ilyitch.

"At that time," narrates Martov, the leader of the Menshevist Party, "Lenin made quite a different impression than in later years. He did not possess or at least did not display that self-confidence which characterized him afterwards. He was about twenty-six then. The leading place which he occupied in the 'elder' group and the attention which his first literary works attracted were not sufficient to raise him in his own estimation far above his colleagues. Being first among his equals, who were all serious-minded and educated men, Lenin was not yet saturated with that contempt and distrust for people which contributed so much to his emergence as a leader. However, I never noticed any signs of personal pride in Lenin's character. Lenin sought, when in the company of others, an opportunity to acquire knowledge rather than show off his own. He was full of reverence for the heads of the socialist movement. But he also showed considerable modesty in his attitude to political opponents."

Thus, at a meeting in Moscow, Lenin made a bitter attack on the Populist group and its leader Vorontzov.

The speech was a great success. But when Lenin discovered that Vorontzov himself was present in the audience, he became confused and ran away from the meeting.

Lenin's first attempt to get in touch with the common people was rather unfortunate. It was during a factory strike in Petrograd when Lenin and a friend went to a tavern near the factory to pick up some information as to what the strikers were saying, with a view to doing some propaganda among them. A man who was drinking one glass of tea after another was telling how the firemen were called out to the factory and turned the water hose on the strikers. Lenin tried to draw the men out, but the latter, wiping the perspiration from his forehead after each glass of tea, had one answer to all questions: "Ugh, there was sure some scandal!"

One night in December, 1896, the Petrograd police raided the nests of the socialists and among others arrested Lenin. After a few months in jail the prisoners were condemned to exile in Eastern Siberia for a term of three years. But that was a comparatively liberal time and those of the prisoners who could afford it were permitted to proceed to Siberia at their own expense. Lenin availed himself of this privilege and together with another exile went to Krasnoyarsk, Western Siberia. There they awaited the arrival of the rest of the party of exiles to join it on the long river trip into the Siberian wilds.

Lenin and his companion came to the station to meet the train carrying the exiles. But when the latter arrived

they were forbidden intercourse with anyone at the station. They disobeyed and made an effort to enter a conversation with Lenin. There followed a row and confusion, the soldiers not knowing what to do, until some gendarmes seized Lenin and locked him up. Later he was released.

At Krasnoyarsk all the exiles were permitted to proceed to their destination at their own expense. There was a certain political inmate in prison, Feodosiev, who remained behind. He had never met Lenin and expressed a wish to do so. When the exiles left the prison they purposely departed without their belongings. The following day they returned in a wagon driven by a peasant to claim their luggage. The warden without suspecting anything admitted the wagon into the prison court. The driver was Lenin, who was especially dressed as a peasant. While the prisoners loaded their luggage, Feodosiev and Lenin engaged in a conversation. The warden realized this, but was ashamed to disclose how he had been deceived and therefore avoided starting trouble.

Lenin spent his term of exile at work and in 1899 finished his big book, *The Development of Capitalism in Russia.* The following year his sentence expired and he was permitted to return to Russia, with the provision that he was allowed to live neither in Petrograd nor Moscow nor in towns or districts having universities or factories.

By this time Lenin formulated and preached the views

which later became the foundation of Bolshevism. He arrived at the conclusion that the unpropertied manual workers, the proletariat, were but half enlightened beings, incapable of understanding their own interests, who require guardianship and who can be saved only by the advanced minority banded into a secret revolutionary organization ruled by iron discipline.

Upon his return from Siberia in 1900, Lenin devoted himself to the creation of such an organization. He was arrested in Petrograd but released after three weeks of detention. He moved to Munich, Bavaria, and there edited the new party organ, "The Spark," which was published secretly for clandestine distribution in Russia. In 1902, Lenin, aged 32, delivered a series of lectures in the Paris "Institute for Social Sciences." The eminent Professor Maxim Kovalevsky remarked in those days: "What a fine professor Lenin could become!" But Lenin preferred to choose a different path in life.

In "The Spark" Lenin clearly set forth the policy which still remains the watchword of the Bolshevist Party. In his famous article *What Is to Be Done?* he wrote:

"The workingmen are not and cannot be conscious of the antagonism of their interests to those of the existing order. . Only the educated representatives of the possessing classes are conscious of it. The history of all countries shows that the working class alone can create but trade unionism. The workingmen can be saved only by an

organization of revolutionaries which, unlike the labor unions, must consist exclusively of people whose profession is revolutionary activity. Such an organization must not be too wide and must be as secret as possible."

He set himself to the task of converting the majority of the members of the Russian Social Democratic Party to his views, and at the convention held in 1903 his faction proved to be in the majority, for which the Russian equivalent is "bolshinstvo." Hence, the purely incidental name of Bolsheviki. But the temporary minority, or the Mensheviki, were very powerful and the fight between the two factions for the control of the party machinery was bitter and long.

In 1904 Lenin suffered a setback. The Mensheviki regained the majority and they imposed certain restrictions on Lenin. His signature, for instance, as the representative of the party abroad was declared no longer valid if not endorsed by some other member of the executive committee. In the supreme council of five Lenin had a minority and all his motions and proposals were doomed. He founded the Bolshevist publication "Forward!", editing it in Switzerland.

Then came the revolution of 1905, following upon the heels of the disastrous Russo-Japanese War. Lenin returned secretly to Russia from abroad on a forged British passport, and lived in Petrograd as an Englishman, changing his quarters very frequently. He started a daily

newspaper, one of the official editors of which was the poet N. M. Minsky, but the hidden driving force behind it was Lenin.

Lenin's authority in the management of the paper was recognized at once, according to Minsky, although he behaved modestly, did not play the part of a dictator, did not display his knowledge or eloquence, speaking only in short phrases accompanied by an innocently sly smile. Lenin impressed one with his unqualified self-confidence. "We are rock-ribbed Marxians," was his favorite phrase. He used derision more than reasoning in his arguments. "Idiocy, ignorance," were his frequent epithets.

Lenin's prestige among his followers was due to his gentility and modesty in all that concerned him personally and to his iron perseverance in everything that had to do with his party. This explains Lenin's political pliancy which amazed the world in later years. Lenin would compromise on everything in order to keep his party in control of the situation.

"One might say Lenin lived outside of his own personality," writes Minsky, "and this is why he had no intimates. He was a devotee of his cult, a hermit of his vow. He met and parted with people only on party grounds.

"Men and conditions are nothing to Lenin but means to accomplish his aims. This is why some of his former associates now call him a 'hangman.' But he is really a monomaniac—a man with a fixed idea.

"Whoever met for the first time this ungainly, poorly dressed, somewhat round-shouldered, bald-headed man, with his impenetrable Mongol face and slow movements, would take him for a small bureaucrat, and would never believe that he was face to face with one of the most fearless, crafty and wilful maniacs of our time. Only after scrutinizing his narrow sharp eye and unforgettable smile, might one guess the extraordinary will-power concealed behind the ordinary mask of his face.

"Those who knew Lenin well twenty years ago never doubted that sooner or later he would play the first rôle in the history of his country. There was a legendary heroic halo around Lenin's personality."

Perhaps the most striking incident from the early career of Lenin was his opposition to the Petrograd Soviet, the first in history, during the revolution of 1905. The Soviet, which later became the model for the Revolution of 1917, was a spontaneous development, representing all the revolutionary parties to some extent but the majority of its members was composed of nonpartisan deputies of all the Petrograd factories.

In that Soviet Trotzky played a leading part, but Lenin never participated in its sittings, which were open. He frankly expressed his contempt for it, criticizing its open procedure and its lack of a definite fighting policy. He sharply condemned the members of his party who sat in it. Events justified Lenin's attitude, for after several

weeks of "parliamentary" activity, the Czar's police arrested the Soviet's entire executive committee, tried it, and condemned it to penal servitude in Siberia.

During the turbulent days of the Revolution Lenin secretly converted his editorial office into a store for arms. When the Czar's Government took the upper hand, the arms were discovered and the official editors who had known nothing of it had to go to prison while Lenin disappeared.

The abortive Revolution of 1905 was largely a Menshevist enterprise in so far as the workingmen were concerned in it. Its main objective was the establishment of constitutional government in Russia. But Lenin was for direct action. He raised the cry: "Boycott the Duma!" He agitated for an armed uprising. He went to Moscow and helped organize the famous December Revolt there, and endeavored unsuccessfully to incite a simultaneous rising in Petrograd. Lenin's hand was also behind the naval mutinies which broke out in 1906 in Kronstadt and Sveaborg, and the sympathetic outbreaks in the capital.

The failure of the Revolution of 1905 strengthened Lenin's extremist following among the Russian Social Democrats. With the aid of the intransigent Polish and Lettish factions, as against the Mensheviks and the Jewish "Bund," Lenin again gained the upper hand in the party councils. Lenin proceeded to form a secret Bolshevist executive organ and waged unremitting war-

fare against the moderate Mensheviks. He considered participation in the trade union movement a crime, for instance. His idea of revolutionary activity was actual armed preparation, in the greatest secrecy, for a general uprising.

The fight between the two factions grew so bitter that Martov, the leader of the Mensheviks, publicly accused Lenin of appropriating for his secret organization a large amount of money bequeathed to the entire party by the will of a certain woman. Lenin and his followers were also accused of availing themselves of a big sum obtained in a holdup on the State Treasury in Tiflis, the Caucasus. There seems little doubt that this holdup money actually found its way into the treasury of Lenin's group. In this party wrangling Trotzky sided neither with the Bolsheviks nor with the Mensheviks, sometimes acting as a mediator and sometimes incurring the severe criticism of both sides.

During the years 1906 and 1907 Lenin lived under a false name in Kuokalla, Finland, near the Russian border. From here he directed the revolutionary activities of his faction. Here frequently important secret conferences took place and all the preparations for the next party congress in London were made. The Czar's secret service, through its agents in the high councils of the Bolshevist faction, learned of Lenin's whereabouts. The chief of the Russian foreign service in Paris, the notorious

Harting, addressed on June 22, 1907, the following communication to the Director of the Police Department in Petrograd, marking it "very secret":

"I have the honor to report to Your Excellency that, according to information received from absolutely confidential sources which cannot be disclosed, Lenin is living in Finland on a passport issued in Berlin to the German subject Erwin Weikoff, a printer by trade, born in Hameln on July 16, 1862."

On this letter His Excellency wrote: "What is his status with regard to responsibility before the law?" A week later the following memorandum was attached to the correspondence:

> The Case of V. I. Lenin.
>
> Vladimir Ilyitch Ulianov (Lenin) has been under surveillance since 1896. He was implicated in the case of the St. Petersburg Social Democratic circles and by Imperial order was exiled on January 29, 1897, to Eastern Siberia for a term of three years. Upon his return from exile he went abroad in May, 1900, and entered the central committee of the Russian Social Democratic Party. By a circular letter of June 22, 1901, Ulianov was ordered to be arrested upon his appearance in Russia, but in 1905, after the Imperial Manifesto of October 21, this order was revoked and now Ulianov is not wanted on any charge.
>
> According to the information from the agents, he has been living in a villa in Kuokalla, and is visited on holidays by leading members of the Social Democratic Party. His wife is the secretary of the central committee to which he was elected substitute member at the London congress. He belongs to the Bolshevist faction.

As a result of this memorandum, the Petrograd police was ordered to arrest Lenin and extradite him from Finland, but the Bolshevist leader escaped the net in time and fled abroad.

The congress of the Russian Social Democrats mentioned before met in the spring of 1907. In a long address Lenin championed the view that revolution is not a half measure and that one cannot overthrow the autocracy and stop there. One must go farther and overthrow the capitalist society. The majority of the delegates did not share this theory, holding that Russia was far from being ripe for a social revolution. But Lenin was unshakable. "He who storms a fortress cannot give up fighting after taking the fortress," Lenin said. "Either we take the fortress to hold it or we need not storm it."

In the same year, in an introduction to a German book, Lenin made a remarkable prophecy of the nature of the next Russian revolution. "The Russian working class will win its freedom," he wrote, "and its revolution, although full of errors, will push Europe forward, and let the scoundrels boast of the flawlessness of their revolutionary inactivity!"

Towards the close of 1907 Lenin attended the international socialist congress in Stuttgart. When the question of the socialist position in the event of war was raised, Lenin and Rosa Luxembourg offered an amendment to the compromise resolution in which they proposed that any

war among the European powers should be turned by the common efforts of all the socialist parties into a war of the international proletariat against the capitalist system, practically into social revolution. The amendment was rejected.

From 1908 to 1911 Lenin lived in Paris. This was the most difficult period of his life. He could scarcely make ends meet, and went hungry more than once. But the greatest torment was the lack of an outlet for his enormous energy. The Russian revolutionary movement had been crushed to death. Lenin lectured, wrote articles and worked on his great book, a criticism of philosophy. He absorbed a vast amount of literature on the subject, spending fifteen hours daily for a long period in the public libraries reading and writing.

In a private letter written in the fall of 1909 Lenin said: "The times are as difficult as hell . . . We must demand everything as regards the general democratic platform. If we succeed, we will get all, if we fail—we will get only a part, but going into battle we cannot limit ourselves to a demand for a part."

This was written in the blackest days of the Czarist reaction then reigning in Russia. Hundreds of thousands of revolutionaries were in prison or in Siberia, and the movement against Czarism was suppressed with iron and blood. There was only despair in the hearts of those who escaped persecution. It seemed that for a generation at

least the Russian fight for liberty was crushed beyond resurrection. Lenin alone was as determined and confident as ever. Although the times were "as difficult as hell," Lenin did not moderate his demands but increased them. He was regarded as a lunatic by many. But he saw what others did not see.

"To tell you frankly," Lenin said to a comrade, in those days, "it is hard to foresee any life in the labor movement in the near future. For two more years we will have nothing to do." This forecast proved exact. Two years later, in 1911, the Russian workingmen began to stir again, and the activity which culminated later in the colossal upheaval that brought Lenin to the top commenced in the hidden depths of Russia.

In 1912 Lenin moved to Galicia to be nearer to Russia. He kept in constant touch with the workingmen's movement and the Bolshevist deputies in the Duma. The latter were plain workmen and would travel to Galicia to confer with the hidden party "boss" about their tactics and speeches. They would come from Petrograd to raise grave questions about the budget or some special legislation which they could not understand. Once Lenin burst into laughter at such questions. The deputies, in confusion, inquired as to the cause of his hilarity.

"Dear comrades," replied Lenin, "what do you want with the budget or with an amendment to the bill of the Constitutional-Democrats? You are workingmen. Come

out and tell about your life, describe the horrors of the capitalist servitude, and call all those gentlemen in the Duma by their right names, villains and exploiters!'

And Lenin proceeded to draft some speeches for the representatives of the Bolshevist Party in the Duma which he then regarded as an excellent forum for the dissemination of his views throughout Russia.

CHAPTER III

THE WORLD WAR

IN the poor quarter of Zurich there stands the humble house of a workingman. In 1915 two of its rooms were occupied by a middle-aged Russian couple, belonging to the political emigrés then so numerous in Switzerland. The ceiling was low in the two rooms and they were almost bare of furniture.

A little bald-headed man, with narrow eyes and a pointed beard, was sitting and writing. His coat was frayed, his trousers bulgy, his shoes mended. In the corner a grey-haired woman, with a virile and expressive face, was tending to a gasoline burner. She was cooking dinner. The meal consisted of a pot of macaroni.

This was the year of the war lords. Europe was trembling from the concussions of the mighty armies. The kaisers, the czars, and the kings were firm in their powerful thrones. Nobody dreamed of revolution.

But what was the seedy little man writing about? He was at his favorite theme, always dwelling on the same idea. The war itself did not interest him. It was its aftermath that obsessed his mind. He was writing of the transformation of the great conflict of emperors and capi-

talists into universal revolution, into civil war. The quarrel between the rulers of mankind for the riches of the earth, he insisted, must change into a struggle of the oppressed against the oppressors.

The White House, Potsdam, Downing Street, Quai d'Orsay, and the Quirinal had never heard of this poor Russian maniac, who signed his articles appearing in obscure publications "N. Lenin."

It is true the Socialist leaders of all countries knew him well, but how did they regard him?

The leader of the German Socialists, David, branded him as "insane."

The father of Russian Socialism, Plekhanov, and the Anglo-French Socialists called his idea "a farcical dream."

And the neutral pacifist Socialists derided him as "drawing a straight line into airless space."

The outbreak of the World War found Lenin and his disciple Zinoviev in an obscure village in Galicia. As enemy subjects they were arrested by the local Austro-Hungarian authorities and kept in the country prison for two weeks.

It was here that Lenin and Zinoviev made their memorable bet. Zinoviev claimed that the German Socialists would not dare to vote against the Kaiser's Government and would therefore abstain from voting war credits. Lenin argued that the German Socialists could not be such rascals and while they would not fight against the

war, they certainly would vote against war credits if only to save their standing with the masses.

Perhaps nothing illustrates more sharply than this bet Lenin's erroneous judgment in affairs and conditions outside of Russia. Both Lenin and Zinoviev lost their bet. The German Socialists did not vote against the war credits, as Lenin expected, nor did they abstain from voting, as Zinoviev held, but voted in favor of the war credits.

When the issue of the Berlin "Vorwärts," the organ of the Social Democratic Party, containing the account of the war credits session in the Reichstag, reached the hands of Lenin, he could not believe his own eyes and insisted that that issue of the paper was especially forged by the German Government to deceive the outside world. But when he later convinced himself that its contents were genuine he exclaimed: "The Second Internationale is dead!"

Lenin and Zinoviev were permitted by the Austro-Hungarian Government to leave for Switzerland. Lenin settled in Zurich and with inexhaustible energy began to organize a small group of anti-war socialists. He almost ran after every workingman trying to convert him to his views, and was as happy as a child when he succeeded in recruiting seven young workers for his organization. The official Socialists regarded him nearly as an anarchist. The Swiss Government was on the point of expelling him,

but the Socialist leader Moor intervened in his behalf and signed a guarantee that Lenin would not engage in activities injurious to the interests of Switzerland.

According to Zinoviev, the World War wrought a profound change in Lenin which at the time struck even his nearest friends. His hatred for the capitalist system became so concentrated that his very countenance and demeanor betrayed it. He was one of the organizers of the famous Zimmerwald Conference of the active anti-war Socialists. This conference was held in September, 1915, and among its participants were Karl Liebknecht, Rosa Luxembourg and Ledebour from Germany, Karl Radek from Austria, Lenin, Zinoviev, Martov and Chernov from Russia, and Platten and Grimm from Switzerland. At this meeting, as well as at the one held the following year in Kinthal, Lenin advocated extreme measures against the war, such as sabotage, general strikes, and armed risings, all for the purpose of provoking a European revolution.

It is curious that Chernov, the leader of the Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries and President of the Constituent Assembly, who later joined Koltshak to fight Lenin's Soviet Government, was then even more irreconcilable than Lenin himself. When the latter submitted at Zimmerwald the text of a resolution for the conference to adopt, Chernov told Radek he would support it if it were made a little sharper. To which Lenin laughingly replied:

"Better not make it sharper, for the fool might sign it, then, and compromise us."

The campaign for the conquest of the world initiated by the Zimmerwald Conference was started on the colossal capital of 50 francs and 25 centimes. This was all the cash in the treasury of the dangerous internationalists who undertook to subvert the European Powers possessing tremendous armies. Out of this sum, the biggest contribution, amounting exactly to 20 francs, came from the central committee of the Bolshevist Party. The first publication of the "Zimmerwaldists" left a deficit of fifty francs which was collected in centimes by German pacifists who had sought refuge in Switzerland.

At the conference Lenin severely upbraided the German Socialist leaders for their support of the Kaiser. Ledebour, although himself a pacifist, then attacked Lenin for his immoderate attitude. It was easy for Lenin, said Ledebour, to fight the war and fume against the Czar's Government while living in Switzerland, but why did he not go home to do it? Lenin answered that he was sent abroad by the Russian workingmen, that he was in the same position as Karl Marx when the latter wrote his Communist Manifesto in exile, and that he would be at his post and not shirk heavy responsibility when the time came for it.

The news of the overthrow of the Czar in March, 1917, found Lenin and his wife living with the family of Herr Kammerer, a shoemaker whose home was in the old and

narrow Spiegelgasse 14, Zurich. They had moved there a year and a half before, their quarters consisting of one front room overlooking a little square. The shoemaker and his three sons were of Lenin's own faith, and retain the kindliest recollections of their former tenants.

A dark and ancient staircase may safely lead to the upper floors of the five-story house in Spiegelgasse any one under six feet in height, as the ceilings are unusually low in it. The ground floor is occupied by "Jacob's Well," the restaurant of the little square. From the small windows on the left of the second floor Lenin watched the cabinet-maker and the laundry across the way at work, the bookstand displaying an old copy of "The Red Magazine" and a huge Nuremberg Bible two hundred years of age, and the second-hand shop showing a set of rusty knives, a velvet jacket and a couple of old-fashioned watches. One is stirred by a peculiar emotion facing this house with its little green shutters, guarded on the right by Kammerer's neat shoemaking establishment and on the left by a sausage factory, and pondering over the fact that in this home-like neighborhood Lenin during 1916 and 1917 bathed in the serene and placid Swiss sunshine and dreamed his wild dreams of turmoil and despair.

Six years later a German writer, Arthur Holitscher, called on the shoemaker to inquire about his old tenants. "Comrade Lenin," narrated Kammerer, "was very plain in his mode of living. He and his wife did not care for

fine clothes and good food. They paid me, altogether, 28 francs per month. In the winter I made for him a pair of heavy peasant boots which I reinforced with thick nails. 'Comrade Lenin,' I said to him, 'in these boots you will look like a country sheriff.' But he wore the boots the whole winter. Frau Lenin was sick for a long time, and they went to French Switzerland. When they returned I put my new tenants out and took them in again. We have always been good comrades. Have you been to the little bookshop on the corner? There you can see his signature in a book. Now he lives in the Kremlin. How does it look there? He occupies spacious and lofty rooms, doesn't he?"

"What will you say," asked the visitor of the shoemaker, "if some day under that window on the second floor a marble tablet is set up?"

The shoemaker and his son looked bewildered. "A marble tablet? What for?"

"To commemorate the fact that Lenin lived in this house in 1916 and 1917."

The shoemaker and his son exchanged glances and, greatly amused, burst into laughter. A marble tablet on the wall! Just because comrade Lenin, that plain and kindly fellow, lived there for a few months! What a funny idea, indeed! But the shoemaker suddenly stopped laughing, for he recalled that his former lodger now lived in the imperial apartments in the Kremlin and was at the

head of the largest state in Europe, wielding almost unlimited power.

A dictator without arrogance, without any personal ambition, a ruler who shunned honors, Lenin was perhaps the first great leader in history who had no mania for glory, for authority, for pomp. His quest for power was not an egoistic passion but a duty imposed upon him by his faith, and he used it not to further his own selfish ends, but to promote his ideals.

Luxury, women, art, gambling, riches, all these did not exist for him. "It is not that Lenin is purposely starving his flesh, but simply because he feels no need for all that," writes Abramovitch, the Menshevist leader who had known Lenin for years. "He is wholly in the grip of one idea, one passion: Revolution. And revolution means power to Lenin. He agitated and worked for a dictatorship in the party as far back as twenty years ago. But not because he is ambitious, not because he likes to be flattered and glorified, but because he regards himself as the most suitable and accurate interpreter of the ideas of socialism and revolution. He alone correctly understands Marx, therefore he alone among the socialists is entitled to head the revolution. This is his deep and indestructible conviction, as strong as that of a maniac."

Lenin was above all a source of will-power, according to Abramovitch, a center of radiating will-energy. If he wanted a certain thing, he would not stop talking, writing,

demanding, insisting, and intriguing until he got it. Those around him might be completely worn out, but he continued to hammer away at the same point.

"Lenin's energy is enhanced by his fighting methods. To Lenin all means are right except those which do not accomplish his ends. In this respect Lenin is a direct follower of the principles avowed by the Jesuits, by Machiavelli, by Talleyrand, Napoleon, Bismarck on the one hand, and by Bakunin, Blanchi, and Netchaiev on the other.

"For Lenin moral principles do not exist, just as there is no music for a deaf person. And if one should discuss the subject with him, he would but laugh. For he is deeply and unalterably convinced that everything is coming out the way he sees it and not otherwise, and considers it obvious and axiomatic. The expediency and not the ethics of his acts worries him.

"The words morality and humanity do not exist in Lenin's vocabulary, except in such phrase as 'capitalist morality' or 'slobbering humanity.'

"As an intellectual force he is nothing phenomenal. He has great intelligence and a rare ability of penetration, but his education is one-sided. But no one can proclaim with such iron obstinacy as Lenin every utterance of his as the loftiest wisdom.

"As an orator Lenin is far surpassed in Soviet Russia not only by Trotzky but also by Lunacharsky. He speaks

drily, in a monotonous voice, without colorful figures, without biting sarcasm or subtle irony, but his dry and colorless phrases he hammers into the heads of his listeners like iron nails. While he speaks his voice, countenance, gestures and entire bearing radiate hypnotic and dominating strength. He selects two or three ideas and repeats them with the persistence of a madman and the unhesitating self-confidence of a fanatic until his audience believes that there is no other way, that Lenin is right.

"Lenin has falsified election returns at a party convention in order to gain a majority," declared Abramovitch, "he approved of armed hold-ups on government treasuries for the purpose of filling the coffers of his party, he participated in the printing of counterfeit money for party purposes, but these and many similar deeds were to him but steps to his goal, and therefore right and permissible. Only that is wrong to him which ends in failure.

"But it would be very mistaken," added the Menshevist leader, "to imagine Lenin as a demoniacal being. On the contrary, his home life and personal relations would merit the enthusiasm of any Baptist minister. It is difficult to conceive a simpler, kinder and more unpretentious person than Lenin at home. Making ends meet with difficulty, he was always shabbily dressed, and is not much different in that respect even now.

"I visited him once in Zurich in 1916. His wife was cooking macaroni for dinner, and while she talked to me,

29/. La socialdémocratie suisse doit obtenir non seulement que le Congrès de Berne (de février 1917) se rallie entièrement aux décisions de Kienthal, mais elle doit encore exiger que de son côté le congrès déclare rompre entièrement et définitivement avec le B. S. I., ce rempart de l'opportunisme et du socialisme patriote, tendances absolument incompatibles avec le socialisme.

30./ La socialdémocratie suisse ~~qui~~ se trouvant dans des conditions particulièrement favorables d'informations, qui lui permettent d'observer de très près le mouvement ouvrier de tous les pays avancés d'Europe et la lutte des tendances, et qui est parfaitement située pr travailler à l'union ~~intime~~ des éléments révolutionnaires ~~de~~ de ces mouvements prolétariens, ne doit point se borner à attendre, en observateur passif, le développement de la lutte des tendances au sein des partis elle doit ~~aller de l'avant~~ se mettre en avant garde du mouvement en suivant la voie tracée par la gauche de Zimmerwald et confirmée tous les jours par la marche des événements en France, en Allemagne en Angleterre, aux Etats-Unis en général dans tous les pays civilisés

---

A PAGE FROM A LENIN MANUSCRIPT

Instructions to the Zimmerwald Lefts and the Swiss Socialist Party

the macaroni was considerably burned. Lenin was then in great need, although our patriotic papers later wrote that he was in the pay of the German general staff. But poverty worried him little. For his only interest in life lies in party affairs and politics. He is a walking machine for the scheming of revolutions, as if especially built for that purpose.

"As far back as 1907 Lenin publicly accused the leaders of the Menshevist faction of having 'sold themselves to the bourgeoisie.' The Russian Social Democratic Party brought him to trial and I was one of the judges. Lenin calmly declared that he purposely used the expression so that the workingmen would take his words literally in the sense of being bribed, adding: 'While fighting an enemy it is always necessary to use expressions that would excite the worst suspicions of the public.' "

In 1911 there was a conflict within the Russian Social Democratic Party as to whether the next plenary session of its central committee should take place in Russia or abroad. The Menshevist faction and the Jewish "Bund" insisted on Russia, since they did not want the leaders living abroad who were torn away from Russian conditions to play the leading rôle at the meeting. Lenin accused the Jewish "Bund," for its insistence on Russia, of seeking to draw the conference into the nets of the Czar's police so as to get rid of the Bolshevist leaders. While nobody thought that Lenin actually believed his own words, some

of his opponents considered them as showing what Lenin himself was capable of doing. When taken to account and invited to face a tribunal of his comrades, Lenin refused to comply, remarking ironically: "As if there is any reason for offense! I needed an argument, and I said what I did."

When, in 1914, Malinovsky, the Bolshevist member of the Duma and a close colleague of Lenin's, was accused of serving in the "Okhrana" (the Czar's secret service), Lenin disregarded all the evidence and compelled his adherents to pass a resolution whitewashing Malinovsky, just because the latter was necessary to him. Later the police itself acknowledged Malinovsky's connection with the "Okhrana." Lenin was naturally upset but not confounded. In 1918 Malinovsky was executed by the "Cheka" of the Soviet Government, and Lenin wrote: "It is true, he was an agent of the 'Okhrana,' but he was of greater advantage to us than to the Czar."

"The system existing in Russia under the name of the Soviet Government," concludes Abramovitch, "is essentially the product of Lenin's designs during his life abroad. At the bottom there is the dictatorship of the Communist Party over the entire people. Then comes the dictatorship of the Central Committee over the Communist Party. And on the very top is the virtual dictatorship of Lenin over the Central Committee. Lenin wrote even after his seizure of power that the idea of the dictatorship of the

proletariat is not necessarily antagonistic to the dictatorship of one person."

Lenin's divinity was the working class. He ruled and labored in the name of this divinity. But simultaneously with his profound worship for this abstract god, he had no illusions about the nature of the mob and even of the laboring masses. In this regard he was perhaps related to the despotic rulers of the past who held that without paternal protection, without forcible imposition, one cannot help humanity. Mankind is too stupid to help itself, according to Lenin. Hence, his genuine distrust of and scorn for democracy and liberty.

It has been suggested that if Lenin could for a moment have been absolutely frank, he would have expressed his innermost credo in words like the following:

"The best form of government for humanity is unlimited despotism, but one which is exercised not in favor of the oppressors and rulers, but in behalf of the downtrodden and oppressed."

CHAPTER IV

"THE SEALED CAR"

MILLIONS of people all over the world believed for years that Lenin was a German agent and that his passing through hostile Germany on the way to Russia after the Revolution was proof of his having been sent from Germany to disintegrate the Russian army and bring about a separate peace. This "proof" was reinforced by a set of forged documents purporting to reveal Lenin's connection with the German General Staff, published in 1917 by the American Committee on Public Information.

The facts about Lenin's return to Russia via Germany have become available through the publication of two letters written by Lenin from Zurich soon after the Revolution and of his own declaration upon his arrival in Russia of the circumstances of the trip through Germany.

The downfall of Czarism in the middle of March, 1917, found Lenin and a large colony of political emigrés in Switzerland. They were all naturally anxious to return home at once, but many of them were considered too radical by the Allied authorities to be permitted to proceed to Russia. The Provisional Government, then headed by

Lvov and Miliukov, and the Soviet, dominated by Kerensky, were not too anxious to have Lenin and the pacifist internationalists in Russia.

When all the efforts to obtain transit through the Allied countries proved futile, the secretary of the Swiss Socialist Party, Fritz Platten, applied to the German authorities for permission for Lenin and a party of thirty other emigrés to cross Germany on the way to Russia. Previously Lenin had refused the interference in his behalf with the German authorities of the Swiss Socialist, Grimm, who had been trying with the connivance of the Swiss Government to bring about negotiations for a separate peace between Russia and Germany, as well as the intervention in his favor with the Allied authorities of the Russian pro-war socialists.

The German Government agreed to permit the Russian emigrés to pass through Germany on condition that none of them should, while on German territory, enter into any relations whatsoever with any private persons. The Russians asked that their car be given ex-territorial privileges, that they should be subjected to no passport or customs control, and that not a single German official should be allowed to enter their car. The membership of the party was to be decided by the Russians themselves. In return, they promised to demand of the Provisional Government the release of the German and Austrian civilians interned in Russia.

This was the origin of the famous "sealed car." With Lenin were a number of exiles who belonged to non-Bolshevist parties. The party carried their own food supplies and for three days did not leave the car, which was escorted from one end of Germany to the other by three German officers. Fritz Platten was with the party throughout the entire trip, to get in touch, in case of emergency, with the outside world. When a representative of the German pro-war Socialists wanted to enter the "sealed car" to greet Lenin, the latter sent a message to the caller, that he would have nothing to do with traitors and that should he make an attempt to appear in the car, he would be attacked bodily.

All the facts about the much-rumored "sealed car" were contained in a statement which Lenin read at a session of the executive committee of the Petrograd Soviet upon his return to Russia. The Soviet was then largely under Kerensky's influence. Lenin appeared there of his own free will to lodge a complaint against the attacks made upon him for his trip through Germany, and to demand exoneration. He was exonerated, in view of the fact that he had a perfect right to return to his own country and that the Provisional Government and the Allies had refused him passage. A month later, the Menshevist leader Martov and his followers also returned home via Germany.

The following private letter from Lenin to a friend in Stockholm, written two weeks after the Revolution, shows

his desperate impatience to return to Russia and his view of the Provisional Government then in power:

March 30, 1917.

Dear Comrade:

I thank you heartily for the help and the trouble. Of course I cannot make use of the service of people who have any connection with a publication like the "Kolokol" (the organ of the patriotic Socialists). I wired you to-day saying that the only hope of getting away from here was the exchange of the emigrants in Switzerland from the interned Germans. England will never let me pass. . . . The British deported Chernov (later the President of the Constituent Assembly) back to France, although he had all the papers needed for the journey. It is clear that the Russian proletarian revolution has no greater enemy than the British imperialists . . . Without exaggeration, the sole and only hope of our getting home is to send as soon as possible a reliable person to Russia to obtain from the government by pressure on the Soviet the exchange of all the emigrants in Switzerland for the interned Germans. One must act super-energetically, weighing every step, without sparing money on telegrams, gathering documents against Miliukov and Co. who are capable of delaying the matter, of feeding us on promises, duping us. You can well understand what a torture it is to all of us to sit here in such times.

Lenin then goes on to recall the program adopted by the Bolshevist Party in 1915 which "proclaimed in a straight, clear and precise manner how we are to act in the event of a revolution in Russia," and waxes enthusiastic over its principles which were "marvelously, literally confirmed by the revolution." He then elaborates his views as follows:

The cry: "We are now defending the Russian republic, we are waging a defensive war, we must fight for the overthrow of Wilhelm!" is the biggest fraud ever put over on the workingmen. . . . One must explain to the workmen and soldiers in a very clear and popular way, without scientific words, that one must overthrow not only Wilhelm, but also the British and Italian Kings. This is one point. The other and main point is the overthrow of every capitalist government beginning with the Russian, for in no other manner shall we obtain peace. It is possible that we cannot overthrow at present the government of Miliukov and Gutchkov. All right. But that is not an argument in favor of telling lies. One must tell the workers the truth . . . For God's sake, try and send all this over to Petrograd, to the "Pravda" . . .

Conditions in Petrograd are particularly difficult. The republican patriots are making every effort to heap refuse and dirt on our party . . . There must be no understanding with any other party. No shadow of confidence in, or support of, the government of Gutchkov-Miliukov and Co. . . .

Spare no money for connections between Petrograd and Stockholm. I beg you, dear comrade, to wire me about everything. I hope the Swedish friends will help us in this. I shake your hand heartily.

Your LENIN.

Before leaving Switzerland for Russia, Lenin addressed a letter to his Swiss comrades in which he furiously attacked all the European governments, reiterating his opposition to the world war, but announcing that he was no pacifist and no enemy of revolutionary warfare. Perhaps the most striking statement in Lenin's letter is his confession that "socialism cannot be immediately victorious in Russia." In spite of that he proceeded to wreck the Provisional Government and seize power with the misleading cry of an immediate socialist revolution.

April 8, 1917.

Swiss Workers, Comrades!

Leaving Switzerland for Russia to continue the revolutionary-internationalist work in our country, we . . . send you our fraternal greetings and an expression of deep gratitude for the comradeship shown towards the emigrants. . . .

We must say a few words about our understanding of the aims of the Russian Revolution. We consider this all the more necessary as through the medium of the Swiss workmen we can and must address ourselves to the workingmen of Germany, France and Italy, who speak the same language as does the population of Switzerland which until now has enjoyed all the blessings of the world and also a relatively unlimited political freedom. We remain absolutely faithful to the declaration made in the central organ of our party, "The Social Democrat," No. 47, for October 13, 1915. We announced there that if Revolution were to be victorious in Russia and a republican government desiring to continue the imperialistic war, the war for the conquest of Constantinople, Armenia, Galicia, etc., were to take over power, we would be the most determined enemies of such a government, we would be against "the defense of our country" in such a war.

This is exactly what happened. The new government of Russia which carried on negotiations with the brother of Nicholas II for the restoration of the monarchy and in which the chief responsible posts belong to monarchists, Gutchkov and Lvov, is striving to deceive the workmen by the cry: "The Germans must overthrow the Kaiser." (This is right, but why not add: the English, the Italians and the others their kings, and the Russians their monarchists, Lvov and Gutchkov?)

This government tries by that watchword and by its keeping secret the imperialist, predatory treaties concluded by Czarism with France, England, etc. and confirmed by the government of Gutchkov-Miliukov-Kerensky to disguise this imperialist war against Germany as a defensive one, as a right and just war even from the viewpoint of the working class, and to proclaim it as a war of the defence of the republic (which does not yet exist in Russia and which the Lvovs and

Gutchkovs have not yet promised to establish), this war of the defence of the rapacious, imperialist, predatory aims of the English, Russian, and other capitalists."

Lenin then proceeds to outline his program as follows, in reply to the question as to what his party would have done had the revolution put it in power.

I. We would have immediately offered peace to all belligerent nations.

II. We would have published our peace terms, granting immediate freedom to all colonies and all oppressed and incompetent peoples.

III. We would have at once inaugurated and executed to the end the freeing of the nationalities subjected by the Great Russians.

IV. We do not for one moment entertain the thought that these terms would have been accepted either by monarchic Germany or by the republican bourgeoisie of Germany, and not only of Germany, but also by the capitalist governments of England and France. We would have had to wage a revolutionary struggle against the German bourgeoisie, and not the German alone. We would have waged it. We are no pacifists. We are antagonists of an imperialist war, on account of the distribution of the spoils among capitalists, but we always declared the absurdity of the Revolutionary proletariat forswearing revolutionary wars which may prove to be necessary in the interests of socialism.

The task which we outlined in No. 47 of "The Social Democrat" is colossal. It can be achieved only in a long series of great class wars between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. But it was not our impatience nor our desire, but the conditions created by the imperialist war, that have brought humanity into a blind alley and put it before the dilemma: Either millions of people must continue to perish and all European civilization must go under, or the power in all

civilized countries must pass into the hands of the revolutionary proletariat to bring about the socialist revolution.

The great honor of starting the series of revolutions born of the imperialist war fell to the lot of the Russian proletariat. But it is far from us to consider the Russian proletariat as the chosen one of all the countries. We know very well that the Russian proletariat is less organized, less prepared and less enlightened than the workmen of the other countries. . . .

Russia is a country of peasants, one of the most backward in Europe. Socialism cannot be immediately victorious in it, but the peasant character of the country, given the enormous reserves of the land resources of the nobility . . . can give a gigantic impetus to a bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia and make of it a prologue, a step upward, a universal socialist revolution. . . .

When our party proclaimed in November, 1914, the motto of the "transformation of the imperialist war into a civil war" of the oppressed against the oppressors, that watchword was met by the hostility and furious derision of the socialist patriots and the incredulous, sceptical and dubious silence of the Social Democratic middle element. . . .

Now after March, 1917, it is only the blind that do not see that this watchword was right. The transformation of the imperialist war into a civil one is becoming a fact.

N. Lenin.

CHAPTER V

LENIN ARRIVES

A HUGE flashlight was sweeping the square in front of the Finland Station in Petrograd. It revealed military and naval detachments standing ready to salute, army bands, armored cars, and a large crowd of civilians, over all of whom floated scores of red banners bearing striking inscriptions embroidered in gold.

The platform of the station was a riot of streamers and pennants. Several delegations, led by a group carrying wreathes, were lined up along the tracks. A guard of honor was at attention at the entrance to the imperial waiting-room formerly reserved for the Czar's exclusive use.

It was April, 1917. The United States had just declared war against the Central Powers and joined the Allies. The newly-born Russian Republic was in a state of high patriotic fervor. Surely, this great reception at the railway station was in honor of some eminent Allied guest.

But no, the arrival was a certain political exile who had crossed hostile Germany on the way to Russia. The Allies had even tried to bar his passage to Russia, compelling

him to come home with the odious stigma of Prussian friendship on his character.

The train pulled in, to the strains of the Marseillaise, the salute of the soldiers, the tremendous cheers of the multitude. The doors to the imperial waiting-room were flung open. The hustling figure of a devotee was energetically clearing a path, with the cry: "Comrades, make way, please, comrades!"

At the head of a small group of shabbily dressed people, a little man with a withered face, wearing a round hat and holding a luxuriant bouquet of flowers, almost ran into the royal apartment. Reaching the center of the room, where a gloomy-looking person was waiting to welcome him, he stopped suddenly as if he had struck an unexpected obstacle.

The surprised newcomer was Lenin. The gloomy man was Tchekeidze, the president of the patriotic Petrograd Soviet, delegated to welcome the noted revolutionary, Lenin, the irreconcilable internationalist who had spent more than half of his life as an exile abroad, returned to Russia during the honeymoon of the Russian Revolution when nationalism was the dominant note and when the Soviet and the Provisional Government, the laborer and the banker, were fraternizing in the joy and ecstasy of the freshly-won freedom. But the phlegmatic Tchekeidze knew Lenin's views, and he said:

"Comrade Lenin, we welcome you to Russia in the name

of the Soviet of Workmen's and Soldiers' Deputies and of the whole Revolution. . . . But we think that the main task of the revolutionary democracy is the defense of the revolution against external as well as internal dangers . . . We hope you will pursue together with us the same aims."

During the address of welcome Lenin was looking about the room as if the speech did not concern him, according to Sukhanov, the Russian writer, who was present at the reception. Lenin was gazing at the ceiling and walls of the Czar's apartment, examining the faces of the people or arranging the bouquet which harmonized little with his dilapidated appearance. Lenin, the fanatic of socialism, Lenin, the ultra-rationalist who despised illusions and responded to dogmas more readily than to emotions, completely failed to understand the mood of his own country then. He came not with an olive branch but with an axe on his shoulder and began to hack away at once.

"The piratical imperialistic war is the beginning of civil war in all Europe," he replied, turning his back upon the delegation of welcome. "The dawn of the world socialist revolution is breaking . . . All Germany is boiling . . . Any day the collapse of the entire European imperialism may come."

The official reception was ended. But the multitude in the square outside clamored for a speech. Lenin spoke from the top of a waiting automobile. He denounced "the

shameful imperialistic butchery," he called all the warring governments "robbers and impostors," and derided the Provisional Government. The crowds which had been fed on "War to the end!" and "Down with the Kaiser!" cries, were dumbfounded. They had never heard of Lenin and came out to greet him as a revolutionary hero at the instigation of the Bolshevist agitators. Nevertheless, Lenin's trip from the railway station was a triumphal procession, with speeches almost at every street crossing.

The headquarters of the Bolshevist Party were in the palatial house of Kshesinska, the famous dancer and former mistress of the Czar. Lenin was escorted there, and although hoarse, came out on the balcony to address another gathering.

There was one man in the crowd who was curious to know how the populace was taking these startling anti-patriotic speeches. Lenin was shouting: "The defense of the country means the defense of the capitalists."

"Such a bird should be raised on bayonets!" a voice suddenly cried from a group of armed soldiers beneath. "Hey, do you hear what he says! If he were down here we would show him. We would . . . Ach, the Germans fixed him up all right."

But the soldiers were not really in a fighting mood. For had they been keen for action they could have had Lenin when he was in their midst before, and the balcony made quite an easy target for their guns.

A few days later the cry was raised in the press: "Down with Lenin! Back to Germany!" And the most revolutionary element in Russia, the Kronstadt sailors, who had been at the station to welcome him, passed the following resolution:

"Having learned that Mr. Lenin returned to Russia with the permission of His Majesty, the Emperor of Germany and King of Prussia, we express our deepest regret about our participation in the solemn reception accorded him upon his arrival in Petrograd. Had we known how he reached here, he would have heard instead of our enthusiastic cheers, our indignant cry: 'Down! Back to the country through which you came here!' "

Kshesinska's palace was brightly illuminated on the night of Lenin's arrival and profusely decorated with red flags. Everything in the interior was helter skelter. Most of the fine furniture had been stored and plain tables and chairs substituted for it. In the dining-room tea was being served to the guests. At the table Lenin laughed coarsely, as was his habit, and without mincing words attacked the personalities of the men then in power. The tea was hurriedly finished, as in the hall below about two hundred representative Bolsheviks were waiting to meet and have an intimate talk with their leader. After a few remarks by lesser lights, the party chieftains became impatient to hear Lenin.

"And then the glorified grand mogul himself arose,"

writes Sukhanov, the only outsider at that historic conclave. "I will never forget that thunder-like speech which shook and amazed not only me, an accidental heretic, but all the orthodox Bolsheviks. I assert that no one expected anything like it. It seemed as if the elements had been let loose from their depths and the spirit of all-destruction knowing no obstacles, doubts, human difficulties and calculations, was sweeping through the hall of Kshesinska's house, over the heads of the spellbound disciples.

"Lenin is generally a very good speaker, not an orator of the finished, round phrase or the striking figure, or gripping pathos, or clever pun, but an orator of tremendous driving force dissolving complicated problems into their most simple elements.

"A year and a half afterwards, changed from a demagogue and a rebel into a statesman, a defender of statutes, a guardian of his governmental property, Lenin lost his force and individuality as an orator. His speeches were all alike, all harping on the same subject, with trivial variations. But all happened as a result of being in power. In the early days, Lenin could shake one thoroughly. But he moved the entire Bolshevist audience then not only with his eloquence but with the unheard-of contents of his speech. Lenin spoke for about two hours. He sharply attacked the Soviet as belonging to the enemy's camp. This alone was enough to make the most radical hearers dizzy.

"What kind of revolution was it which permitted the capitalists to run the country, which did not publish the secret treaties? Was this freedom when all the printing presses were in the hands of the capitalists? And Lenin added:

" 'When I and my comrades reached Russia, I thought they would take us directly to prison from the station. Apparently, we are far from it. But we must not lose the hope of sharing that fate, of getting there yet.' "

Lenin's speech was an appeal for action, for immediate experimenting with social revolution by means of blind class hatred and fanaticism. Lenin did not show how a backward country like Russia with a small labor class and a vast peasantry could evolve a socialist order. But he did raise some burning issues. His suggestion that the Soviet from a deliberative body should become the government itself was like a bolt from the blue to everybody. His proposal that the workmen should be armed was another bold stroke. Nobody argued against or answered Lenin. The Bolshevik captains themselves were confused and rendered speechless by the program of their leader.

"I went out into the street," narrates Sukhanov, "and I had the feeling of having been beaten on the head with chains all night."

There was chaos in the ranks of Lenin's own party after he had made his position clear. The Bolsheviks were willing to go a long way, but to strike out with their commander for immediate social revolution very few were

prepared to do. Lenin then called together a conference of his old marshals, among whom was also Krassin. Claiming to be hoarse, Lenin did not speak. He did not call his old lieutenants to convert them to his views, but to listen to theirs.

Lenin does not argue, according to Sukhanov. He dislikes to face his critics personally or to answer direct questions. He usually lets others untangle the knots which he ties. His attitude is: "Do you sympathize with me? Do you believe in me? If so, obey and follow. If not, go to the enemy, and you will be branded as a traitor to socialism, a flunky of the capitalists, a lackey of the Black Hundred."

Lenin's veteran marshals spoke their minds freely. Not one of them expressed any sympathy for the views of their master. They were all to a man full of the orthodox socialist prejudices. Socialism was impossible in a peasant country where capitalism was in its infancy. Lenin silently listened to them and let them go. Not one of them was fit for his staff.

Several days later the official Bolshevist newspaper, the "Pravda," published Lenin's famous articles with an editor's note which expressed the paper's disagreement with the fundamental ideas of the old leader. But how did it come to pass that Lenin, isolated and single-handed, succeeded in winning his party over to his side a month later?

"First of all," Sukhanov answers this question, "Lenin

is an extraordinary phenomenon. He is a man of absolutely unusual spiritual force. He is an exceptionally happy combination of a doctrinaire and a popular leader. I would not hesitate to call Lenin a genius, that is, a man with an extremely limited mental horizon, but uncommonly potent and prolific within these limitations. Many elementary truths are foreign to his nature, even in the field of social movements. But within the sphere of the few ideas obsessing him, Lenin showed astounding force, superhuman attack, and his tremendous influence was due to this very characteristic.

"Lenin's victory over the orthodox Bolsheviks was in a great measure the result of the fact that he has been traditionally the sole head of his party since its foundation. The Bolshevist Party was Lenin's creation, and his only. Hundreds of important members came and went, generations of revolutionaries changed, but Lenin unalterably remained at the helm, dividing power with no one.

"For the party now to remain without Lenin was like beheading itself, it meant the wrecking of the party. The very thought of fighting Lenin was so odious to, and so frightened the rank and file, that it was out of the question. Besides, there was no one of any magnitude in the party save Lenin. Trotzky was then an outsider and was bitterly attacked by Lenin.

"Lenin's extremism, his unlimited radicalism, his primitive demagogy, assured his success with the dark

masses who had been accustomed to nothing better than the Czar's whip. These elements also appealed to the ignorant members of his party. They had the alternative of remaining with the orthodox socialists, but without Lenin and the masses, or to be with Lenin and discard the cloudy and theoretical Marxian principles."

When Lenin raised his cry, "All power to the Soviet!" he knew that he meant all power to the party controlling the Soviet, but he did not disclose his true design. The masses and even leading Bolsheviks naïvely believed at first that the Soviets would actually rule in Russia, that the councils of workmen would govern, without suspecting the real nature of Lenin's dictatorship of the proletariat.

Lenin's whole life training was in the art of conspiracy and clandestine activity. In this respect he was a typical product of the underground revolutionary raised by Czarism. He had attained perfection in plotting, and had practiced political duplicity and subterfuge for a quarter of a century. When he proclaimed the popular battle-cry of the immediate convocation of the Constituent Assembly, his own lieutenants did not know that it was but a catchword and that Lenin would never tolerate anything interfering with the dictatorship of his party committee.

"At that time Lenin perhaps laughed up his sleeve," says Sukanov, "at the naïvete of his own people which

enabled him to compel them later to recognize black as white and *vice versa.* A utopian and a visionary, soaring in abstractions, Lenin is yet an excellent practical politician, the former on a big scale, the latter on a small one. To set Europe afire, to start a world social revolution, to plant the banner of socialism in Russia, Lenin could not and will not achieve. But to conquer his own party by throwing over his own theories was a task for which Lenin was admirably fitted and which he accomplished. It was a comparatively small job for him."

In May, 1917, a month after Lenin's arrival in Russia, the first national conference of the Bolshevist Party was held in Kshesinska's palace. One hundred and forty delegates were present. This was the supreme test of Lenin's life. If he won his party, his winning of power was assured, in the impotent conditions of the Provisional Government caught in the strangle-hold of the war. If he lost his party, his cause was doomed.

The conference adopted Lenin's propositions in their entirety. What a few weeks before seemed delirious nonsense even to the Bolshevist old guard, was now the party platform. Some of the veterans resigned, but most of them accepted the new commandments.

Thus did Lenin achieve his greatest and most fundamental victory on the road to his ultimate triumph.

CHAPTER VI

THE THREE TEMPTATIONS

THE story of Lenin's rise to the dictatorship of Russia is the story of a cool, calculating and relentless arch-conspirator executing his plans with the utmost craftsmanship and care.

"Revolution is an art," wrote the apostle of Bolshevism in 1917, recalling the words of his master, Karl Marx, the founder of modern socialism. And he proceeded to coach himself in the art of revolution-making to a degree approaching perfection.

Three times after his return from Switzerland was Lenin tempted to lead a revolt against the Provisional Government and seize power. Three times did Lenin withstand the temptation, learning something each time and postponing his stroke until sure of success. The fourth time he struck out and captured power to hold it.

The first occasion was on the memorable May 4, 1917. That day the workers of Petrograd for the first time poured out into the streets to demonstrate against the government which deposed the Czar. The Foreign Minister of that government, Paul Miliukov, had sent a note to the Allies assuring them that revolutionary Russia would

continue the war against the Central Powers, pursuing the same aims as the dethroned Czar. The masses demanded the resignation of Miliukov and threatened the Provisional Government. Only the timely intervention of the patriotic Soviet averted a bloody clash.

Lenin later said that the events of that day opened his eyes to the real character of a popular uprising. He and his lieutenants were not active in the workers' demonstrations. Lenin purposely refrained then from taking up their battle-cry for democratic peace terms, because it was the cry of the non-Bolshevist Soviet.

Lenin realized at once that if he should head the rebellious masses, it might lead to the overthrow of the Provisional Government and the establishment of the Soviet authority—but of the non-Bolshevist patriotic Soviet in which Lenin's disciples were then a mere handful! And that would have been ruinous to his plans.

Lenin therefore stood aside during the tumultuous hours, observing and acquiring knowledge. He knew that the longer the government of Miliukov and Kerensky stayed in power, the deeper would the popular discontent grow, the more rapid and powerful would the influence of the Bolshevist party become.

Lenin was not and never became interested in the Soviet principle of government, and even urged that the motto of the Bolsheviks should openly declare their aim to be the seizure of exclusive power on behalf of the proletariat.

He was interested in the establishment of a Bolshevist dictatorship. And this could be achieved only by means of a large and strong organization which was then but in the process of early development. The masses were quite ready to force the Provisional Government to surrender its sovereign authority to the Soviet, but they did not think of it in Lenin's terms of an armed revolt but as a peaceful solution of a government crisis. "Only a small part of the proletariat and army," writes N. Podvoisky, one of Lenin's closest collaborators in those days, "dimly, rather instinctively than intelligently, felt that power does not pass from one hand to another, and that one has to take it 'by force of arms' as Lenin formulated it." To hand over the power to the scrambled collection of phrase-mongers then sitting in the Soviet was indeed far from Lenin's intentions. He preferred to work and spread his gospel outside the Soviet, while the latter was losing the confidence of the masses by defending the unpopular Provisional Government.

Lenin alone understood the psychology of the downtrodden masses of Russia who had suddenly become free and powerful. He saw that they were bursting with impatience to do something with their freedom and power. The dark and oppressed people wanted light and joy after the long nightmare. The peasants wanted to quench their ancient thirst for the land, the workers wanted better living quarters, shorter working hours, higher wages, plenty

of good food, educational and recreational opportunities for their children. All longed for peace. But the Provisional Government, born of the Czarist Duma, told them to fight for Constantinople, for Galicia, for Armenia. And their own Soviet through Kerensky urged a holy crusade against the Kaiser. The masses sought for other outlets for their instinctively growing dissatisfaction. These outlets Lenin provided. His partisans were in the factories and barracks spreading their propaganda directly in the midst of the people and not from the forum of the Soviet. The Bolshevist Party was rapidly absorbing all the stifled discontent of the nation.

Lenin himself was never to be found in the lobbies or at the sessions of the Soviet like the other public men. He was somewhere "underground," in his general headquarters, quietly mapping out and conducting his campaign, while the other celebrities talked. "Lenin behaved like a true aristocrat in those days," says Sukhanov. When he did come out to address a convention or conference, he always asked for the special privilege of speaking at once, outside of the regular roster of speakers, a privilege accorded only to a minister or distinguished visitor. It was not in Lenin's code to await his turn. Once he failed to get the privilege, he disappeared from the meeting without speaking at all.

One day Lenin addressed the Soviet of Soldiers' Deputies, considered the life-guard of the Provisional Govern-

ment. His failure there was regarded as certain by his enemies. But the soldiers' delegates listened with the keenest interest to the talk of the man who was rumored to be a traitor.

In the middle of the speech, the Chairman announced that Lenin's time was up. But the audience wanted the speaker to go on. Lenin was wiping the perspiration from his bald crown with his handkerchief while the question was being decided whether he should go on or not. The body overruled the chairman, and Kerensky's "own" voted to hear Lenin.

Lenin himself addressed very few factory meetings. Once he agreed to appear at a large Petrograd plant where, of the twenty thousand men employed on war work, only a handful were Bolsheviks. Lenin was generally spoken of by the workmen as a spy whom the Kaiser paid a handsome sum varying from four to forty million marks. "The workingmen's committee," related one of the organizers of the meeting, "would not let him enter the factory grounds. The meeting was held outside the limits of the plant. It was on a Sunday. I can see him as if it were now, standing, in his grey suit, without a hat, his bald head shining in the sun, on the top of a large two-wheeled cart. He spoke at length and made a deep impression on the workingpeople. I saw women weep during his speech. When the turn came to ask questions, somebody passed a note to him which read: 'Well, brother, how

much gold did you bring with you from Germany?' Lenin glanced at it and handed it to the chairman to read it aloud. 'Shame! Don't answer!' cried the audience."

Sometimes Lenin braved greater dangers than being denounced as a German spy when appearing in public. It is often said that had Lenin been killed in the summer of 1917, there would have been no Soviet Revolution. But this idea was not foreign to certain individuals and groups in Russia at that time. Thus, for instance, Lenin received among others of a similar nature the following communication in May, 1917:

> The League to Combat Bolshevism and Anarchy.
>
> Mr. Ulianov (Lenin):
>
> The League to Combat Bolshevism and Anarchy, sympathizing to the fullest extent with the conquests of liberty and having for its aim the support of the Provisional Government, upon consideration of the case of Lenin (Ulianov) at its meeting of May 4, and of the newspaper "Pravda," has arrived at the conclusion that Lenin and the newspaper "Pravda" are aiming to create anarchy in Russia and are striving to provoke civil war in Russia. Having found the guilt of Lenin and the newspaper "Pravda" fully established by the data attached to the case and by the material collected by the members of the League, and having heard the opinions of those present, the League has resolved by a majority vote:
>
> 1. To deprive Ulianov, who has appropriated the name of Lenin, of his life.
> 2. To blow up the printing office of the "Pravda."
> 3. This sentence to be carried into effect in the event Lenin does not leave the country within two weeks and the newspaper "Pravda" does not cease publication within

the same period of time. The execution of the sentence to be carried out by members of the league.

The President,
BOGDANOV.

The Secretary,
YAZIKOVA.

Undeterred by threats and vilification, Lenin continued his work in the depths of his organization, building rock by rock the foundation of his future edifice. He created a military section in the Bolshevist Party and put at its head Podvoisky, Krilenko and Nevsky. Its purpose was to organize a Red Guard among the workers of Petrograd and to win the soldiers over to the Bolshevist cause. This section at first numbered but two hundred men, all highly disciplined fanatics of Bolshevism, forming the nucleus of the subsequent Red Army. It worked in flying columns and recognized no barriers. Frequently kept out of the barracks, sometimes arrested and threatened with shooting, these pioneers of Lenin's had orders to win at all costs. By obstinacy, trickery or surprise attack they would break through the rows of sentinels and the walls of distrust, and penetrate into the midst of the barracks where they scattered and conducted their propaganda intensively and effectively. In every regiment a small group of Bolsheviks was organized, comprising the most active and wide-awake element of the unit, whereas the majority of its members remained passive and apathetic. In this way most of the

regiments of Petrograd were swayed soon in favor of Lenin by energetic minority groups.

Some weeks later a national conference of the Bolshevist military organizations was convoked. One hundred and sixty delegates from five hundred regiments took part in it, representing 26,000 organized Bolshevist soldiers. Previous to that it had been discovered at a conference of delegates from all the factories of Petrograd that 335 men out of a total of 421 present were Bolsheviks. In the municipal elections in the capital held a little later the party of the "German agent" Lenin received 150,000 votes, or as many as all the non-Socialist parties together. All the supplementary elections to the Soviet were bringing in Bolsheviks, so that a third of the Workmen's Deputies soon appeared to be adherents of Lenin. The First Machine Gun Regiment walked out all ready for action and forcibly released its Bolshevist Commander when the latter was accidentally arrested.

But nobody paid any attention to these symptoms of the popular discontent so admirably exploited by the hidden master-mind. Instead, the eyes of Europe and America were spellbound by the foam of the Russian Revolution. At this time clerks, students, tradespeople and hysterical women were showering flowers on Kerensky's automobile and the world was echoing with the triumphs of the hero of the day.

In June a congress of Soviets was held in Petrograd.

Defenders of the Kerensky Coalition Government declared that there was no party or element in Russia capable of taking over the government. Here Lenin emerged from the shadows and made a startling announcement.

"There *is* a party in Russia willing to take over the government," he challenged. "We are ready to assume full power at any moment." And a few days later the field-marshal of the subversive forces decided to review his army and see if the moment for attack had come.

Now came Lenin's second temptation to revolution. June 23 was the date set by the Bolshevist general staff for the first public mobilization of its forces. Posters all over the city called the workers and soldiers of the capital to demonstrate against the counter-revolution, against the war, against the secret treaties and for a democratic universal peace. There was great excitement at the session of the Congress of Soviets when it became known in the evening of Saturday, June 22, that the factories and barracks of Petrograd were preparing for a general uprising. It was suddenly discovered that the leading Bolshevist deputies were absent from the session.

The Congress demanded the suspension of the demonstration, threatening otherwise to expel the Bolshevist faction from the Soviets. It took extraordinary measures to avert the walk-out, despatching its best speakers to keep the workers and soldiers from obeying the Bolshevist call and proclaiming a general demonstration of its own for the

following week in support of the Soviet and Provisional Government. At the same time Lenin and his staff were holding an all-night sitting, Lenin had not intended this to be a direct attempt to seize power. It was more in the nature of a trial balloon, and if conditions were favorable, he was not averse to striking at the government. But the action of the Soviet demanded an immediate decision. Kamenev, Zinoviev and Nogin led the opposition to the demonstration, regarding it as calamitous for their party to be outlawed by the Soviet. Late in the night Lenin decided to call off the demonstration and to participate in the general walk-out ordered by the Soviet. The latter occurred on July 1, at the very time Kerensky was starting his ill-fated offensive on the front, and was a great Bolshevist triumph, as the overwhelming majority of the marchers followed Bolshevist banners calling for peace and denouncing the Provisional Government.

A couple of hours after the demonstration there met in closed session at Lenin's apartment the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party. Said the leader of the military section, Podvoisky, to Lenin:

"What next? We are at a turn of events which will undoubtedly force us to decisive steps. After the demonstration of their will, the masses are certain to clamor for action."

"The masses should bury the illusory hope," replied the master to his disciple, "of a peaceful transition of power

to the Soviet, and learn that power has to be captured by force. The next developments will be the following: the bourgeoisie, having perceived the strength of our organization and the colossal speed at which it is winning over the masses, will not allow us to gain them completely and will resort to every possible means to provoke them prematurely in order to justify repressive measures which would shatter and crush us. Therefore, we must devote ourselves to organization work in the intensest possible manner, under the sign of the impossibility of gaining power by peaceful methods. It is necessary to point out to the workingmen that the organization of their forces has for its ultimate goal a revolt, if not in the next days or weeks, then at least in the nearest future."

Lenin's third temptation to seize power was the greatest of them all. As an experiment in revolution, as a dress rehearsal of the final event, it came nearest to the master stroke of the following November. The disastrous ending of Kerensky's offensive on the front gave rise to soldiers' demonstrations in Petrograd on July 16. The First Machine Gun Regiment marched to Kshesinska's palace, the Bolshevist headquarters, demanding action against the Provisional Government and declaring its intention to move on the Tauride Palace, the home of the Duma and the Soviet. Followed by grenadier units and by masses of Red Guards, it proceeded to carry out its intention. The streets and grounds surrounding the Duma became

an armed camp. The whole life of the capital was paralyzed. Motor lorries packed with soldiers and Red Guards raced about the streets. The military section of the Bolshevist Party favored an immediate revolt. But Lenin was away in Finland. A hurry call was sent for him and the following morning he was on the spot. Golden-tongued Lunacharsky was despatched to Kronstadt to bring the Bolshevist élite troops to Petrograd.

The following day, July 17, the riots were renewed. The masses were in an ugly mood and threatened not only the Provisional Government but even the Soviet leaders. Chernov, one of the heads of the Socialist-Revolutionists and later the President of the Constituent Assembly, had been arrested by the mob and saved only through the interference of Trotzky. While Lenin arrived from Finland, forty boats from Kronstadt landed twenty thousand armed sailors and workmen in Petrograd. Thirty thousand men from the Putillov works advanced upon the center of the capital.

In the lunch-room of the Tauride Palace, where the Duma and the Soviet were housed, Lenin, Zinoviev and Trotzky held a little conference. Laughing, Lenin remarked:

"And should we not attempt it now?" But he added, almost immediately:

"No, it is too early yet, it would end in failure, for the front is not with us, and Kerensky will bring the army and massacre all the workmen."

Kerensky was then at the front where his popularity was not yet wholly undermined, and could probably have crushed the revolt with a few divisions from the fighting line. The Provisional Government was beginning to show fight, but the rash and military element among the Bolshevist leaders was for going through with the battle. Lenin, however, displayed more caution than recklessness, although in the course of the day the temptations were indeed supreme. When the Kronstadt sailors surrounded Kshesinska's palace and demanded a speech from Lenin, it was with great difficulty that the Bolshevist leader held his ground. In spite of the pleadings of Podvoisky and a delegation of sailors, he refused to speak, Lunacharsky tried to appease the turbulent hosts with his eloquence, but the men cried for "action, not words!"

Lenin knew that he could have been in power on July 17, but he was not quite certain of retaining it. The decision of the Bolshevist Central Committee was therefore against an attempt to overthrow then the Provisional Government. An earlier proclamation to the contrary which was to appear in the "Pravda" that morning had been cut out from the matrix at the last moment and the Bolshevist organ appeared with a blank space on its front page. The marchers paraded through the main streets and engaged in numerous conflicts, suffering defeat and many casualties at the hands of the regular troops loyal to the government. The latter even brought up artillery. During the day the Soviet parleyed with Lenin. Towards

evening the Bolshevist order was, "The workmen to the factories, the soldiers to the barracks!" In the night the Provisional Government was the master of the situation. It was out to crush Bolshevism. Trotzky, Kamenev, Lunacharsky, Kollontai, Raskolnikov, Krilenko, Rochal, and other prominent leaders were arrested in the course of the following days. The Bolshevist headquarters at Kshesinska's palace were stormed, but Podvoisky managed to slip away with the records of the military organization. The offices of the "Pravda" had been sacked. Thus ended Lenin's third temptation. It looked like a severe defeat.

In the morning Petrograd was staggered by the publication of a set of "documents" purporting to prove that Lenin was an agent of the German General Staff, who was seeking to overthrow the Provisional Government on German money. Zinoviev appeared at the Soviet and demanded in the name of Lenin the most resolute inquiry into the charges and the rehabilitation of Lenin. But he was received with little sympathy. Kerensky arrived from the front, and the Provisional Government decided to arrest Lenin and Zinoviev and to disband the rebellious units.

At two o'clock in the morning the police arrived at Lenin's quarters to arrest him, but Lenin was gone. He had disappeared. This fact caused a terrific sensation. Nobody, not even his sympathizers, expected it. It clinched his guilt. Even his friends thought Lenin's

escape indefensible from moral and political viewpoints. Lenin should have gone to prison and faced a trial.

While Lenin was being hunted by hundreds of sleuths, there met on July 18 in a small room of the Viborg quarter of Petrograd, the citadel of Bolshevism, the so-called limited central committee of the Bolshevist Party to consider the situation arising out of the defeat of the previous day. There were present Lenin, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin and Podvoisky. Briefly and incisively Lenin reviewed the sudden crisis of his party and forecast the events of the future. He pointed out that the acid test of the vitality of the party had come, that all its achievements were temporarily wrecked, that its enemies would strangle it now at every turn in an effort to destroy it altogether, that its activities would have to be transferred "underground," but that the defeated proletariat would now give up the illusion of gaining power by peaceful means. The future of the revolution, said Lenin, will depend on the extent and quality of the organization work in the newly created, very difficult conditions, and only through heroic efforts could the party re-form its ranks.

"Having defeated the proletariat," he continued, "the big bourgeoisie will try to get rid of the small middle-class and the so-called radical parties which favored agreement with it. It will strive to develop its victory over the workers into a complete triumph of its power. The next

government crisis will follow soon, giving an opportunity to the masses to convince themselves that only the proletariat and our party are the true champions of revolutionary ideals and can lead to the overthrow of the power of capitalism. The next government crisis will be painful to the petty middle-class as well, and will drive it to the recognition of the proletariat's hegemony over the Revolution and of our party's leadership of it, thereby allowing the workers to seize power and through their dictatorship establish the republic of the workers and peasants. The conduct of the Soviet under the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists makes it necessary to substitute for the old battle-cry, 'All power to the Soviets!' the watchwords, 'All power to Soviets of genuine revolutionary workers!' and 'All power to the working class led by its revolutionary party, the Bolsheviks-Communists!' "

This is not the place to trace in the subsequent acute crisis of the Provisional Government and the Kornilov affair the extent to which Lenin's analysis was justified by events. Lenin realized that conditions were in his favor, in spite of the temporary setback. When it was suggested to him that the Bolshevist organizations should form self-defense corps to resist the Provisional Government's repressive measures, he pointed out that only the intrinsic popularity of the Bolshevist program could save the party, and that the dark masses would finally discern that the Government was blaming the Bolsheviks for all the coun-

try's troubles, whereas the real reason for the latter was the bitterness due to the war and the Government's failure to carry out the promises of the Revolution. He feared that too much arming would create popular suspicion against the Bolsheviks as a group desirous to usurp power and use it against the masses.

The reorganization work was started by the Bolshevist remnants at once. The military section was reconstituted and after counting up its losses, mapped out its new campaign. An "underground" printing press which worked in the days of Czarism was restored to its former uses, and overcoming enormous difficulties, the military section issued from the unknown depths a newspaper called "The Soldier and Workman." Podvoisky narrates that when the first issue of that paper was brought to Lenin, he was as happy and jubilant as a child who is presented with a toy.

It was at that limited conference of July 18 that the decision was reached that Lenin and Zinoviev should not surrender themselves to the Provisional Government but disappear "underground" to conduct the activities of the party. It was considered that the effect on the outside world of this act would at first be damaging to the Bolshevist cause, but not so much as the demoralization that would ensue within the party if Lenin were to be in prison.

"The disappearance of the Bolshevist shepherd in these

circumstances," writes Sukhanov, himself Internationalist-Menshevik, "was a cruel blow to his sheep. The masses that Lenin had mobilized were left to carry the full onus and responsibility for the outbreaks while the 'real culprit' deserted his army and his comrades, and sought personal safety through escape! Why was this necessary? Did anything threaten the life and health of the Bolshevist leader? It was ridiculous to speak of it in the summer of 1917, when lynching, capital punishment or penal servitude were out of the question. However unjust the trial might have been, nothing worse could have befallen Lenin than a prison sentence.

"Of course, Lenin might have valued not his life or health but the freedom of his political activity. But was he more limited in this regard in the prison of that period than when living 'underground'? Lenin could have written his newspaper articles in prison as well. Whereas, from the political standpoint, the effect of Lenin's imprisonment would have been of colossal positive importance to him, his escape was important only in a negative sense."

Lenin's associates who were arrested actually fared well in Kerensky's prisons. They spent a few weeks there, continuing to contribute their articles to the party publications, while they were passed off for martyrs among the masses.

"But there was another circumstance which strength-

ened the odium of Lenin's escape a thousand-fold," continues Sukhanov. "In addition to being accused of conspiring to revolt, he was charged with a monstrous lie which millions believed. He was accused of a base and shameful crime—serving for money the German General Staff. Simply to ignore this charge was impossible. And he did not ignore it. He sent Zinoviev to the Soviet to defend his honor and party. . . . But Lenin disappeared with such a charge on his head. It was something altogether new, unprecedented, incomprehensible. Any other mortal would have demanded a trial in the most unfavorable conditions, and would have endeavored personally to rehabilitate himself. But Lenin invited somebody else to do it and himself sought refuge in escape.

"This fact of Lenin's disappearance I consider as striking at the very heart of the personality of the Bolshevist leader and subsequent ruler of Russia. No one in the world except Lenin could have acted in such a manner. It seemed to this Napoleon-Machiavelli that the interest of his party, his cause, would be benefited by his escape from his accusers, giving no answer to the country. And he smashed through all objections, carrying out his intention cynically and unswervingly."

It is but just to give here Lenin's side of this memorable incident, as expressed by Zinoviev in a speech made after the attempt on Lenin's life in 1918. Zinoviev said:

"We disappeared, but previously we had firmly de-

cided to go and surrender ourselves, so strong was our confidence in the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries. But our party did not allow us to carry out our intention. A week later Lenin said to me:

" 'How could we have been so stupid as to think for one moment of trusting that gang by surrendering ourselves?' "

A price was put on Lenin's head and the whole country seemed to be on the lookout for the elusive fugitive, but no trace of him could be found.

Where did Lenin go?

CHAPTER VII

THE MYSTERY MAN

ON Sunday, July 22, 1917, the Novoderevenski Boulevard in Petrograd was crowded with promenaders. They talked of the only topic then discussed in Russia, the sensational disappearance of Lenin and Zinoviev. Nobody noticed four individuals walking in the same direction at a considerable distance from each other. Two of these were in fact the notorious Lenin and Zinoviev themselves. The other two were "underground" men in the Bolshevist Party. They were Stalin and Alliluev, and were charged with the task of protecting the two leaders.

Under the trees near the Primorskaya Railroad Station they stopped and approached a man who was apparently waiting for them there. This man was a peasant by the name of Emelianov who would have otherwise escaped mention in history had he not been entrusted with the mission of taking the two Bolshevist generals off to his village and hiding them there.

The greatest danger of the enterprise, according to Emelianov, was in passing through the crowded station and boarding the train without arousing the suspicions of

the police. But this was accomplished successfully. At a small station called Razliv the three men alighted. Emelianov led his two companions to his cabin, where Mrs. Emelianov proceeded to give the two eminent comrades a close hair-cut and otherwise to transform their appearance. Then they were taken up to their quarters in the loft of a dilapidated barn.

The barn, in addition to its supply of hay, had another advantage. Its roof was cracked and therefore made the loft a splendid observation post. One had to be careful even in this village, for there were all kinds of summer campers roaming in the neighborhood. And summer campers are notoriously bourgeois. It is true the city newspapers announced that Lenin and his companion as "German spies" had fled back to Germany. But then considering the high reward promised for the capture of Lenin, some of the campers might have become interested in any suspicious looking characters infesting this locality.

Therefore, when a party messenger arrived from Petrograd at the farm-house to call upon the two residents of the barn, Emelianov would engage him in conversation while Lenin and Zinoviev peeped through the cracks to see if the man was a genuine comrade and not a disguised police agent. Usually, the caller would be left to enjoy the surrounding landscape, while the owner of the farm climbed to the high seat of Lenin and Zinoviev to report

and find out if the arrival could be admitted. More than once there were some anxious moments on such occasions, but the sinister police of the Socialist Kerensky were after all not as efficient as the Communist "Tcheka" which Lenin and Zinoviev were yet to create.

However, the constant anxiety of being discovered by one of the many rovers in the village compelled Lenin to search a safer habitation. It was the hay-gathering season. Some miles from the village, across the stream Razliv, were wide hayfields. Lenin and his companion were disguised as farm-hands and moved to the field, where no campers passed. With the help of Emelianov, they soon improvised a hut of branches and hay. Next to the hut was erected the "kitchen," consisting of a tin kettle suspended from forked sticks over a small fireplace. Here Lenin boiled tea and cooked potatoes.

The future ruler of Soviet Russia and the future head of the Third Internationale led a strenuous life. They pitched hay, and it appears that Lenin became very adept at the work and could pile up a hay-stack as well as any farm-hand. In the hot hours the two arch-Bolsheviks could have been found more than once bathing nude in the stream. At twilight they often turned fishermen. Emelianov's children would drag the net into the water up to their knees. The catch was always good. Supper consisting of fish and tea would then be prepared over the campfire, amidst the darkness and silence broken only by

the twittering of birds and the chirping of grasshoppers. After the meal Lenin would frequently amuse his audience by telling funny stories.

In this idyllic environment, disturbed only by the pestiferous mosquitoes, Lenin did not neglect his main work. Indeed, the mysterious hut soon became the general headquarters of the maturing Soviet revolution. Secret messengers constantly came and went. The system of communication was very intricate but it worked perfectly. The couriers from Petrograd never came directly to Razliv, but usually started out in the opposite direction, describing a huge circle and changing trains and vehicles many times before they got there. They would arrive in Emelianov's house at night, and from there be guided to the camp of Lenin. Sometimes important all-night conferences took place in the hayfield.

Lenin would go over all the information, studying the relative strength of the various parties and elements and mapping out his plans for the future great revolt. Lenin's "cabinet" was in a secluded corner behind a shrub of willows. Here he regularly wrote his articles appearing in the Bolshevist press. The hostile papers were furious. Lenin especially enjoyed the stories they published of his fleeing from Russia on a German submarine or airplane. He would read them with evident pleasure, chuckling and calling the editors "those confounded jesters."

The question that Lenin and Zinoviev frequently discussed in those days was: "Shall we seize power and shall we be capable of holding it?" Here Lenin for the first time decided it in the affirmative.

One day the conspirators had a narrow escape. Zinoviev, armed with a shotgun, went into the neighboring woods to look for game. But he encountered the forester who took his gun away and began to make notes and examine him.

"Who are you? Where do you come from?" asked the forester.

But Zinoviev, feigning to be dumb, did not reply. The guardian of the law took the gun away from him and let him go. Later Emelianov, wanting to make sure the forester did not have any suspicions, went to talk to him. It appeared he had taken Zinoviev for a Finnish farmhand who did not know any Russian.

August was passing and autumn was rapidly approaching. It was getting cold, rainy and windy. Lenin shivered in the hut. One day a big shower soaked the hut and its inmates. Lenin and Zinoviev sought shelter in a haystack where they spent some wretched nights, while their accomplices in Petrograd were making arrangements for new quarters.

Finally a man came down from the capital to take charge of the transfer. Emelianov, who had worked at the Sestrorietsk munition factory, obtained two passes to

go to Finland, such as were granted ordinarily by the administration of the factory to its workers. It was necessary to attach photographs to the passes. Dressed in wigs, Lenin and Zinoviev were photographed, and the party started out at night on foot to walk to the station Dibuni. It had been decided that it would be best to proceed to Finland via Petrograd.

At Dibuni the agents of the secret service went through all trains going to and from Petrograd. Emelianov undertook before the arrival of the train to divert the attention of the agents so as to prevent an examination of Lenin. He purposely gave false and provocative answers to questions put to him. Here is his account of this tense incident:

"Knowing that Lenin might have been arrested by those rascals, I resolved to detain them. In this I succeeded. An officer asked me:

" 'Who are you?' I gave a false name. 'I am a workman of the Sestrorietsk factory, Ivanov.' He asked: "Do you know who Grech is in the factory?'

" 'The doctor,' I answered, 'and it would be hard to find a bigger scoundrel than he.' He got furious. 'Do you know who I am? I am his nephew.'

"I saw that my design was working out. There were already about twenty of them staring at me. 'Do you know who the Bolsheviks are?'—'Yes, I hear they are fine people.'

LENIN'S FORGED PASSPORT

Lenin was disguised and photographed for this passport issued during Kerensky's rule. It bears the name of Konstantin Petrovitch Ivanov, and was issued by the Sestrorietsk Factory. It was valid until January 1, 1918, but was not used to the limit, for Lenin became the head of the government seven weeks before the passport expired.

" 'And you, aren't you a Bolshevik?'

" 'No.'

" 'Look out, for we shoot every one of them.'

" 'Go ahead, shoot me, you are probably a good hand at it!' "

The officers could hardly restrain their fury. While Emelianov was being arrested, keeping the secret service men busy, the train to Petrograd arrived and Lenin and his companions boarded it and departed escaping examination, but leaving Emelianov behind.

In the suburb of Viborg, the factory district of Petrograd, a room had been reserved at the apartment of one Emil Kalske, a Finnish Bolshevist workingman, for Lenin and Zinoviev. In the dead of the night the two fugitives crept into the apartment and, exhausted, went to sleep.

"Opening the door of the room in the morning," tells Kalske, "I saw two comrades lying on the bare floor, the one on the right was cleanly shaven and wore a wig, the other was a broad-faced man, with short moustache and a recent growth of beard on the chin and cheeks, resembling a Mohammedan. When my friend told me that on the right was Zinoviev and on the left Lenin, I could not believe it."

In this apartment Zinoviev remained for weeks, while Lenin, dressed as a fireman, was taken aboard a locomotive run by a Bolshevist engineer, and smuggled out to Finland.

In Helsingfors, the capital of Finland, the Governor General was an extreme conservative but the chief of police, elected by the people after the overthrow of the Czar, was a Bolshevik by the name of Gustav Rovio, although this fact was not then publicly known. Shotman, who was charged by the Bolshevist Party with the hiding of Lenin, chose the home of the chief of police as the safest refuge for Lenin.

"I had an apartment of one room and a kitchen," writes the ex-chief of police of Helsingfors. "As my wife was in the country and nobody ever visited me, we found it safest and most convenient to quarter Lenin in my place. Shotman even joked:

" 'I will return to Petrograd and tell our people that I left Lenin with the Helsingfors chief of police. They certainly will be shocked to hear it, and will have a good laugh when I tell them all about it. And I am confident that not a single devil of Kerensky's will ever think of looking into your home.' "

It was agreed that Lenin would arrive in a couple of days. At 11 o'clock in the evening, Rovio was waiting in the square in front of the house at an agreed place for two men. A few minutes later they came. One of them, a deputy of the Finnish Diet and old friend, shook hands with Rovio. But let Rovio himself continue:

" 'Comrade Rovio?' the other comrade asked quietly in Russian, stretching his hand out to me. This was

Lenin, whom I now saw for the first time. Looking about cautiously and noticing no one on the street, we went in and climbed to the fifth floor, to my rooms. I was a bit excited, suddenly becoming the host of Lenin. Of course, I did not even suspect then that four months later he would be the head of a great power, but reading the newspapers and seeing how much attention they gave to Lenin's 'espionage,' I could not help feeling a certain agitation, especially since I was almost daily in touch with Kerensky's secret service and sometimes with the Governor General of Finland.

"I prepared tea and offered it to my 'boarder.' Lenin inquired how one could get all the Russian newspapers. I replied that the surest way to procure them was to meet the evening train from Petrograd at the station.

" 'You will have to go daily to the station to get the newspapers for me,' Lenin began to instruct me. 'Then you will have to arrange the transmission of letters through our own mail, for we cannot trust the government post.'

"I promised to carry out exactly all his requests, informing Lenin that I had a reliable postman in the mail car on the Petrograd-Helsingfors train. When Lenin learned everything that he needed, he told me to go to sleep and himself sat down to work. In spite of the fact that it was late and he had just arrived in new quarters, he calmly worked away. I don't know how long he wrote. I awoke about nine and looked at the table. There was

a writing-book bearing the title, *The State and Revolution.* Lenin was asleep when I went away.

"When I returned home at four, Lenin asked me to buy eggs, butter and other things for him. I offered to bring him dinners from the cooperative restaurant where I dined, but he categorically refused, explaining that he could boil his tea and eggs on the gas burner, and more than that he did not need.

" 'The main things,' he said, 'are the newspapers. Don't neglect that.' I went to the station and brought a batch of them with me. This I did every evening. He would read them immediately, then write his articles at night, and in the morning gave them to me to transmit to Petrograd. During the day he prepared his own food.

"Comrade Manner was the President of the Diet. One fine day we drove to his house with Lenin. The conversation was carried on partly in Russian and partly in German, and I remember only that when the question of anti-militarism was discussed, Lenin observed that anti-militarism was a disease of small countries, which is natural, as the burden of militarism is too heavy for them. But from the viewpoint of the class struggle, anti-militarism is wrong. The workmen must enter the army and get military training, and then seize the command of the army, for without an army revolution is impossible."

In September Lenin was getting impatient at the slow pace of his associates in Petrograd. "It is necessary to

seize power as soon as possible," he wrote, "otherwise it will be too late." After the Petrograd and Moscow Soviets turned Bolshevik, he urged immediate revolt. "History will never forgive us," he wrote, "if we do not take power now. . . . To wait for a formal majority is naïve, no revolution ever waits for this. . . . We will come out victorious without a doubt."

During the session of the famous Democratic Congress, representing all the parties, called together to save the situation of the Kerensky government, Lenin wrote:

"Enough of dragging through this mire. The Alexandrinka must be surrounded with troops, the whole rotten gang dispersed, and power seized."

But the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party did not agree with Lenin's views. Lenin decided in October that there was no time to be wasted. He had to go personally to Petrograd and take the initiative on the spot. One day he announced to Rovio he was leaving, and asked for a passport, a wig, and dye for his eyebrows. Rovio discovered in the local newspaper the advertisement of a wig-maker.

"Early the following morning we went to the wig-maker's shop, walking through side-streets," Rovio describes this amusing episode. "The wig-maker was an old Petrograd specialist who had worked for the artists of the grand opera. He told us how he made princes, generals and aristocratic ladies young. When Lenin asked

him how long it would take to make a wig, he answered not less than two weeks. And Lenin wanted to leave in a day or two."

"Perhaps you have some ready-made wigs?" asked Lenin. The proprietor inquired what color he preferred. Lenin said he wanted a grey wig, so as to make him look about sixty. The poor wig-maker was bewildered and shocked. He had never had a customer who wanted to look older.

"What?" he cried. "You are young yet, one could hardly give you more than forty. What do you want to look old for?" And he tried in vain to persuade his queer customer that he could make him look like a dashing cavalier.

Lenin began to examine the cases and found a grey wig in one of them. Unwillingly the proprietor fitted it on Lenin's head. The wig required some repairs, but was all ready the following day. Lenin was learning to wear the wig naturally, asking Rovio frequently:

"Now, is it noticeable that I wear a wig?"

Provided with a Finnish passport, his eyebrows dyed grey, Lenin proceeded to the border and later to Petrograd. The Helsingfors wig-maker is probably still telling his customers of the freakish gentleman who insisted looking so many years older than he really was.

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONSPIRACY

AND it came to pass that the shepherd moved far ahead of his flock, and the laboring flock had difficulty in following its leader. Lenin, the high priest of discipline, which is the corner-stone of the Bolshevist organization, broke his own commandments at the supreme moment and terrified his own disciples. Anathema awaited, according to the gospel of St. Lenin, any member of the Bolshevist order who broke the rules and dared to take independent action. But what punishment was to be visited upon the seditious apostle himself?

Consternation was on the faces of the several members of the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party assembled to consider an irksome message from their chief. Everything had been running smoothly. "We were holding a session and our tactics seemed quite clear, i.e., the development of our agitational propaganda with a view towards an armed revolt which was expected to break out any day," Bukharin tells of that meeting. Has it not been proved that revolutions break out of themselves! One needs only to agitate. Were they not doing their utmost in the way of propaganda? What else could one expect

of them? But the master was not satisfied. To him revolution was more than propaganda. It was an art. It was war. It required preparation and action of a different kind.

When Bukharin entered the room where his colleagues were in session, Miliutin met him with the words:

"You know, Comrade Bukharin, we have received a little letter here." It was from Lenin.

"You will be traitors and scoundrels if you do not send out the entire membership of the Bolshevik delegation to the factories and shops, and if you do not surround the Democratic Conference and arrest all those villains."

This, in effect, was Lenin's message to his devotees. "The letter," says Bukharin, "was written with extreme vigor and threatened us with every kind of punishment. An 'A-a-a-h!' escaped our throats after it was read. No one had put the question so sharply before. None of us knew what to do. At first everybody was bewildered. Then we held a conference and reached a decision. Perhaps it was the first case in the history of our party when the Central Committee unanimously decided to burn a letter of Lenin's. This fact was not made public then. It shows that we were more to the 'Right' than he. I am telling this to prove that Lenin does not always preach moderation and orthodoxy, and that he sometimes errs on the side of the 'Left.'"

It may be that the text of the burned letter was identi-

cal with that of the message Lenin addressed about the middle of October directly to the Petrograd and Moscow Bolshevist organizations, without the approval of the Central Committee, which also was a breach of party discipline. This latter document, the text of which follows, indicates the feverish condition of Lenin's mind at the time:

Dear Comrades:

Events are dictating our task to us so clearly that delay is becoming positively a crime.

The agrarian movement is spreading. The government is intensifying its savage repressions. The sympathies of the soldiers for us are growing (99 per cent of the votes of the Moscow troops are for us). The Finnish troops and navy are against the government.

It is clear that a revolution is beginning in Germany, especially after the executions of the sailors. The elections in Moscow, returning 47% Bolsheviks, are a gigantic victory. With the Left Socialist-Revolutionists we have an obvious majority in the country.

The railroad and post-office workers are in conflict with the government. The Libers and Dans,[1] instead of a congress meeting on the 20th of October, are already talking of a congress "in the twenties."

In such circumstances waiting is a crime.

Bolsheviks have no right to wait for the congress of Soviets. They must seize power at once. They would save thereby the world revolution, (otherwise there is the danger of a deal

[1] Liber and Dan were two Menshevist Soviet leaders.

among the imperialists of all the countries who after the executions in Germany will be conciliatory towards each other and unite against us), as well as the Russian revolution, (otherwise the tide of the present anarchy might overpower us), and the lives of hundreds of thousands of men in the war.

To delay is a crime. To wait for the congress of Soviets is an infantile play in formalities, a shameful game, a betrayal of the revolution.

If power cannot be taken without an uprising, then we must go in for an uprising at once. It is very possible that just now power can be taken without an uprising. For instance, if the Moscow Soviet at once assumed power and declared itself (together with the Petrograd Soviet) the government. In Moscow victory is assured and there is no one to *fight against us.* In Petrograd one may wait yet. The government can do nothing and there is no salvation for it. It will surrender.

The Moscow Soviet, after seizing power, the banks, the factories, the "Russkoe Slovo," would be in possession of a gigantic base from which to agitate all over Russia, and put the following issue before the country: "We will propose peace tomorrow, if the Bonapartist Kerensky will surrender (and if he will not surrender we will overthrow him). Give the land to the peasants immediately, make concessions to the railroad and post-office employees, etc."

One does not have to begin with Petrograd. If Moscow should start without bloodshed, she would certainly be supported by,

(1) the sympathy of the army at the front,
(2) the peasants everywhere,
(3) the navy and the Finnish troops who are advancing on Petrograd.

Even if Kerensky has near Petrograd one or two cavalry

corps, he will be compelled to surrender. The Petrograd Soviet can afford to wait and agitate for the Moscow Soviet Government.

Our watchword: Power to the Soviets, Land to the Peasants, Peace to All Peoples, Bread to the Starving.

Victory is assured and the chances are nine-tenths that it will be bloodless.

To wait is a crime against the revolution.

Greetings,

N. Lenin.

When Lenin arrived in Petrograd he found that there was no definite program for immediate action. Thus at a meeting of the executive committee of the Petrograd Bolshevist organization, Nevsky, of the military section, reported that the overwhelming majority of the Petrograd troops were under Bolshevist influence. Evdokimov remarked, "If we do not strike now, the Revolution will put a cross over us." But Kalinin, who was later elevated to the rank of President of the All-Russian Soviet, argued that while "we are actually preparing to revolt, it is uncertain when that will be possible, it may be only in a year."

In the foregoing letter Lenin urged that Moscow take the lead in the uprising, without waiting for Petrograd. The Muscovites, however, declined the invitation. The conference called to consider Lenin's proposal unanimously concluded that Moscow was not yet ripe for a

successful stroke, and resolved to redouble the propaganda among the local soldiers and workmen. Lenin then turned his attention to the Petrograd organization. A secret meeting was called of all the responsible Bolshevik leaders in Petrograd. Shliapnikov, one of the Petrograd chieftains, narrates that "nothing definite was known about the subject to be discussed at the meeting." After passing through the customary conspiratory channels, he arrived at a house enveloped in darkness. "There were a few people present," he continues. "Lenin and Zinoviev were both shaved and arrived undisguised. There were very few chairs and most of those present accommodated themselves on the floor."

Lenin spoke. He urged actual preparation for immediate revolt. He urged the Petrograd organization to plan it and carry it into effect. He was supported by Podvoisky, of the military section of the Party. Zinoviev and Kamenev spoke against Lenin. For the first time many of the chieftains present learned that the Central Committee was divided on the question of the revolt. Lenin answered his critics with quotations from Marx. He developed the view of Marx on revolution-making as a science, and skillfully demolished the charges of adventurous gambling and bonapartism.

The main rules of this science Lenin formulated as follows, on Sunday, October 21, in instructions to the Bolshevist delegation at the Petrograd Regional Soviet:

"1. Never play with revolution, but once having started it, be firm in the purpose of carrying it through.

"2. Large forces in reserve must be assembled at the decisive spot in the decisive moment. Otherwise the enemy, better prepared and organized, will destroy the rebels.

"3. After the revolt is begun, one must act with utmost decisiveness and without fail or hesitation assume the offensive.

"4. One must try to strike at the enemy when it is unprepared, to choose the moment when its forces are scattered.

"5. One must try, in order to maintain at all costs a superior morale, to win daily (it may be said hourly, if it concerns one city) even small successes."

Everything was now ready for the great conspiracy. On the night of October 23 (10) the historic bomb, which was to rock human society everywhere to its foundations, was designed and timed. In Sukhanov's Petrograd apartment, at Karpovka 32, the general staff of the Bolshevist Party gathered to make the supreme decision. This very secret conference lasted continuously for ten hours. The question before the body was: "Shall an immediate attempt be made to overthrow the Provisional Government and seize power?"

Thirteen persons participated in the conference, eleven men and two women. The men were Lenin, Trotzky,

Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin, Sverdlov, Djerjinsky, Uritzky, Bubnov, Sokolnikov, and Lamov. The women were Kollontay and Yakovleva who acted as the secretary. Lenin came wearing his Helsingfors wig, but without his customary beard. Zinoviev had a beard, but the bushy hair on his head was completely shaved off. It was the first time in the history of the Bolshevist Party that Trotzky and Lenin sat together at a meeting of the Central Committee. Trotzky had been elected to that august body but a few weeks before. It was this night which defined clearly the respective rôles of Lenin and Trotzky in the Russian Revolution. Lenin was the chief of staff, Trotzky was the field-marshal. Lenin was the strategist, Trotzky was the executive.

"It must be said that we gathered not in a very conspiratory manner," Yakovleva tells of that eventful night, "although we knew that Lenin would be present. Lomov and Sverdlov came with me. On the way we met Djerjinsky and Trotzky, and as it was early, we all went to a café. We split up into small groups only when we were near the house. Lenin arrived when all were present, and was beyond recognition. Smoothly shaved, in a wig, he resembled a Lutheran minister. . . . I was entrusted with keeping the secretarial minutes, but on account of the conspiratory nature of the meeting they were very brief."

The deliberations continued until morning. Kamenev and Zinoviev opposed Lenin's plan to engineer a revolu-

tion. Uritzky considered that the 40,000 rifles in the possession of the Petrograd workingmen were not sufficient to begin an uprising and to resist the army of the Provisional Government. But Lenin sensed the psychology of the masses and their complete distrust of the Provisional Government, and was relentless in his arguments. He carried the field. His resolution was adopted against the votes of Zinoviev and Kamenev.

"The session," narrates Trotzky, "lasted all night. We broke up at dawn. I and some others remained to sleep there. There were two shades of opinion. The members of the Petrograd Soviet regarded it all as an affair of the local garrison. Lenin insisted on the revolt, but not in connection with Petrograd only. Whereas we regarded it as a Petrograd affair, from the viewpoint of Lenin it was something which concerned the whole country. The day for the revolt was set for October 28."

The resolution of the plenary session committing the Bolshevist Party to an armed uprising was drafted by Lenin in pencil, and has been preserved. In translation, the document reads:

> "The Central Committee recognizes that the international situation of the Russian Revolution (the mutiny in the German navy, and the extreme signs of growth throughout Europe of the universal socialist revolution, finally, the threat of peace among the imperialists for the purpose of strangling the Russian Revolution), and the military situation (the unquestionable decision of the Russian bourgeoisie and of Kerensky and

Company to surrender Petrograd to the Germans), as well as the majority gained in the Soviets by the party of the proletariat, all this, in connection with the peasant risings and the turn of popular confidence toward our party (the elections in Moscow) finally, the obvious preparation of a second Kornilov stroke (the removal of the Petrograd garrison, the despatch of Cossacks to Petrograd, the encircling of Minsk by Cossacks, etc.), all this makes an armed revolt the question of the day.

"Having recognized thus that an armed revolt is inevitable and the time fully matured for it, the Central Committee proposes to all the party organizations to be guided by this fact and to consider and decide all questions (the conventions of the Northern soviets, the removal of the Petrograd garrison, and the demonstrations of the Moscow and Minsk workers), from this viewpoint."

There is nothing beautiful or inspiring about the wording of this resolution, but it served its purpose. Lenin may have been wrong about the international aspects of the question, the likelihood of a universal socialist revolution and the threat of peace among the imperialists to strangle the Russian Revolution, but were not these sound theories according to Marx? No orthodox Marxian could argue against them. But he was right about the shift in the state of mind of the Russian people, which was the decisive factor. After all, the international aspects of the Russian Revolution were immaterial. When Lenin expressed the fear of being overpowered by the tide of anarchy engulfing the country, he knew that his task would consist of harnessing this Russian tide and driving it into the more or less normal channels of a revolution.

He aspired to make the Russian Revolution a force in the international class struggle led by the Bolshevist Party, but the Russian Revolution made the Bolshevist Party an instrument of Russia's inchoate will.

The plenary session elected a Political Bureau, at the suggestion of Djerjinsky, composed of seven members, which became in effect the supreme organ of the Bolshevist Party. It was the first "Politbureau," the institution which was fated to play such an important rôle in the years to come. A committee of five was appointed to plot and organize the revolt. It was decided, at Trotzky's suggestion, to urge the Petrograd Soviet to organize a Military Revolutionary Committee. This body was to defend the revolution, but really to overthrow the Provisional Government.

"We invited Lazimir, a Left Socialist-Revolutionist, to draft the plan of the Military Revolutionary Committee, which he undertook to do," Trotzky recalled later at an evening arranged for the exchange of reminiscences by the leaders of the November Revolution. "Whether he realized that this was a result of a conspiracy, or whether it was only his expression of the formless, rebellious mood of the Left Socialist-Revolutionists, I do not know. It was probably the latter. When he brought in his plan, we corrected it and disguised the insurrectionary character of the proposal. In the evening of the following day the plan was accepted by the Petrograd Soviet. The ques-

tion of creating the Military Revolutionary Committee had first been raised by the military section of the Bolshevist Party, which in September, 1917, when the question of organizing an armed revolt had come up for discussion, arrived at the conclusion that it was necessary to create a non-partisan Soviet organ to conduct the revolt. I communicated that decision to Lenin. The moment was highly favorable for us. We had discussed the question in the Central Committee and arrived at the conclusion, after a study of the facts, that to bring out the garrison might lead to conflict and an open revolt. This very circumstance, then, was extremely helpful to us in establishing a certain method of procedure, as our purpose was to accomplish the revolution purely by means of a conspiracy."

While the Petrograd Soviet was deliberating whether to organize a Military Revolutionary Committee, Lenin was pacing his room in the home of a workingman in one of the suburbs of the capital. The Revolution, scheduled to take place on October 28, was postponed because of technicalities. In his obscure retreat Lenin received his lieutenants, who made their way to him in an extremely roundabout manner, in order to avoid the police who were combing the town for him. One of the leading Moscow Bolsheviks, Ossip Piatnitzky, was delegated by his organization to come to Petrograd and confer with the Central Committee. Piatnitzky writes of his call on Lenin at that time:

"I went to the Viborg quarter, and at the end of a very long boulevard, after much circumspection, I found the house. I immediately located the apartment in the court, knocked in the agreed manner, and Lenin himself opened the door to admit me. Apparently nobody was at home except Lenin. The room which we entered was piled with books and newspapers. It was evident he was availing himself of his compulsory confinement, to do literary work. As soon as I entered, he asked for the latest newspaper. Immediately upon opening it he exclaimed: 'The Petrograd Soviet is for the revolt! It elected a Military Revolutionary Committee even without discussion, in spite of the fact that the Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionists demanded a debate on the subject.'

"Lenin questioned me in great detail about the state of affairs in the Moscow organization. The conversation then turned on the subject of the revolt. I outlined the view that Moscow could not start the uprising but that it would support any city beginning it. I raised the question as to the ability of our party to remain in power, since we had so few active and capable men. In reply Lenin advised me to read the manuscript of his pamphlet entitled, *Will the Bolsheviks Retain Power?*"

"If we succeed in concluding peace with Germany," said Lenin to Piatnitzky, "the peasants will be on our side. Germany will certainly demand from Russia the Baltic provinces, most of which she now occupies. In the extreme eventuality, it will be necessary to give way for

the sake of saving and preserving the conquests of the Revolution. As regards men, we have them. It will be possible to delegate the sailors to the rural districts to explain to the peasants the meaning of the revolt. They will not come with empty hands to the peasants, as our first step after the seizure of power will be the promulgation of a decree about the land and peace."

"During the few days I spent in Petrograd," adds Piatnitzky, "I had occasion to see Lenin several times. The Moscow organization had put up Lenin as its candidate for the Constituent Assembly, for which it was necessary to obtain his written consent. Having secured this paper, I returned to Moscow." One can easily imagine the smile on Lenin's face when he was filling out the paper making him a candidate for election to the Constituent Assembly, but the records do not reveal Lenin speaking his mind on the subject. Had he then already confided to his nearest associates his innermost designs on the Constituent Assembly?

In the days preceding the Bolshevik coup, Trotzky occupied the stage entirely, while Lenin was the man behind the scenes. Trotzky's dramatic role in the Military Revolutionary Committee and his public denunciations of, and threats against, the paralytic Provisional Government, were a cover for Lenin's secret function and for the conspiracy of the Bolshevist Party. Behind the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet was

the military section of the Bolshevist Central Committee. Behind the latter was Lenin, issuing orders from his subterranean headquarters and receiving reports from the commanders in the field. One of these, Antonov-Ovseyenko, narrates how he was suddenly told to come to see Lenin. "Come, Lenin wants to see you. Waste no time," was the message. He writes:

"Hurriedly I followed Comrades Nevsky and Podvoisky. Our car made long, roundabout loops through various side streets, finally stopping in an alley in the Viborg quarter. We got out and walked for a couple of blocks, looking about to see if we were being followed. Having convinced ourselves that we were not, we slipped into the courtyard of an unsightly house. On a pre-arranged signal, the door was opened. A gray but rather vigorous little old man in glasses, of a kindly appearance, who might have been taken for a teacher or a musician or perhaps a bookworm, admitted us. Who could have recognized our beloved comrade and leader in that face, familiar to us even to the slightest wrinkle? Lenin removed his wig and glasses, and looked us over with eyes sparkling with his customary humor.

" 'Well, what's the news?'

"Our news was not in accord. Podvoisky was dubious. Nevsky either agreed with him, or with the unequivocal tone of Lenin. I reported about the situation in Finland. Lenin interrupted me:

" 'Can't the whole fleet be moved upon Petrograd?'

" 'No,' I replied. 'First of all, the river depth will not permit it. Then, the large vessels are afraid of submarines and gunboats. Finally, the sailors will refuse to expose the Baltic Waters to the enemy.'

" 'But they must understand that the Revolution is in greater danger in Petrograd than on the Baltic. Can't they see that?'

" 'They don't quite understand it.'

" 'What's to be done?'

" 'We can send two or three gunboats to the Neva and a special detachment of marines, altogether about three thousand.'

" 'Insufficient,' said Lenin reproachfully. 'And the northern front?'

" 'According to reports from there, the situation is fine and assistance can be expected, but one should go down there personally to make sure of it.'

" 'Then go, there is no time to lose.' "

Before leaving, Nevsky and Podvoisky argued in favor of postponing the coup for at least two weeks, in order to complete preparations, but Lenin remained unconvinced and adamant.

"It is especially important," Lenin replied, "that the revolt occur before the meeting of the Congress of Soviets, so that the Congress, regardless of its character, should be confronted by the *fait accompli* of the seizure of power

by the workingman and sanction this seizure immediately."

The three chieftains depart, encouraged by Lenin's overwhelming confidence. Podvoisky, however, still has his doubts. As they cautiously reach the gate, a tall, dark figure is observed starting off on a bicycle. Could it be a spy? Only that morning the papers boasted that the Provisional Government was on the tracks of Lenin and Zinoviev, and that their arrest was imminent.

After a brief conference in whispers, Podvoisky crosses the street and occupies a position at the corner, acting as a picket. Antonov-Ovseyenko, gripping the revolver in his pocket, stands guard nearby. Nevsky returns to Lenin's abode. Two minutes later he reappears accompanied by the Bolshevist chief who is disguised beyond recognition. The Supreme Headquarters of the Revolution are instantly transferred to another haunt, on the very eve of the great event.

CHAPTER IX

AT THE HELM

ON the fateful November 7, a weird-looking little man arrived at the Smolny Institute, the seething camp of the Petrograd Soviet, and passed unnoticed into the interior. His face was bandaged with a large handkerchief, as if he were suffering from a toothache. He wore huge eyeglasses and a dilapidated cap. With his arrival, the headquarters of the Revolution emerged from "underground" into the open. The battle was on. The little visitor, perhaps the drollest leader of a revolution history has ever known, took charge at once. His army consisted of a few thousand sailors and workingmen. His battlefield was Petrograd. His stake was Russia, Europe, the world.

Without removing his strange make-up, Lenin turned on his colleagues as soon as he entered the room where they were assembled. He had seen in the newspapers that the Military Revolutionary Committee of the Petrograd Soviet, the instrument he had selected to perpetrate the Revolution, was conducting negotiations with the commissars of the garrison for an agreement which held out the prospects of a compromise. "Lenin, reading it, was

furious with us," narrates Trotzky, "and the first question upon his arrival was 'Is it true?' We calmed him, 'No, it is only to disguise the game.'"

By this time the main telegraph office and the state bank had already been seized. The Winter Palace was surrounded. Only the naïve bourgeois papers could believe that the Revolution might yet be averted. Nominally, the Smolny was still the seat of the Petrograd Soviet. Actually, it was already the seat of the embryo Bolshevist Government. The Mensheviks still stalked through the rooms and corridors of the Smolny, but they were already shadows of a swiftly disappearing to-day. To-morrow the Smolny would be the stronghold of the Bolshevist dictatorship.

"Dan and Skobelev (the Menshevist leaders) came to the Smolny," Trotzky recalls, "and passed through the very room in which Lenin and I sat. . . . His appearance was rather queer, but Dan, whose eye is experienced and sharp, looked at us first from one side and then from the other, and nudged Skobelev with his elbow, winking on the way out. Lenin, too, nudged me with his elbow, saying: 'The rascals recognized me.' But it was no longer dangerous, for we were already at that moment the masters of the situation."

November 7 was the date on which the All-Russian Congress of Soviets, that powerful organ of the laboring masses, was scheduled to meet. The great Soviet Revolution

was timed by Lenin to take place on November 7. What a significant coincidence! But why was the long-awaited Congress of Soviets delaying its opening? Or was the Revolution of the laboring masses being carried out without the guidance of their supreme organ? And what was the cause of the extraordinary tension at the Smolny? Why was the little man with the bandaged face so irate in his impatience?

"It was proposed to confront the Congress with the fact of the overthrow of the Provisional Government," writes Podvoisky, one of Lenin's lieutenants actually in charge of the attack on the Winter Palace. "The delay in the capture of the Winter Palace extremely agitated the entire Smolny. Every minute of strained waiting seemed an hour. Lenin sent to me, Antonov, and Chudnovsky, dozens of little notes denouncing us for delaying the opening of the Congress and provoking thereby excitement among the deputies. 'The session must be opened and the Winter Palace is not yet taken!' he wrote. Later I was told that Lenin did not appear at the opening of the Congress, awaiting momentarily the fall of the Winter Palace. He rushed about his little room in the Smolny like a lion in a cage. He demanded the Winter Palace at all costs. It was the last barricade on the road to the power of the workers. Lenin swore . . . bellowed. . . . He was ready to shoot us all."

The Winter Palace fell. At midnight the news was

announced to the Congress. The little man removed his bandage and his eye-glasses, and behold! he was a demigod. He left his cage and sprang upon the scene with a roar that made the world tremble. The great assembly of the representatives of the laboring masses was informed that its Revolution had been consummated, and it echoed its lion's roar. The powerful All-Russian Soviet was told that the Soviet power had been established, and it believed.

Now came the candidacies for the Soviet Government. Who but Lenin could be at the helm? But the demigod would not be idolized. He hated thrones. The rôle of a prime minister was distasteful to him. The Zurich emigré was shy of pomp and glory. He wanted to be the power behind the throne, the "boss" of the Bolshevist Party, the hidden master-mind of the army of world revolution.

"At first Lenin did not want to assume office in the government," Lunacharsky told Sukhanov. "'I will work,' he said, 'in the Central Committee of the Party.' But we said no. We could not consent to this. We compelled him to take over the responsibility of the foremost post. To be a critic only is agreeable to anybody." And Lenin became the President of the Council of Commissars. He set to work immediately. In his characteristic handwriting and style, without regard to form, he drafted the historic decree giving the land to the peasants, fulfilling

a dream of ages. "If we succeed in promulgating this decree," he said to Bonch-Bruyevitch, "I defy anyone to try to take it back."

This defiance has weathered the onslaughts of countless enemies. The decree was easily promulgated by acclaim and became the touchstone of the Revolution. Clumsily worded, it was the epitaph marking the end of an era, the feudal era, which no power in the world could resurrect, and served at the same time as the sign of a new epoch. The decree was the invulnerable armor with which Lenin, the father of the Revolution, protected his newly-born child. When Kerensky improvised an army outside of Petrograd and attacked on November 8 the forces of the Soviet government, he was doomed from the outset by this decree, just as his innumerable successors from Kornilov to Wrangel were doomed.

Kerensky's campaign against Petrograd was the first severe test of Lenin's generalship. The soviet troops were few and poorly organized. Their leaders were inexperienced and the operations were conducted haphazardly. At one time the road to Petrograd was virtually open before Kerensky. "It would have been easy for the enemy," writes Podvoisky, "with our lack of organization, to enter the capital on the heels of our retreating troops." Podvoisky's reminiscences give a vivid picture of how Lenin saved the situation.

"At this grave moment," he continues, "Comrade

Lenin appeared on the scene. On November 8 we began to form and send Red Guard regiments to the front. The Smolny literally became a camp. The news from the front was meager. It was known that the leading detachment of Comrade Chudnovsky was unable to execute its task. Comrade Lenin, who followed Kerensky's offensive and the course of the White campaign with exceptional intensity, apparently grasped in the most realistic manner the critical situation at the front. Unexpectedly for us, he appeared at the staff headquarters together with Stalin and Trotzky. He asked for me, Antonov, and Mechonoshin, and demanded a detailed report about the situation, and that we should acquaint him with the forces at our disposal, the forces of the enemy, and the plans of our operations.

"In answer to my question as to what his arrival meant, distrust towards us or something else, Comrade Lenin simply but firmly said:

" 'No, not distrust, but the Government of the Workmen and Peasants merely wants to know how its military authorities act!'

"At this moment I felt for the first time that we have a dictatorship and a strong workers' power.

"Comrade Antonov began to outline the general plan of the operations, showing on the map the position of our forces and the probable location of the enemy. Lenin fastened his eyes on the map. With the penetration of

the most profound and attentive strategist and commander-in-chief, he demanded explanations why this point was not guarded, why that point was not defended, why this step and not another one was proposed, why Kronstadt had not been called upon to give assistance, why a certain position was not elaborated and a certain pass not closed. This thoughtful and severe analysis showed us that we had actually committed a whole series of oversights and had not displayed the extraordinary alertness required by the moment. We had followed the masses, but had done nothing to become their leaders and commanders. There were two solutions at the moment: either to tell Lenin that we were good for nothing and could not carry the responsibility for the operations, or to surrender the command to somebody else.

"After a short interruption and consultation with the comrades on the staff, I went to Lenin and declared that I would undertake to correct the grave situation at the front and hope to succeed in mobilizing the forces of 'Red' Petrograd.

"At noon the following day, Lenin appeared at my headquarters and demanded that a table should be put in for him in my office, announcing that he wanted to be constantly in touch with the development of events. Having assumed the place at the top of the organization, Lenin sent to me every five or ten minutes someone to help either in the quartermaster's department or in the mobilization

of the workingmen or in the supply service. Now it was an aviator and now an agitator. Gradually carried away by his work, he would leave my office, without noticing it, to give direct orders, sometimes to one and sometimes to another comrade. The work was at full blaze, but Comrade Lenin was not satisfied.

"It seemed to him that everything was still going slowly, indecisively, unenergetically, and he began to invite to his office the representatives of factory organizations to inquire of them concerning the extent of the workers' arms, the technical supplies, and the possibility of obtaining from their factories useful material for the defense. Here were issued the orders to the Putilov workmen to armor the platforms of the locomotives and to mount the guns at the Putilov works ready for action. The Narva district was ordered to requisition the cabmen's horses, to transport the forty guns from the factory to the front.

"Several times in the course of four or five hours I had arguments with Lenin, protesting against his 'wild' work. My protests seemed for a while to have an effect, but a few minutes later they would be forgotten and ignored. In reality there were two headquarters, Lenin's and mine. Lenin's office was a sort of a field headquarters, as his table was in my room. But the more Lenin frequented his office, where at his orders all kinds of people came and went ceaselessly, the more these incidental orders became a continuous stream. It is true, they did not affect the

operations of the military units, but only the mobilization of all and everybody to defense. But this parallel work shook my nerves terribly. Finally, I sharply and altogether unjustly demanded from Lenin that I be relieved of the post of commander.

"Lenin raged as never before: 'I will hand you over for trial to a Party tribunal; we will shoot you. I order you to continue the work and not to interfere with my work.'

"Only the following day I appreciated the full importance of Lenin's work, after I analyzed the results of a conference of representatives of workmen's organizations, district Soviets, factory committees, trade unions and military units which Lenin called together. He ordered me to be present at the conference. Here I understood wherein Lenin's power lay. In an extraordinary moment he can bring the concentration of thought, power and means to the utmost limits. We had been scattering, gathering and dispersing our forces, without any system, on account of which our action at the front was spasmodic."

It was Lenin's tireless energy and resourcefulness which contributed to the speedy collapse of Kerensky's campaign. At the critical moment he telegraphed to Kronstadt for aid. Fortunately, the record of this telegraphic conversation has been preserved. Lenin handed over to Lunacharsky a big roll of tape. The latter gave it to one,

Polonsky, with the words: "Preserve this historical document. Comrade Lenin has just given it to me. If we should be arrested, take good care of it." The conversation with Kronstadt, as recorded on the tape follows:

"Lenin wants to talk to you in the name of the Revolutionary Government."

"Please, what has he to say?"

"Can you talk in the name of the District of the Army and Navy?"

"Of course I can."

"Can you move on Petrograd a large number of gunboats and other warships?"

"I will call at once the Chairman of the Central Committee of the Baltic Fleet, as it is a purely naval matter. What news in Petrograd?"

"There is news that Kerensky's troops have approached and taken Gatchina, and as part of the Petrograd troops are tired, it is urgently necessary to have the quickest and strongest reinforcements."

"And what else?"

"Instead of the question what else, I expected a declaration of readiness to move and fight."

"Yes, this obviously need not be repeated. We declared our decision. Therefore, everything will be carried out."

"Have you supplies of rifles and machine-guns, and in what numbers?"

"The Chairman of the District Committee, Comrade

Michailov, of the military department, is here. He will tell you about the Finnish Army."

Michailov to Lenin:

"How many bayonets do you need?"

"We need as many as we can get, but only with loyal men ready for battle. How many such men have you?"

"About five thousand, who will fight. They can be despatched with extra speed."

"In how many hours can you guarantee their arrival in Petrograd, at the maximum speed of travel?"

"Twenty-four hours from this moment, at the most."

"By land?"

"By railroad."

"And can you guarantee food supplies for them?"

"Yes. There is enough food. There are also about thirty-five machine-guns. We can send also a small number of field artillery with crews, without jeopardizing the local situation."

"In the name of the Government of the Republic, I urgently request you to begin at once their despatch, and ask you if you know about the formation of the new Government. How was it received by your Soviets?"

"So far, only through the newspapers. The Government of the Soviets has been hailed with enthusiasm."

"Then the land forces will be started immediately and the transport of supplies for them will be assured?"

"Yes, we will begin at once."

"At the instrument is the Assistant-Chairman of the Baltic Fleet, as Comrade Dibenko left for Petrograd at 10 o'clock tonight."

Lenin speaking:

"How many gunboats and other warships can you send?"

"We can send the warship 'Republic' and two gunboats."

"Will they be provided with food supplies?"

"We have enough food in the navy and they will be supplied. All the gunboats and the warship 'Republic' will fulfill their duty of defending the Revolution, I am confident. Have no doubts as to our despatch of armed forces. We will execute it unequivocably."

"In how many hours?"

"In eighteen hours, at the most. Is it urgent?"

"Yes, the Government is absolutely convinced of the necessity of immediate assistance, and that the warship should enter the Morskoy Canal as close to the shore as possible."

"Since the regular warship is a large vessel, with 12-inch guns, it cannot come close to the shore because then it could be seized simply with bare hands. For this purpose the gunboats with small artillery and machine-guns are used. Regarding the regular warship, it must remain outside the harbor, approximately near the cruiser 'Aurora,' as its artillery can fire at a distance of 25 versts.

All this will be attended to by the sailors in cooperation with the officers."

"The gunboats must enter the Neva around the village of Rybatzkoe, in order to defend the Nikolaiev Railroad and all its approaches."

"All right. Everything will be done. What else have you to say?"

"Has the 'Republic' a radio station, and can it communicate with Petrograd on its way?"

"Not only the 'Republic,' but also the gunboats which are in communication with the Eiffel Tower. Generally we can assure you that everything will be executed well."

"And so we can rely on the boats mentioned starting at once?"

"Yes, you can. We will immediately issue urgent orders for these boats to be in Petrograd on time."

"Have you reserves of rifles and bullets? Send as much as possible."

"We have only a small quantity on the boats. We will send it."

"Farewell. Greetings.

"Farewell. Who was speaking? What is your name?"

"Lenin."

"Goodbye. We begin at once.' "

In the first days of the revolution, Lenin devoted himself to military matters, while Trotzky, the future Commissar of War, dealt with foreign affairs and the publica-

tion of the secret treaties. The Council of People's Commissars met in Lenin's small office, in the upper story of the Smolny. Shliapnikov, one of the Petrograd labor leaders, narrates: "I often found our Premier Lenin at a military map, planning some war move. More than once I had to go to the factories to look for barbed wire or some other material for defense." Lenin was frequently interrupted by workingmen's delegations, which sometimes witnessed the sessions of his Cabinet. At first no stenographic record was kept of the proceedings. Snatching a couple of hours sleep after an arduous day, Lenin would rise at dawn to draft the decrees which several hours later would be transmitted by radio in the name of the Soviet Government to "All, All, All."

After Kronstadt, Lenin communicated by direct wire with Supreme Army Headquarters at the front. In the night of November 9, accompanied by Stalin and War Commissar Krilenko, he conversed by telegraph with the High Command, demanding the immediate initiation of armistice negotiations with the enemy. The following record of this striking conversation reveals how Lenin broke the resistance of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin, paving the way for the Brest-Litovsk Peace:

"At the instrument is Commander-in-Chief Dieterichs."

"Will you please call the Acting Supreme Commander-in-Chief? If General Dukhonin is not holding this office,

kindly call the person who replaces him now. As far as we know General Dukhonin has not resigned his duties."

"General Dukhonin waited until one o'clock. He is now asleep."

"The instrument was out of order, and then it was kept busy by Headquarters. Please tell us, if you can: Did you receive the radiogram of the Council of People's Commissars sent at four o'clock? And what was done to carry out the order of the Council of People's Commissars?"

"A telegram of state importance was received without a number and a date, whereupon General Dukhonin inquired of General Monikovsky what guarantees there were of the authenticity of the telegram."

"What did Monikovsky answer to the question, and what time was that question sent to him, and how, by radio, telephone, or telegraph?"

"There has been no answer as yet and an hour ago a request was sent to hasten the reply."

"I ask you to state when and exactly how was the first question despatched. Can't you hurry a little?"

"The telegram was sent to General Monikovsky by telegraph and radio. The hour you will be told immediately. At 7:50."

"Why was not simultaneously a request sent to me, the People's Commissar of War, since the Supreme Commander-in-Chief knew from a personal conversation with me that General Monikovsky is a person whose duty is

only to supervise the technical side, whereas the political guidance of the activity of the War Ministry and responsibility for it rest in me?"

"I can say nothing about this."

"We categorically declare that the responsibility for the delay in such an important matter of state lies wholly upon General Dukhonin, and demand unconditionally first, the immediate despatch of negotiators, and second, the personal appearance of General Dukhonin at the wire tomorrow at 11 o'clock in the morning promptly. If his delay should lead to hunger, dissolution, or defeat, or anarchical mutinies, then the entire responsibility will be yours and the soldiers will be informed about it."

"I will report this to General Dukhonin."

"When will you report?"

"Now."

"Then we will wait for Dukhonin."

"I will awaken him at once."

"The Acting Supreme Commander-in-Chief, General Dukhonin, is at the instrument."

"The People's Commissars are at the instrument, and we are awaiting your answer."

"Having convinced myself from the contents of the tape recording your conversation with the Commander-in-Chief that the telegram to me was sent before the decision contained in the radiogram signed by the People's Commissars Ulianov—Lenin, Trotzky, and Krilenko was

reached, I must absolutely have information as to the following facts: First, Has the Council of People's Commissars received any answer to its appeal to the warring states to declare peace? Second, How is the Rumanian Army, forming part of our front, to be treated? Third, Is it proposed to enter into negotiations for a separate armistice, and with whom, with the Germans and Turks only, or will negotiations be conducted by us for a general armistice?"

"The text of the telegram addressed to you is absolutely exact and clear. It speaks of an immediate opening of negotiations for an armistice with all the warring states. And decisively denying anybody's right to delay this important state matter by any preliminary questions whatsoever, we insist on the immediate despatch of negotiators and on hourly reports about the development of the negotiations."

"My questions are of a purely technical character. Without their solution the conduct of negotiations is impossible."

"You cannot fail to understand that in the course of the negotiations there will arise many technical questions of detail which we will answer as they arise or as they are put by the enemy. Therefore, we again submit to you the ultimatum of the immediate and unqualified opening of official negotiations for an armistice, and with all the warring states, with the Allies as well as those with whom we are in a state of war. Kindly give an exact answer."

"I can only understand that direct negotiations with the powers are impossible for us. They are even less possible for me in your name. Only a central government, supported by the army and the country, can have sufficient weight and importance in the eyes of the enemies to lend to such negotiations the authority necessary in order to achieve results. I also think that it is in the interests of Russia to conclude a general peace as soon as possible."

"Do you categorically refuse to give us a clear answer and to execute the order given by us?"

"I already gave you a clear answer as to why it is impossible for me to carry out your order, and I repeat again, that only a central government can give Russia the peace she needs. Dukhonin."

"In the name of the Government of the Russian Republic, at the command of the Council of People's Commissars, we dismiss you from the post you hold for disobeying the orders of the Government and for conduct which is causing to the laboring masses of all the countries, and especially the armies, unheard-of suffering. We order you under the threat of martial law, to continue in command until the new Commander-in-Chief, or the person empowered by him, arrives at the Headquarters to take over your office. Lieutenant Krilenko is appointed Supreme Commander-in-Chief. Lenin, Stalin, Krilenko."

The historic conversation begun at two in the morning, closed at four-thirty. The sequel to it was the memorable death of General Dukhonin. Krilenko proceeded to

Moghilev, Supreme Headquarters, and arrested Dukhonin upon his arrival. The deposed Commander-in-Chief was attacked by an infuriated mob of soldiers and lynched while convoyed to the station. All the attempts of Krilenko and the convoy guards to save him were futile.

In the early days when the Soviet Government was sabotaged by the educated classes, there was a dearth not only of office help, but even of Commissars. The Bolshevist Party lacked the personnel to run a government. Lenin did the work of several Commissars. There were very few men willing to assume posts in his Cabinet. The bureaucracy which was later to infest to an unprecedented degree the machinery of the Soviet Government was not yet born. "I vividly recall," Shliapnikov writes, "how Lenin and I tried to persuade Petrovsky to become Commissar for Internal Affairs. We looked for a Commissar of Trade, and I was asked to take it up with Krassin, but his attitude was negative at the time." It was easy in those days to obtain a ministerial portfolio. Nearly everyone who walked into the Smolny was offered a responsible position in the government. A certain Pestkovsky records how he called on Trotzky in quest of a job. The latter informed him that his office as Commissar of Foreign Affairs was to last only until the publication of the secret treaties.

"I went to Lenin," continues Pestkovsky, "and offered my services. He listened attentively and smiled when I

told him of Trotzky's view of the office of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. Lenin asked me to wait until the arrival of Rykov, who was appointed Commissar for Internal Affairs. I decided to wait, seating myself on a little bench in the hall outside Lenin's room. It was a convenient place for observation. A varied crowd thronged Lenin's office. Soon this waiting exhausted my patience. I opened the door across from Lenin's room and entered. Menjinsky was lying on a couch, apparently very tired. Near him was a sign: 'Commissar of Finances.' After talking to me for a while, he suddenly jumped up, looked at me fixedly, and declared categorically:

" 'If that's the case, we will make you Director of the State Bank.'

"I became frightened and answered that I had no desire to assume the post, as it was not in my line. Menjinsky, without saying a word, asked me to wait a moment and went out. He returned a little later with a paper on which there were many signatures, and which certified that I was appointed Director of the State Bank."

Lenin's government was hardly formed when it was torn by internal dissension. The trade unions and the railroad workers demanded a coalition ministry, responsible before the All-Russian Soviet. There were some Left Socialist-Revolutionists in the Cabinet. Kamenev was delegated to negotiate with the trade unions and the other revolutionary parties for a Socialist Coalition government, but the

price demanded was too high. The Mensheviks asked for Lenin's and Trotzky's resignation. On November 14 a stormy session of the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party took place. Kamenev reported the results of his negotiations. Trotzky argued that all such negotiations were intended to wrest power from the party which made the Revolution and to hand it over to those who stood aside. Lenin severely criticized Kamenev, suggesting that if the conversations should be continued, they should serve as a cover for military operations. Zinoviev agreed with Kamenev as to the necessity of a coalition.

"The question is fundamental," Lenin said, "and an end must be put to negotiations. There is no room for wavering. Behind us are the majority of the workmen and peasants in the army. No one proved here that the lower classes are against us. We must rely on the masses and send agitators into the villages. The railroad union was invited to transport troops to Moscow, and it refused. We must appeal to the masses, and they will overthrow it."

The crisis was complicated by differences over Lenin's proposal to suppress the burgeois newspapers. A number of leading Bolsheviks, headed by Kamenev and Zinoviev, fought for the preservation of the freedom of the press. Lenin was intransigent. "We announced before, too," he declared, "that we would close the burgeois papers if we seized power. To tolerate the existence of these papers

means to cease being a socialist. He who is for the bourgeois press does not understand that we are going at full speed towards socialism. Were not the Black Hundred newspapers suppressed after the overthrow of Czarism? Now we have overthrown the yoke of the bourgeoisie. We did not invent the social revolution. It was proclaimed by the members of the Congress of Soviets and no one protested against it. Everybody accepted the decree announcing it . . . We cannot allow the bourgeoisie to slander us. A committee should be appointed at once to inquire into the dependence of the bourgeois newspapers on the banks. We must establish the kind of 'liberty' which hired these newspapers. Is it liberty to buy a lot of paper and to hire a pack of scribblers? We must get away from this freedom of the press which depends on capital. This is a question of principle. If we are marching toward the social revolution, we cannot add bombs of lies to the bombs of Kaledin."

The All-Russian Executive Committee of the Soviets adopted Lenin's and Trotzky's resolution against the freedom of the press. The People's Commissars, Rykov, Nogin, Miliutin, Ryazenov, Theodorovich, and Derbishev, resigned, and handed in the following declaration:

"We take the view that it is necessary to form a Socialist Government of all the Soviet Parties and consider that only the formation of such a government would strengthen the achievements of the heroic struggle of the working-

class and the Revolutionary Army. We think that there is only one other way, the preservation of the purely Bolshevist Government by means of political terror. The Council of People's Commissars has entered upon this path. We cannot and will not enter upon it. We see that it leads to the estrangement of the proletarian masses from the political leaders and to the establishment of an irresponsible regime and the wrecking of the country and the Revolution. We cannot assume responsibility for this policy, and therefore resign as People's Commissars."

The foregoing remarkable declaration was supported by Kamenev and Zinoviev, who with Rykov, Miliutin and Nogin, resigned from the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party on November 18, 1917. Five years later the facts pertaining to the crisis were made public for the first time, but it was never made clear when and under what circumstances Kamenev and Zinoviev took their resignations back. A crisis in Lenin's Cabinet was unlike any other ministerial crisis. He knew how to discipline his erring disciples, and to instill into young enthusiasts who had illusions about the freedom of the press and a horror of political terror, an appreciation of practical politics and a lust for power.

CHAPTER X

BREST-LITOVSK

"YOU are worse than a hen. A hen has not the courage to cross a circle drawn around her with chalk, but she can say in apology that this circle was drawn around her by somebody else. But you drew around yourselves a formula with your own hands, and now you look at it and not at reality. Our formula of a peace of the peoples was intended to arouse the masses to fight the militaristic and capitalistic governments. Now you want us to perish, and the capitalistic governments to win, because of our revolutionary formula."

Lenin was angry. His patience was exhausted. For weeks he had been arguing in favor of peace, any peace, with the Central Powers. But the odds were overwhelmingly against him. His lieutenants and collaborators were simple folk. Lenin's logic had burdened their souls for months. Time and again they had given in to his irresistible personality. But every time there was a deposit of bitterness left in their hearts. Now came Brest-Litovsk, where Prussian diplomacy was trampling upon every watchword of the Revolution. And Lenin was for peace with monarchist Germany and Austria! Lenin's flock was

bewildered at first. "How will we conclude peace with the Hohenzollern Government?" Carl Radek asked his master, to which the latter responded with the classic metaphor about the hen.

"I will never forget my conversation with Lenin," Radek writes, "on the eve of the conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Peace. All the arguments which we marshalled against the Peace rebounded to us like a rubber ball. His answers were extremely simple."

"A party of true revolutionists clutching at the throat of their own bourgeoisie cannot be suspected of making a deal with the German bourgeoisie and cannot make war," Lenin argued. "War must be made by the peasant. Don't you see that the peasant has voted against the war?"

"If you please," Radek inquired, "how do you mean he voted?"

"He voted with his legs, he is running away from the front."

Brest-Litovsk was Lenin's supreme trial and triumph. It was an epic struggle which kept the world breathless for weeks, months. On the one side was victory—drunk, cynical, imperialist Germany. On the other side, Revolutionary Russia, proud of her newly-gained freedom, impassioned, erratic. This Russia hungered for peace, but not peace at any price. She would not sign a peace of shame. Her armies disorganized, she would yet wage a Holy War and go under defending her liberty rather than

LENIN TALKING TO TROTZKY (LEFT) AND KAMENEV (RIGHT)

become a vassal of the Hohenzollerns. She would appeal to the disavowed bourgeois Allies to come to her assistance. Or she would make no war and no peace and defy the Prussian armies to invade her territories at the peril of a revolution in Germany. Beautiful illusions which made Lenin snarl. His feet were on the ground, and he had no doubt as to the Prussian bayonets. He would not expose his child, the Revolution, to their mercy, and fought the hardest battle of his life to save it. Single-handed he went into the combat and won his point by the narrowest of margins. History, moving swiftly, soon justified him completely, and Brest-Litovsk in Russia became the recognized mark of Lenin's genius as a statesman.

There were two stages set during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations. One was at Brest-Litovsk, where the spectacular struggle between arrogant Prussianism and defiant Bolshevism went on, with intermissions, for more than three months. Retired generals and deposed foreign ministers have described this contest in their memoirs. The other stage was hidden from the public eye. In the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party the struggle was not less dramatic in its intensity, as revealed by a batch of confidential records kept by E. D. Stasova and preserved in the archives of the Central Committee. Here, however, there were three, and not two, adversaries in the field, a fact which proved fortunate for Lenin. These three groups first took form at a private conference of leading

Bolshevik delegates to the Third Soviet Congress. This meeting was held on January 8. Lenin urged the acceptance of the annexationist peace terms proposed by the Germans and defended the signing of a separate peace should the Allies refuse Russia's invitation for a general peace conference. Bukharin championed the rejection of an annexationist peace and was for a Revolutionary War. Trotzky, in view of the reported disturbances in Germany and Austria, came out with his slogan, "No peace and no war." He favored a proclamation declaring the war at an end and demobilization of the army, but no signing of peace. Fifteen of the delegates were with Lenin, thirty-two with Bukharin, and sixteen with Trotzky.

The following day, January 9, the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party met to consider this situation. It was the first of a series of historic sessions. The vote of the previous day having indicated the mood of the Party, Lenin now assumed the offensive. He pointed out to his several colleagues that Bolshevism never repudiated defensive warfare, but that such warfare and the defense of the country must have a particular situation such as the one which existed now, namely, the defense of the Socialist Republic against a menacing imperialism.

"The question before us," Lenin continued, "is only, How shall we defend our country—the Socialist Republic? The army is extremely tired of war. We have

not even the means to keep the artillery apace with the troops. The position of the Germans in the Baltic Islands is so strong that in the event of an offensive they could take Reval and Petrograd with empty hands. Fighting in such circumstances, we would strengthen extraordinarily German imperialism and would have to sign peace anyway, but then it would be a worse peace, as there would be no one to sign it. Undoubtedly, the peace which we are compelled to conclude now is a bitter one, but in case of a renewal of the war, our government will be swept out and another will sign the peace. We are now supported not only by the proletariat but by the poor peasantry which will desert us should the war be continued. The resumption of the war is in the interests of the French, English, and American imperialists, a fact which is proved by the offer, for instance, made to Krilenko at Headquarters by Americans to give one hundred rubles for every Russian soldier. Those who are assuming the viewpoint of a Revolutionary War argue that we would be in a state of civil war with the German bourgeoisie and that we would thereby incite a revolution in Germany. But Germany is now only pregnant with revolution, while we have already given birth to a healthy baby, the Socialist Republic, which we would kill by resuming the war.

"We have in our hands a circular letter of the German Social-Democrats, advising us of the disposition of the two currents of opinion regarding us. One is of the view that

we have been bought, and that soon there will be played in Brest a comedy the rôles of which had been previously assigned. This group is attacking us for the armistice. The other section, the followers of Kautsky, are of the opinion that the personal honesty of the leaders of the Bolsheviks is beyond any suspicion, but that the conduct of the Bolsheviks is a psychological puzzle to them. We do not know the views of the Left Social-Democrats. Of course, the peace which we will sign will be a foul peace, but it is imperative for us to have time to effect social changes. We must establish ourselves firmly, and for that we need time. We must bring to a conclusion the process of strangling the bourgeoisie, and for this we must have both hands free. Having accomplished this, we will have full freedom of movement and will be able then to conduct a Revolutionary War against the international imperialists. The volunteers of our present Revolutionary Army are the officers of our future army.

"That which Comrade Trotzky is proposing, the suspension of the war, a refusal to sign the peace and the demobilization of the army, is an internationalist political demonstration. By removing our troops from the front, we deliver to the Germans the Estonian Socialist Republic. It is said that by accepting the peace, we give a free hand to the Japanese and Americans who will immediately seize Vladivostok, but until they reach Irkutsk we will be able to fortify our Socialist Republic. By signing

peace, we of course deliver to the enemy the self-determined Poland, but we preserve Socialist Estonia and are enabled to establish our conquests. True, we are making a turn to the 'Right,' which leads through a very filthy passage, but we must make it. If the Germans should begin to advance, we would be compelled to sign any peace, and then it will be a worse peace. Three billions of indemnity is not too high a price for the salvation of the Socialist Republic. Signing peace now, we demonstratively show the great masses that the imperialists of Germany, England, and France, who took Riga and Bagdad, continue to fight, while we devote ourselves to reconstruction and the development of the Socialist Republic."

Trotzky, Bukharin, Djerjinsky, Uritzky, Sokolnikov, Krestinsky, Lomov, Kassior and Sergiev-Artem, argued against Lenin. Zinoviev and Stalin supported Lenin with some reservations. Before the vote Lenin replied to his opponents. He said:

"Of course, there is a mass movement in Western Europe, but the Revolution has not yet begun there. Should we, however, change our tactics because of this, we would be traitors to international socialism. I cannot agree with Zinoviev that the signing of peace would weaken for a time the movement in the West. If we believed that in case of a break in the peace negotiations, the German movement would develop immediately, then we should sacrifice ourselves, for the German Revolution is much

more important than ours. But the trouble is that the movement there has not yet started, while we have a newly-born and loudly screaming infant. And if we will not say now clearly that we consent to peace, we will perish. It is important for us to hold out until the rise of the Socialist Revolution, and this we can achieve only by concluding peace."

The vote was characteristic of the confusion in the minds of the Bolshevik leaders. First, the motion in favor of Revolutionary War was voted on. Two were for it, eleven against, the rest abstaining. Next, Trotzky's formula of "No peace and no war" was put to a vote, which resulted in a tie, nine for and nine against. Lenin's proposal to procrastinate the negotiations was then considered. Twelve voted in favor and one against. The Central Committee thus decided not to resume the war and to drag out the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk, but failed to give exact instructions as to the future policy. This was a tactical victory for Lenin.

The scene of battle was then transferred from the recesses of the Central Committee to the floor of the Third Soviet Congress which met on January 10. The Russian Peace Delegation pressed for definite directions. The renewal of the negotiations was scheduled for January 29. The Congress, however, selected a middle path between the two extremes. It adopted a resolution supporting Trotzky's slogan of "No peace and no war," but did not

expressly forbid the signing of an annexationist German peace. It, therefore, gave the Council of People's Commissars a free hand, and went home.

Again the fight moved back to the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party, where Lenin had the advantage because of his traditional position. A group of leading Bolsheviks, headed by Bukharin, demanded of the Central Committee the urgent convocation of an extraordinary Party conference. Lenin opposed this demand, arguing that such a conference could not bind the Central Committee anyway. He thought that the best cure for those who advocated a Revolutionary War would be to go down to the front and see its condition. The opposition, however, feared diplomatic trickery on the part of Lenin. A conference of the leading Party figures was called on January 21. The debates were impassioned and acrimonious. It seemed that the Bolshevist Party, and with it, the Soviet Government, was on the rocks. Lenin, however, manoeuvered the conference into voting not upon one clear-cut resolution, but on a number of minor points. The question whether peace between imperialist and socialist states is generally admissible was first taken up. Only two voted in the negative. Lenin got a majority on the question whether or not the negotiations with the Germans should be definitely and immediately broken. Only one voted in the affirmative. To the motion whether the signing of an annexationist peace, in the event of a break in

the negotiations and a consequent German ultimatum, is admissible, only two replied in the negative. In all these votes a number of delegates abstained. Everybody voted in the affirmative when the formula, "Is it necessary to create a Red Army?" was put before the body. This was the first time that the Bolshevist Party considered the creation of a regular army.

The climax of the Brest-Litovsk drama was rapidly approaching. Trotzky exasperated the Prussian generals. They would not listen to his fiery propaganda speeches, which were intended to go over their heads and reach the German masses. On February 10 the world beheld the grand spectacle of Trotzky, a hundred times crucified by the press of the Allies as a German spy, defying German imperialism to its face. The spokesman of the Soviet delegation declared its refusal to sign a peace of violence. Revolutionary Russia would not continue the war and would demobilize the army, matching moral force against the brutal power of militarism.

A week later, in the evening of February 17, the Central Committee of the Bolshevist Party met to consider the question of war. The peace negotiations had been broken off. This was a blow to Lenin. The sentiment of the rank and file in the Bolshevist Party was against Lenin. The meeting was stormy and the voting hectic. Lenin proposed an immediate offer to Germany to reopen the negotiations with a view towards the conclusion of peace,

but failed to get a majority. Six members opposed the proposal, namely, Trotzky, Bukharin, Joffe, Krestinsky, Lomov, and Uritzky. Only five were in favor, Lenin, Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, and Smilga. Next, the question of the declaration of a Revolutionary War was submitted to a vote. Bukharin, Joffe and Lomov refused demonstratively to vote because of the way the motion was formulated. All the others opposed it, including Lenin and Trotzky. Everybody voted yes when the question of resisting to the utmost a German invasion was raised. The next motion was whether the commander-in-chief should be instructed to destroy all war material at the front in the event of a retreat. Trotzky, supported by Bukharin, Joffe, Lomov, and Uritzky, voted in the affirmative. Lenin and the rest did not vote.

It looked dark for Lenin, but he would not surrender. Perhaps never before did he display such absolute self-confidence. The fierce opposition only sharpened his wit and strengthened his resolution. He finally found a formula which bridged the chasm between the conflicting viewpoints. "If there should follow after the German invasion of Russia a decline in the revolutionary movement in Germany and Austria, will we conclude peace?" Lenin asked. For the first time at this meeting he mustered a majority. Trotzky supported the motion to sign peace in such an event. Coincident with this prophetic resolution, the Germans announced an offensive against

Soviet Russia. A radiogram from Berlin informed the world that the Kaiser's Government will save civilization from the Bolshevist menace.

The session of the Central Committee was continued the following day, February 18. Discussions were limited to one question: "Shall a message offering to sign the peace be despatched or not?" Trotzky and Bukharin fought the proposal. Lenin and Zinoviev championed it.

"Yesterday the most characteristic vote," said Lenin, "was the one in which everybody recognized the necessity of peace in case of a German offensive and no manifestation of a revolutionary movement in Germany. There is doubt whether the Germans want to advance in order to overthrow the Soviet Government. We are confronted by a situation which demands action. When the purpose of the imperialist offensive is absolutely clear, then all of us will be for defense and then it will be possible to explain to the people. Should the offensive begin and we come to explain later its purpose to the masses, we shall have more confusion than if we conducted negotiations now for the extension of the armistice. We haven't an hour to lose, for the masses will not understand it. Either we conduct a Revolutionary War for the socialization of the land, and then the masses will understand us, or we conduct peace negotiations."

Lenin's proposal to renew the Brest-Litovsk negotiations was rejected. Seven voted against it and six for it. The

meeting was adjourned until the evening of the same day. The German High Command was bent upon helping Lenin. The Prussian Armies advanced and occupied Dvinsk. The excitement in Petrograd was boundless. Was Lenin a Judas Iscariot or a Superman? Not only the man on the street, but many revolutionary thinkers were confounded by his policy. But Lenin ignored public opinion. He would offer no explanations from the platform to the many questions which tormented the minds of the friends of the Russian Revolution everywhere. In the depths of the Central Committee of his Party he fought his battle, unflinchingly, tirelessly, cunningly, hammering away at his divided opposition with sure and well-timed strokes. On the evening of February 18 the crucial encounter took place. Trotzky reported the news of the German occupation of Dvinsk, and proposed that the enemy be asked what were its demands. Lenin took the floor:

"The Central Committee voted against a Revolutionary War, and now we have neither war nor peace, but we are being drawn into a Revolutionary War. One cannot play with war. We are losing railway stock and our transport is falling to pieces. It is impossible to delay now, for the situation is fully defined. The people will not understand it. If it is war, then we have no right to demobilize. The Germans will take everything now. The game has reached such a deadlock that the collapse of the Revolution is in-

evitable if we continue to occupy a wavering position. Joffe wrote from Brest-Litovsk that there is not even the beginning of a revolution in Germany. If it is so, then the Germans can have their rewards by moving forward. To continue the waiting policy is now out of the question. It would mean throwing the Russian Revolution on the scrap-heap. If the Germans were to demand the overthrow of the Bolshevist power, then of course we would have to fight. No further delays are possible. It is now a question not of the past, but of the present. If we address a query to the Germans, it will be only another scrap of paper. This is not politics. The only possible way out is to offer to the Germans a renewal of the negotiations. A compromise decision is now excluded. If it is to be a Revolutionary War, then we must stop the demobilization, and declare it, but we cannot go on as at present. We are writing little papers while they are seizing the stores and the rolling stock, and while we are in agony. The thing at stake now is whether we will deliver the Revolution while playing with liberty.

"History will say that you surrendered the Revolution. We could have signed a peace which in no way threatened the Revolution. We have nothing left, we have not even explosives with which to blow things up. We destroyed everything we could, retreating. We helped the Revolution in Finland, but now we cannot continue to do so. This is not the time for exchanging notes and we must stop this watchful waiting. It is too late now to send out

feelers, for it is clear that the Germans can advance. To argue against the advocates of a Revolutionary War is impossible, but against the advocates of a policy of waiting it is not only possible but obligatory. It is necessary to offer peace to the Germans."

Trotzky, Bukharin, Stalin, and Uritzky spoke. The suggestion was made that a peasant guerrilla war might be waged against the invader. Lenin replied:

"The peasant does not want war and will not go to war. Can we say to the peasant now that he should fight a Revolutionary War? But if he wanted it, then we should not have demobilized the army. A permanent peasant war is an Utopia. A Revolutionary War must not be a phrase. If we are not prepared, then we must sign peace. Having once demobilized the army, it is ridiculous to speak about a permanent war. Comparisons with a civil war are impossible. The peasant will not fight a Revolutionary War and will overthrow anybody who would declare it openly. The revolution in Germany has not yet begun, and we know that our Revolution did not win at once. The Germans will take Lettland and Estonia, but we can surrender them for the sake of the Revolution. If they demand the removal of the troops from Finland, please let them take revolutionary Finland. If we surrender Finland, Lettland, and Estonia, the Revolution is not yet lost. All the prospects with which Joffe alarmed us yesterday do not in the slightest degree threaten the destruction of the Revolution.

"I propose that we declare our readiness to sign the

peace offered to us yesterday by the Germans, if they add a pledge of non-intervention in the affairs of the Ukraine, Finland, Lettland, and Estonia. We must accept this unequivocally. Our soldiers are fit for nothing. The Germans want the grain, they will take it, and go back after having undermined the Soviet power. To claim that the demobilization has been stopped is enough to make people laugh."

Lenin concluded by presenting the following motion: "To immediately address to the German Government an offer to conclude peace at once." The force of Lenin's onslaught, backed by the advance of the German armies, produced results. The motion was carried by a majority of one. Seven voted in favor—Lenin, Trotzky, Zinoviev, Stalin, Smilga, Sverdlov, and Sokolnikov. Six were against — Bukharin, Joffe, Krestinsky, Djerjinsky, Lomov, and Uritzky. One abstained—Stasova. Lenin and Trotzky were delegated to prepare the text of the radio message to the Germans, which was despatched on February 19.

The Teutonic armies continued to advance all along the front. The Russians were fleeing before them without offering any resistance. The Germans simply moved forward on railway trains. Berlin was in no hurry to reply to the latest wireless from Petrograd. Three days of anxious waiting passed. The Soviet Government was in the dark as to the answer, but was unable to organize any

resistance. The split in the Bolshevist Party seemed irreparable. Lenin's opponents resigned from the Central Committee. The Moscow Bolshevist Organization protested against the proposed surrender. The Petrograd Soviet was called upon by Zinoviev on February 21 to approve the action of the government. But Zinoviev's appeal was received with unprecedented coldness. The applause went to Radek and Ryazanov who bitterly attacked the Council of Commissars and urged a resolution demanding the suspension of peace negotiations and the organization of armed resistance.

The Central Committee met again on the 22nd, the opposition agreeing to attend the session. Lenin was absent. Trotzky reported that the French Military Mission had sent a note offering the assistance of France and England against Germany. He urged the acceptance of the proposal on condition that the foreign policy of Russia should not be interfered with, and handed in at the same time his resignation as Commissar of Foreign Affairs. The Central Committee accepted Trotzky's proposal by a vote of six against five. Lenin sent a note on a slip of paper written in ink in a scarcely legible hand, which read:

"I request that my vote be added FOR the acceptance of assistance and arms from the Anglo-French imperialist pirates. Lenin."

The tension was broken by the arrival of the German

reply. It came in the form of an ultimatum, demanding the acceptance within forty-eight hours of terms far more severe than those proposed at Brest-Litovsk, the signing of peace within three days, and its ratification within two weeks. Lenin was vindicated, even though it cost dearly. His prediction of a worse peace came true. The Central Committee assembled in gloom on February 23 to consider the German ultimatum. Trotzky explained that the forty-eight-hour limit expired at seven o'clock the following morning. There was no time to lose. The momentous decision had to be made quickly. Lenin charged with staggering force. He knew it was the final round, and struck for life or for death. The policy of revolutionary phraseology was bankrupt, he announced. If that policy be continued, he, Lenin, would resign from the Soviet Government and the Central Committee! This in the form of an ultimatum.

Lenin's ultimatum was more terrifying than the Kaiser's. As severe as the latter was, one could face it with Lenin. But without Lenin the Bolshevist Party, the Soviet Government, the Social Revolution were all a heap of wreckage. Trotzky came out for the acceptance of the German ultimatum, taking the view that the Party was already split and that therefore no Revolutionary War could be waged. Bukharin continued to insist on war. Lenin spoke:

"I have been reproached for my ultimatum. I availed

myself of it as a last resort. If some members of the Central Committee speak of an international civil war, it is a mockery. There is civil war in Russia, but not in Germany. These terms must be signed. If you will not sign them, then you will sign the death sentence of the Soviet power in three weeks. These terms do not affect the Soviet power. I have not the slightest shadow of hesitation. I resorted to an ultimatum not in order to take it back. I do not want revolutionary phraseology. The German revolution is not ripe yet. It will require months. The terms must be accepted."

The opposition was weakening. It began to raise side questions, evading the main issue. Would the signing of the terms prevent preparation for a Revolutionary War for later emergencies? Would the German demand for the demobilization of the Russian army not exclude the possibility of such preparedness? Lenin was yielding. "I also consider it necessary to prepare for a Revolutionary War," he declared. "The treaty can be 'interpreted,' and we will 'interpret' it. The demobilization demanded refers purely to the war status. We had an army before the war, too. We must seriously prepare for a Revolutionary War, although I do not doubt for a second that the masses are for peace."

The supreme moment arrived. Lenin put the final question to a vote: "Shall the German ultimatum be accepted at once?" The threat of Lenin's own ultimatum

determined the result. Seven voted in the affirmative—Lenin, Zinoviev, Stalin, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Smilga, and Stasova. Four voted in the negative—Bukharin, Uritzky, Lomov, and Bubnov. Four abstained—Trotzky, Krestinsky, Djerjinsky, and Joffe. Lenin won, on the surface not a very handsome victory. Had the abstaining and negative votes united, the Bolshevist Party would have lost Lenin. Instead, Bukharin's group announced its withdrawal from the Central Committee. But in a resolution introduced by Trotzky, the four rebels were requested to remain in the Party, with the right to freely agitate against the signing of the peace. The split was avoided. The proposal of immediate preparation for a Revolutionary War was then voted upon and unanimously approved. The Central Committee considered its decision binding in character, and in a circular letter to all the party organizations demanded support of the decision reached and the utmost exertions in preparing for defense.

The sequel to the long struggle was the defense made by Lenin of his position to an assembly of Party leaders on February 24, on the day of the expiration of the German ultimatum, following the surrender of the previous evening. In the archives of the Central committee the following record of Lenin's statement is preserved:

"The unquestionable necessity of signing at this moment the unbelievably oppressive, piratical peace with Germany is dictated, first of all, by the fact that we have no army and that we are unable to defend ourselves.

"Everybody knows why we all became patriots, favoring the defense of the country, after November 7, 1917, following the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and of the poorest peasantry. It is inadmissible from this viewpoint of national defense to allow oneself to be drawn into a military conflict not having an army and when the enemy is armed to the teeth and magnificently prepared.

"It is even more unbecoming of a Soviet Socialist Republic to wage war, with the enormous majority of the masses of workmen, peasants, and soldiers represented in the soviets being against war. This is an adventure. It would be a different matter if the world war should end with an oppressive peace and German imperialism should then attempt to conduct an offensive war against Russia. Then the majority of the soviets would certainly be for war.

"To fight now means, objectively speaking, to swallow the bait of the Russian bourgeoisie. It knows but too well that Russia is now defenseless and would be defeated by insignificant German forces which need only to cut the main railway lines in order to take Petrograd and Moscow by starvation. The bourgeoisie wants war because it seeks the downfall of the Soviet power and an agreement with the German bourgeoisie.

"The waging of a Revolutionary War at this moment is inevitably reduced to a revolutionary phrase, as without an army, without serious economic preparations, the con-

duct of a modern war against an advanced imperialism is an obviously impossible thing for a ruined peasant country. Resistance to the German imperialism which would crush us and lead us into captivity is unquestionably necessary, but it would be an empty phrase to demand resistance only by means of arms and at once, for such resistance is sure to be hopeless for us and at the same time advantageous to the German and Russian bourgeoisie.

"The argument about the support of the international socialist movement, made in favor of a Revolutionary War, is also a phrase. If we attain the wrecking of the Soviet Republic by German imperialism because of our untimely acceptance of its challenge to fight, we thereby harm and do not aid the German and international labor movement and the cause of socialism. It is necessary to help through varied, persistent, and systematic work the revolutionary internationalists in all countries, but to go in for the adventure of armed resistance when it is clearly doomed beforehand is unworthy of a Marxist.

"Should Liebknecht win in two or three weeks, and it is possible, he would, of course, extricate us from all difficulties. But it would simply be a stupidity and a reduction to mockery of the great watchword of the solidarity of the workers of all the countries if we took it into our heads to guarantee to the people that Liebknecht will unfailingly win in the next few weeks. It is precisely when one argues in such a manner that the great slogan, 'We stake

everything on the world revolution,' is turned into the emptiest of phrases.

"We are under the whip of German imperialism. We are confronted by a hard and long struggle for the overthrow of this champion of universal imperialism. This struggle is undoubtedly the last and decisive battle for socialism, but to begin it with an armed revolt at this moment is an adventure which Marxists will never undertake.

"Systematic, unflinching, all-sided organization of the defensive resources of the country, self-discipline everywhere and in everything, the exploitation of the stern defeat for the raising of the discipline of the workers in all the branches of activity, in order to achieve the economic uplift of the country, and the firm establishment of the Soviet power—this is the task of the day, this is preparation for a Revolutionary War in deeds and not in words."

Lenin's reasoning was unanswerable, but emotionally many of his listeners failed to respond to him. Radek describes the difficulty of overcoming the feeling that a revolution such as the Russian, which attacked its own bourgeoisie, should retreat disgracefully before the foreign bourgeoisie. Lenin would talk to his disciples. In the circle of his intimate friends he frequently remarked: "What do the Russian people know about the Brest-Litovsk Peace? For them it is a good peace because it ended the

war. It will be necessary to go through the deepest humiliation until we build up in the masses the conviction that a powerless country, without an army, is a plaything in the hands of foreign capital the blows of which hit the masses first of all."

"The greatness of Lenin," Radek writes, "lies in the fact that no formula of yesterday prevents him from seeing the changing reality of today, and that he is able in a manly fashion to discard anything he had set up the previous day if it interferes with the demands of the hour. . . . When one watches Lenin at work in his study, in the Council of Commissars, it seems that it is impossible to be a worse organizer than he. He not only lacks a staff of secretaries preparing material for him, but has not yet even acquired the art of dictating to a stenographer and regards a fountain-pen as a muzhik does an automobile seen for the first time in his life.

"History has its own secret still which no 'Cheka' could discover. The German bourgeoisie was unable to unite Germany. But somewhere on the estate of a petty landlord, in the home-brewing factory of history, was created by God or by Satan, Bismarck, who accomplished this task. Reading his first reports and following gradually the development of his policy, one asks in wonderment, Where did this Prussian landlord acquire that vast comprehension of all-European reality? The same thought always comes to me when I think of the history of our

Party, of the history of the Revolution, and of Lenin. In the course of fifteen years, this man has fought for every comma in the Revolution and against every *ism* invented in the last quarter of a century, beginning with 'tailism' and ending with 'empiro-criticism.' Everyone of these was to Lenin a reflection of an actual enemy existing either in the working-class or in the other classes, actually existing. These *isms* were the tentacles of a reality and through this whole abracadabra he absorbed that reality, studied it and digested it in his mind, until a miracle happened and this 'underground' man emerged as the most fundamental person of Russian reality. History does not know a single case of such a transformation of an 'underground' revolutionary into a statesman. This combination of the qualities of a leading doctrinaire, of a politician, and an organizer made Lenin the captain of the Russian Revolution. But in order that this captain could become the single, universally recognized leader, it was necessary that there should be something human about him too, which is the reason why Lenin is the beloved man of the Russian Revolution."

CHAPTER XI

PLAY AND WORK

ABROAD and powerful frame of less than medium height on which was set a salient head as smooth as an ivory ball; a face of strongly marked features illumined by a pair of narrow and somewhat uncanny eyes which were now and then softened by the twinkle of kindly lights; a sly smile partly hidden by a short shaggy moustache and a thin brownish beard. This was Vladimir Ilyitch Lenin.

Nature endowed Lenin with an uncommon physique. Although it was considerably undermined by the privation and sometimes hunger which he suffered during his life as an emigrant abroad, it was powerful enough to enable him after Dora Kaplan's attempt on his life on August 30, 1918, to walk with the bullets in his body and profusely bleeding, to his automobile, to reach the Kremlin, and to climb to the third floor where his apartment was located. It was this remarkable sinewy build of Lenin's which was responsible for the extraordinary resistance he offered to the fatal sclerosis and paralysis which developed during 1922 and nearly overwhelmed him in March, 1923.

Lenin's mode of living always was Spartan. His tastes

were proletarian. He liked plain food. His idea of a comfortable home was a room with a hard iron bedstead and an ordinary table to work on. A prolific and tireless worker, Lenin had his recreations and pleasures. These he found in sports, although it is not generally known that Lenin was an enthusiastic sportsman.

Bicycling, amateur photography, chess, skating, swimming, hunting, and finally cats and children were Lenin's favorite amusements. In the days before the revolution, when he was not so overworked, Lenin frequently organized bicycle excursions, and once nearly lost his life on such an occasion. It was in Geneva, in 1908. He was returning home through the narrow streets crowded with promenaders and various vehicles when an automobile with a riotous drunken group of passengers, going at a high speed, swooped down upon the bicycle which Lenin rode. Another moment and he would have been crushed to death. But Lenin did not lose his self-possession and with lightning-like speed jumped into the crowd on the sidewalk. The bicycle was smashed to bits. The breathless witnesses of the accident congratulated him on his miraculous escape.

While in exile in Siberia Lenin led his comrades in his eagerness and passion for all kinds of gymnastics. Sometimes the whole colony of exiles would pour out on the ice-clad Yenisei River to skate. Lenin, excited and vivacious, would challenge the crowd:

"Now, who will race against me?"

And immediately several pairs of dexterous legs would fly off along the vast ice-field, but leading them all would be Lenin, determined to win at all hazards, and exerting to the utmost his puissant muscles.

In the hunting expeditions Lenin was less fortunate. He was a poor shot. But his brawn and energy made up for this. The best hunters in the colony were Starkov and Kurnatovsky. Resolved not to return with an empty bag, Lenin would cover twice the distance of his companions, literally running for twenty or thirty miles across swamps and through thickets, driven by the hope of approaching a bird or a little beast near enough not to miss his aim.

Lenin was the champion chess player of the colony. Before his arrival, Lepeshinsky was the first player among the exiles. Lenin's coming was awaited with impatience by the chess club. A game was arranged between Lepeshinsky and Lenin, while the others watched the contest with impatience.

"Not without excitement," Lepeshinsky relates, "we began to move the pawns and pieces. Soon the result was clear. I solemnly and beautifully lost.

"Well! This sometimes happens to me, especially when I play a new partner to whose style I am unaccustomed. Let us see what the second game will say!

"But the second game ended as sadly as the first one for me.

"Oh, what the devil! Revenge! I must have revenge!!!

"But the third and fourth games had the same ending, to the general cheers of my old chess partners."

Later the three best players in the colony formed an alliance and fought Lenin on the chess board. They maneuvred him into a very precarious position and were already celebrating their victory. But Lenin would not capitulate.

"Sitting in a petrified position," writes Lepeshinsky, "he was like a stone figure symbolizing the superhuman strain of thought. On his enormous forehead little drops of perspiration appeared, his head was hanging low over the board, his eyes were immovably fixed on the corner where the main strategic point of the battle was concentrated. Not a single muscle stirred on his curved face. On his wide temples bluish veins stood out. Lenin at this moment reminded one of Archimedes. Apparently, had anyone shouted: 'Fire! We are burning! Save yourselves!' he would not have even moved an eyelash. His whole aim in life at that moment was not to surrender, not to acknowledge himself defeated. Better die from brain hemorrhage than capitulate and come out with dishonor from the difficult position."

While the three partners were still jubilating, Lenin delivered his master stroke. They were shocked beyond speech and their faces perceptibly lengthened. Lenin's

eyes were now twinkling. He was wiping his forehead. He won the game.

Lenin's love of children was exceeded perhaps by his fondness for cats. His effeminate weakness for cats, which he liked to cuddle and play with, was in strange contrast to his dominant virile character. He derived genuine pleasure from associating with children and entertaining them. Before he was stricken, he could frequently be met within the courts of the Kremlin or in the country carrying a kodak and photographing children. Developing his own films was another diversion of Lenin's.

"My children adored Lenin and always anticipated his coming with delight," tells Semashka, the Commissar of Public Health in the Soviet Government, an old friend of Lenin's. "He knew their language and would invent new games for their amusement. I remember in 1911 we went for a bicycle ride to a place about eight miles from Paris. My eleven-year-old daughter begged us, with tears in her eyes, to take her along. Lenin insisted she should accompany us. It was a difficult, hilly road. And one should have seen how he bothered with my daughter. At every hill he left his bicycle and dragged hers and his own uphill. I asked him not to do it. 'She is a strong and healthy girl, she can stand it,' I argued. But he called me down severely for 'such scandalous' treatment of the child. 'Such parents,' he said, 'should be deprived of their children.' "

One day during his residence in Geneva Lenin, the bril-

liant controversialist, was outwitted by a five-year-old child. It was on a Sunday. The Lepeshinskys and some other friends called on the Lenins to take them along for a walk. Mrs. Lenin joined the party, but Lenin remained home. The Lepeshinskys left their five-year-old daughter with Lenin, who was absorbed in reading a newspaper. Suddenly becoming aware of the little guest he threw the paper aside, rushed into the kitchen and came back with a large bowl of water. On the water he navigated a fleet of vessels made of shells of walnuts, and starting them off for the opposite shores, he resumed his reading. The little visitor was for a while amused by the marine operations, but later climbed on the sofa and began calmly to watch Lenin. Finally she broke her silence.

"Lenin, ah, Lenin," she said, "why are there two faces in your head?"

"How is that, two faces?" Lenin jumped up in surprise.

"There is one in the front and one in the back of your head."

The nimble Lenin was nonplussed, perhaps for the first time in his life, not knowing what to answer.

"That comes from my thinking so much," he murmured in reply after a pause.

"Aha," said the little inquisitor, apparently satisfied with the explanation, and settling back into her corner.

Lenin had no children. Mrs. Lenin, who is known under her maiden name as Nadejda Konstantinovna

Krupskaya, early devoted herself to educational work among working-people. But after her marriage to Lenin, she became the secretary of the Bolshevist Party. Of a retiring disposition, shunning publicity, Mrs. Lenin had given twenty years of her life to "the cause." Conducting the party's enormous correspondence, coding and decoding thousands of letters yearly going to all parts of Russia in cipher so as to avoid the vigilant censorship of the Czar's secret service, her share in the achievements of her husband is indeed not to be underestimated. But her natural tendency has always been educational and recreational work among the common people. Before her marriage, during Lenin's exile in the village of Shushinskoye, Siberia, she came down to visit her fiancé. Here one December day Lepeshinsky found her bustling about a Christmas tree, decorating it with absorbing interest, and making toys.

"Nadejda Konstantinovna," the visitor asked in surprise, "what do you want with all this rubbish?"

"This is for the village children," she answered simply.

"And she put me to work at once," adds Lepeshinsky, "at drawing and cutting little animals out of cardboard. She was as happy as a child thinking of the surprise and delight of the little folk at the magic tree. But Lenin did not share this religious amusement and had nothing to do with it."

Few people knew Lenin as an affectionate husband, son and brother. Lenin loved his mother tenderly. After

the execution of her son Alexander in 1887, for his share in the plot to assassinate the Czar, she concentrated all her love on her son Vladimir. Lenin was touchingly devoted to his old mother, bent as she was by misfortune and sorrow. He frequently left his most urgent work to meet her in Sweden and sustain and cheer her in the last years of her life. She died in 1913.

Lenin loved especially his sister Maria. The latter is, of course, a Bolshevik and in the first years of the revolution was the secretary of the Bolshevist newspaper, the "Pravda." Lenin would often call for her in the evening and take her home in his car. Sometimes he would take a drive with her. During one of these motor rides Lenin was the victim of a daring hold-up.

It was at dusk one day in March, 1919, when Moscow was infested by gangs of desperate bandits. Lenin was driving through the Tverskaya, the main thoroughfare of Moscow, within a few blocks of the Kremlin, when three young men aiming revolvers at its occupants surrounded the automobile and forced the Bolshevist Premier, his sister, and the chauffeur to alight. The three bandits then drove off in Lenin's car and disappeared. Lenin and his sister returned on foot to the Kremlin. Two weeks later one of the bandits was caught. At the trial he declared that if he had known it was Lenin he had held up, he would not have disturbed him. But he was condemned to death.

The popular conception of Lenin at home was that of

a dry and dogmatic person. They tell a story in Russia which may or may not be true, but which certainly reveals the idea the man in the street had of Lenin. It runs as follows:

Lenin's mother-in-law was gravely ill. Mrs. Lenin spent many watchful days and nights nursing her dying mother. One evening, completely exhausted by her long vigil, she asked her husband to relieve her for the night.

"But don't fail to wake me up when mother needs me," she warned Lenin before retiring.

Lenin promised to do so and settled himself for a night's work at the patient's bedside. During the night she expired. Lenin went on with his work. The following morning, when his wife woke up early to resume her nursing, he quietly informed her of her mother's death.

"But why didn't you wake me up!" exclaimed the aggrieved Mrs. Lenin. "Didn't I tell you?"

"Well," replied Lenin, "I acted strictly in accordance with your instructions. You wanted to be awakened in case your mother needed you. But she certainly did not need you, as she expired."

One of the most striking characteristics of Lenin was his natural simplicity. Power did not corrupt him. He was genuinely pained and sometimes angered when, in the capacity of head of the government, he was asked to participate in some formal reception or function. He never tried to pose, he never said or did anything for effect. He was not an actor. He would never pass any

one he had met without stopping and exchanging a "How do you do?" When some one was introduced to him, Lenin did not attempt to be brilliant or especially profound. He kept his powder, as Osinski remarks, for bigger occasions. And many a caller on Lenin has gone away with the belief that he was a kindly and rather ordinary gentleman, really not remarkable at all.

When Lenin was in Krasnoyarsk, on the way to exile, he learned that the wife of his comrade Lepeshinsky, whom he knew only by reputation, was in town. He hastened to find her, and lent her every assistance on the long boat-trip to Minusinsk. To the surprise of those members of the exile group who did not know Lenin personally and who imagined him always as a proud "general," he turned out to be quite the opposite. When, for instance, during the boat trip which lasted six days, the party found itself short of food supplies, and there was no buffet on the steamer, Lenin offered to get food from the local peasants. At the first station he alighted and with agility climbed the steep hill overlooking the Yenisei to reach the village perched on the top. And he returned loaded with victuals.

Towards the end of 1918 a new managing editor was appointed for the "Pravda," a young journalist by the name of Menshoy who had just then returned from abroad. In the evening, during the busy hours of "making up" the paper, an insignificant-looking man walked into his office, holding a manuscript.

"Are you the managing editor?" the visitor asked.

"Yes," was the curt answer of the preoccupied editor. "What do you want? I haven't any time."

The little man handed him his manuscript, adding:

"I brought an article for publication."

The editor glanced at the article. It was by Lenin.

"All right, it will be published tomorrow," he said sharply. But the visitor still lingered in the office.

"Who are you? Were you sent by Lenin?" asked the editor impatiently.

"I am Lenin," was the reply. And Lenin continued simply, while the editor was recovering from the shock: "I came to fetch my sister. I have heard of you, and want to have a talk with you some time. Call me up and I will make an appointment."

Shortly afterwards Menshoy met an acquaintance on the street who seemed to be all out of breath and in a great hurry.

"What is the rush?" asked Menshoy.

"I am trying to buy a cap," was the hasty answer. It was in the days when the shops were being nationalized and all the goods in the stores had suddenly vanished.

"What do you need a cap for?" asked Menshoy surprised.

"It is for Lenin. I was sent out by him, to get a cap and have scoured the whole city without finding one. He is going to address a workers' meeting, and wants a cap."

In October, 1918, a conference of young communists

met in Moscow and decided to form a national organization. A delegation was elected to go and see Lenin about it. The youths arrived in the Kremlin and the first delegate outlined the purpose and resolution of the conference, informing Lenin proudly that the organization would be called "The Young Men's Communist Association."

"The thing is not in the name," retorted Lenin.

"But we will live up to the name," was the quick reply.

Lenin smiled and asked some questions about the membership. "Beware of the intellectuals," he warned the delegation, adding:

"How many girls are there at the conference?"

"Nine head!" a youthful proletarian poet in the delegation trumpeted forth. There was a general uproar.

"And how about finances?' asked Lenin.

"Our finances are still being projected, but there is no cash."

Lenin wrote a note to the President of the Soviets, Sverdlov, and the matter was closed. The Young Men's Communist Association was founded. A year later it numbered ninety thousand members, two years later it had already four hundred thousand and at the beginning of 1923 six hundred thousand members.

This was Lenin's favorite method of doing things. A matter was put up to him, and there was no procrastination. Lenin scribbled a few lines and it was attended to at once. For instance, in 1920 an American journalist

known for his integrity and sympathy for the Russian revolution was ordered arrested by a petty functionary. Although many leading Bolsheviks knew him well, nobody dared interfere with the work of the "Tcheka." Finally, a certain Russian journalist submitted the affair to Lenin during a session of the Third Internationale.

"Write a short note about it," said Lenin.

In a few minutes the order for arrest was annulled, to the mortification of Menjinsky, the head of the Special Section of the "Tcheka."

There is one thing, however, of which Lenin was afraid. Fearless in world battles and brave when facing great dangers, Lenin literally displayed cowardice at any petty scandal. During his life in Switzerland, when the factional strife between the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks was at its height, the former arranged a lecture by Lunacharsky. The Mensheviks, numerically then far stronger than the Bolsheviks, led by Martov, decided to break up the meeting.

In the hall on the platform were the leading Bolsheviks of the colony, including Lenin. The chairman was Krasikov. At the opening of the lecture three hundred Mensheviks broke into the hall. There followed a wild scene of hooting, hissing, and stamping. One of the Menshevist disturbers, a large fellow, was beating a huge stick of wood against the floor.

The speaker, the chairman, and the other leaders on the

platform looked grave but calm. Only Lenin was agitated. With an expression of contempt and alarm on his face he would walk up to the chairman almost every minute urging him to close the meeting. But the chairman was adamant. "No," was his determined reply to Lenin's pleas.

Finally, the owner of the hall began to turn off the electricity gradually. But the Mensheviks would not stop their yelling and booing.

"Ach, close the meeting!" demanded Lenin, whose usual sangfroid gave way in the riotous atmosphere. "Don't you see the scoundrels have broken it up?"

"Not for anything in the world," replied the unbendable chairman.

Here one of the Bolsheviks conceived a plan. Lepeshinsky, who was a fine caricaturist, took up a sheet of a paper and pencil, and began to draw a caricature of the excited Menshevist chief, Martov. Lepeshinsky was known as a merciless satirist and Martov could stand anything but derision. Unable to hold out against the pencil of the artist, Martov gathered his boisterous hosts and departed. For once the Bolsheviks carried the field against Lenin's advice.

Although Lenin became irritated and excited in a disorderly scene, he preserved his sense of humor even in a grave political crisis. When in the summer of 1919 the Bela Kun Soviet Government in Hugary was overthrown,

the executive committee of the Third Internationale, then in its infancy, met to consider the situation. The position of Soviet Russia was then precarious. Koltchak and Yudenitch were advancing. The Versailles Peace was concluded. The hopes raised in Moscow by the Bullitt mission sponsored by Wilson and Lloyd George were dead.

Among the seven executive members of the Third Internationale was a new man who had never before participated in such an important conference. He went to the Kremlin feeling very nervous, expecting a gloomy and grave session. But he was quite surprised to see Lenin meet the arrivals at the door in a jolly mood. "It was like a five o'clock party," he later said. "Lenin and Bukharin told funny stories. Bukharin even took his coat off. There was general laughter, which at times became uproarious. Lenin told stories from the days when he was coaching the Bolshevist deputies in the Duma, who were ignorant workingmen, how to speak and what to say. Lenin is also fond of telling very humorously of his experience during his short practice of law. In this setting the conference also attended to its business and made important decisions."

In the days when Lenin lived in Paris, he frequently spent an evening in some plain suburban café in the company of his friends. Usually he would be the center of the general merry-making, leading in vivaciousness and wit. One such night he went out with Maxim Gorky and

the latter's wife, Madame Andreeva, who was looking after Gorky very solicitously and showering attentions on him. As is well known, Gorky is a pseudonym. In Russian the word "gorky" means "bitter." After one of these attentions Lenin remarked: "Although Gorky is bitter, his wife is sweet."

CHAPTER XII

MIND AND TEMPER

AT a lecture delivered in Russia in 1902 by one Zhuravlev, an opponent of Marxian Socialism, there followed considerable discussion. An unknown young man with a pointed beard in one of the back rows in the hall rose to argue against the lecturer. Without disclosing his identity, he made a few remarks and returned to his seat. When the speaker answered the criticism of his opponents, he turned to the young man in the back, and said sarcastically:

"Now, young man, you have been trying to prove here that my contentions are wrong. But let me tell you that you do not even know your own Marxian literature. Have you read Lenin's 'Development of Capitalism in Russia?' "

There followed a pause. Many eyes turned inquiringly from the triumphant lecturer to the strange young man near the door.

"I wrote it myself," was the shocking answer, and the young man disappeared.

Lenin the writer had all the characteristics of Lenin the

public man. Commanding an incisive and trenchant pen, Lenin was first of all an acute critic. His expression is vigorous and sarcastic, but not beautiful. He seldom made drafts of his works. He wrote the way he spoke and turned out extraordinarily clean manuscripts, seldom marred by any corrections or erasures. He paid no attention to form or style.

And yet Lenin loved poetry, but not of the ultra-modernist kind. In spare moments he might be found reading Shakespeare, Schiller and Byron. His Russian favorites were also the classics, Pushkin, Bariatinsky and Tiutchev. He was interested in folklore. But most of his reading was along sociological and historical lines. He digested a prodigious amount of literature. His chairs and tables were piled high with books. Here you would find a volume of Hegel or some other great philosopher, books on the Taylor system, recent publications on Indian history sent to him from Calcutta, the latest books in various languages on the organization of the state and the science of government. On the margins of these volumes, pamphlets and magazines there are numerous notes in the small and neat handwriting of Lenin.

On the boat-trip to his Siberian exile Lenin was observed one day by Madame Lepeshinsky lying on his cot reading a scientific book and turning every few seconds a new page. She was curious to find out if Lenin was actually reading the book or merely glancing through it,

and put the question up to him. Surprised, Lenin answered smilingly:

"Of course, I am reading it, and doing it very carefully, for the book is worth studying."

Lenin was interested in fiction when it portrayed great social conflicts, and was especially keen about anything showing the growth of revolutionary sentiment in England. A young friend of his stationed abroad in the Soviet service picked up a copy of Beresford's novel "Revolution," and sent it to Lenin. Lenin sent him a note of thanks and the recipient thought that he need not bother Lenin with an answer. A couple of months later the young man returned to Moscow to attend the opening of the congress of the Third Internationale. It was an impressive occasion. Hundreds of notables in the world revolutionary movement were present. Lenin was on the platform. Suddenly his eyes fell on the man who had sent him the book. He descended from the stand and walked up to the table where his friend was seated, shaking his hand warmly.

"Comrade," Lenin said, "I came to thank you especially for that fine book you sent me." And he did it, amidst the solemn surroundings, in such a simple and sincere manner that tears almost rose to the eyes of the young man. Then he returned to the platform to conduct the congress.

Lenin was a great admirer of Lloyd George as a super-

politician during the latter's tenure of the office of Prime Minister. Once, in 1921, he even wanted to dedicate a book of his to Lloyd George, in a spirit of irony of course. And it was only after urgent counsel by his colleagues that Lenin gave up the idea.

Lenin as a newspaper editor would perhaps not have gone far. One day the telephone rang in the office of the managing editor of the "Pravda." It was Lenin calling. He had an idea about an article that would be good for the paper, but he had no time to write it. Would the editor come over and he would explain the matter to him? The puzzled editor came. It was after office hours. Lenin was alone, sitting in an armchair and going through a stack of papers. He pulled out a certain issue of the Conservative English newspaper, "The Morning Post," and turning to the last page pointed to a little "boxed" advertisement at the bottom which he had marked in red pencil. It was a notice of a meeting of a "Society to Combat Bolshevism at Home." The speakers were announced as Col. Lowther, a conservative Member of Parliament, Havelock Wilson, the leader of the Marine Workers' Union, and a certain minister of the church.

"Now it would be interesting to write a little article about these three gentlemen speaking from the same platform. It should not be a serious piece, for there is nothing serious about it, but rather light and sarcastic. You know something about newspaper technique," Lenin con-

tinued. "Now why is it our papers haven't got the appearance of some of these English newspapers? In order to make the paper look more attractive please put this advertisement into the article just as it is, only in Russian, of course."

The following day the Soviet Press for the first and only time in its life appeared with a "box" on its front page, inserted in the middle of an article. However, Lenin never tried again to interfere with the "making-up" of the paper, for while his criticism about the looks of the Russian press was just, his constructive suggestion was at best naïve.

Lenin liked music, especially of a simple nature. During his life in Switzerland Lenin immensely enjoyed the home concerts that the political emigrants improvised among themselves. When a player or singer was really gifted, Lenin would throw his head back on the sofa, lock his knees into his arms, and listen with an interest so absorbing that it seemed as if he were experiencing something very deep and mysterious. His applause after a good number was vehement, his demand for an "encore" insistent.

In exile Lenin was one of the leaders of the colony's chorus. Only he disliked the typical melancholy Russian songs favored by the majority. Some one would suggest, for instance, the song: "Ah, My Fate, My Fate," but Lenin would jump up and fight such proposals. His favorites were the lusty songs calling to battle and toil.

"To the devil with 'My Fate!' Let us start: 'Boldly, Comrades, in Line!' " he would command. And in order to avoid any parliamentary discussion on the subject, as Lepeshinsky remarks, he would commence at once in his rather hoarse and falsetto voice which defied classification:

"Boldly, comrades, in line,
Forging our spirits in battle . . ."

And when in the middle of the song, which had gotten on the nerves of all of them long ago, the voices would drop and interest lag, Lenin would begin gesticulating violently with his arms and stamping his foot impatiently, demanding support and making up for its lack by straining his voice to its utmost and emphasizing the wrong places, only to bring it to its concluding lines:

"And we shall plant on earth
The red banner of toil."

Perhaps Lenin's favorite verse, which he liked to recite in his most difficult moments and which he repeated more than once on the eve of the Soviet Revolution, was the following:

"We hear the sounds of acclamation
Not in the sweet murmur of the waves,
But in the savage cries of desperation."

Lenin understood very little about art and openly confessed his ignorance of it. But he was not indifferent to it as a social recreation. In the severe winter of 1919, the worst of the dreadful winters through which Soviet

Russia passed in the first six years of its existence, the fuel crisis created an alarming condition. There was a session of the anxious commissars in the Kremlin. One of them made a passionate plea for the shutting down of the state theaters. Epidemics were raging, he argued eloquently, hospitals, and bath-houses were short of fuel, hundreds of workingmen and soldiers were perishing from filth and cold, while the state theaters were consuming large quantities of fuel in order to put on such products of bourgeois art as "Carmen" and "Traviata" for the entertainment of speculators and capitalists largely. It would be better to turn the theaters into propaganda forums, he concluded.

Lunacharsky, the Commissar of Education and the Soviet Patron of Art, was unfortunately absent from the meeting. It seemed that the proposal would be accepted by the majority, although reluctantly. Lenin put the question to a vote, but incidentally made a few remarks on the subject:

"It only seems to me," he said, his eyes smiling, "that the comrade has a somewhat naïve conception of the rôle and purpose of the theater. The theater is needed not so much for propaganda as for the recreation of the workers after their daily toil. And as yet it is a little too early for us to discard our heritage from bourgeois art. Now, those in favor of the proposal raise your hands."

Of course, the proposal was defeated. After Lenin's remarks the majority voted with Lenin against it.

Lenin's dislike for rhetoric was one of his outstanding characteristics. He was not swayed by eloquence. He did not trust beautiful speech. He disdained theatrical gestures or all-inclusive adjectives. Zinoviev once told of an article he had written in the summer of 1917 in which he referred to the overthrow of the Czar as the "great Russian revolution." Lenin erased the word "great" from the phrase.

"When I asked him," said Zinoviev, "why he was so captious about it, Lenin replied: 'What sort of a great revolution is this? It will become great only when we throw Kerensky out, when the Soviet will not be talking but acting. Then you can call it even the greatest.' "

One of the indisputable services that Lenin has rendered Russia was the raising of a type of young man who is concise in speech, energetic in action, and matter-of-fact. The Russian revolutionaries of the past, with the exception of a few terrorists, were actors. They were dreamy and lazy intellectuals. The Bolshevik is a man of action and acumen. "Lenin cultivated in us," writes a leading member of the Bolshevist Party, "contempt for phraseology, for posing, for beautiful gestures, which we find to a sickening degree in the Socialist Revolutionaries. He taught us also to scorn the Menshevist species of man who talks in the language of Marxian quotations but who slept through all revolutions with Marx's 'Capital' under his pillow."

Lenin as an educator was a potent influence in the

success of the Soviet Revolution. When he returned from exile in 1900, he immediately proceeded to work at knitting together the socialist groups scattered throughout central Russia. He visited many cities always leaving behind a deep trail like an enormous plough furrowing the soil. He was unlike any other revolutionary agitator of the time. His personality would cause everywhere a natural division in the ranks of the revolutionaries, attracting some and repelling others. He came to Pskov, for instance, and attacked during his speeches the "kid glove" socialists. The effect was instantaneous. Those who had "kid glove" souls, who were temperamentally "parlor socialists," were the ones that fumed against and denounced Lenin as a demon, as a destroyer of the sacred traditions of the revolutionary movement. But the hardy and practical men psychologically lined up with Lenin and idolized him.

Lenin's personality was therefore the real cause of the split of the Russian Social Democratic Party into Bolsheviks and Mensheviks, which formally occurred at the convention of 1903. That year Lepeshinsky arrived in Geneva, not knowing whether he was a Bolshevik or a Menshevik. Krasikov immediately led him to Lenin.

"And so again, after three years of separation," writes Lepeshinsky, "I saw Lenin. His appearance did not have at all the looks of a conqueror, such as illuminated his face when he departed from Siberia. Sitting on the sofa,



LENIN IN HIS OFFICE IN THE KREMLIN AT MOSCOW

thin and pale, he was fingering his pointed beard, an uncertain smile lingering beneath his long moustache (he had not then cut it yet)."

After an exchange of greetings and personal remarks, Lenin resumed his silence. Apparently the division and wrangling in the party had depressed him deeply. Finally, Krasikov was unable to stand it any longer and burst out, addressing himself to Lenin:

"Why do you keep your mouth shut as if it were full of water? I brought this man to you especially to disperse his doubts and instruct him."

"What for?" smiled Lenin. "Let him find out for himself. There are the published records of the convention, let him read them carefully and arrive at his own conclusions."

In spite of the heated protests of Krasikov, the obdurate Lenin refused decidedly to convert Lepeshinsky to the Bolshevist faith, perhaps because he knew that the arrival could not become anything else but a follower of his.

Viciously attacked by his former comrades of the Menshevist faction for his autocratic methods, his "bonapartistic" and adventurous inclinations, Lenin answered with a pamphlet which he called *One Step Forward, Two Steps Back.* But the job of personal attacks disgusted him then, although later he learned the art of vituperation perhaps a little too well in his denunciation of the socialist leaders who disagreed with him.

"I remember one night," Lepeshinsky relates, "about two o'clock, we accompanied Lenin to the suburb where he lived. Our Ilyitch (Lenin's patronymic) seemed to have altogether lost his characteristic courage. 'I am afraid, comrades,' he said 'I shall not finish this book. . . . I will throw it all up and go into the mountains.' Here we all fell upon him: 'You ought to be ashamed to descend to such hypochondria! Are you not strong enough to pull yourself together? The party is backing you. And you have no right to cast off, at a whim, the yoke of party leader.' "

"But do you realize, comrades," Lenin replied, "what a torture it is to me? When I wrote *What is to be done?* I plunged head foremost into the work. I experienced the joyous sensation of creating. I knew with what mistaken conceptions of my opponents I had to deal, how to approach them and how to define the essence of our difference. But now? The devil only knows what it is! I do not find any disagreement in principle. And to be catching them all the time at petty swindling of thought, to point out that this one here is simply a liar and that one there an intriguer and scandal-monger, you must admit, is disheartening work."

However, Lenin recovered soon from his melancholy mood and pursued his educational and organizing activities with his usual energy. "During the years of 1904-5, the quietest and deadest period of Bolshevism," writes

Lepshinsky, "at the time of the biggest Bolshevist defeats and misfortunes, he would not let us drop into a condition of prostration or mental torpor, and he organized regular gatherings of a group of Geneva Bolsheviks for the purpose of studying systematically the party programme under his guidance. What a touching picture these meetings presented! The sly left eye of Lenin's would be lit with the kindest of little fires, and he displayed no tendency at all to strike with the lightning of irony any of the speakers. No one hesitated to express himself, although many foolish things were uttered, but Lenin, always gently and delicately, led the wandering mind of this or that political infant back to the right path. And the most amazing thing of all was that although the audience was heterogeneous, comprising intellectuals with a considerable theoretical knowledge and semi-literate workmen, all those present felt themselves like pupils in an elementary class."

Lenin as a lawyer was perhaps more severe than Lenin as a teacher. During his exile in Siberia, the escape of one of the inmates without warning to his comrades, caused a quarrel in the colony, which divided itself into two camps on this issue. A "trial" was instituted and Lenin asked to take over the defense. The case of the prosecution was weak, and when Lenin attacked it coldly, formally, impartially, there was an outburst of indignation at his methods. The prosecution put forward some im-

passioned speeches but when Lenin, with paper and pencil in hand, began his scrutiny, there was nothing for the originators of the "trial" to do but hysterically to break it up. Lenin departed shrugging his shoulders and shaking his head.

Lenin was not a natural rebel. His psychology was not of the eternal mutineer. His mind was that of an inveterate revolutionary but not his heart. There was the imprint of the lawyer in Lenin's nature. He was legalistic, formalistic. He had a conservative respect for the law, of course the Soviet law, but nevertheless the law. Whether a law is good or bad, it must be obeyed. Lenin, the arch-Bolshevik, had a deep preference for the constitutional method of deciding troublesome questions, of course not between the capitalist and Bolshevist powers but internally within the limited circle of the supreme directory of Russia, the executive committee of the Communist Party.

Lenin liked to settle questions on the basis of statutes. "In this matter," he would say, "there is a resolution of the party conference which says . . ." Or, "There is a decree of the party of such and such a date demanding . . ." Or, "the fourth congress has passed a resolution to the effect . . ." And after quoting the various resolutions and decrees of the Soviet Government, Lenin felt that there was no need for further argument. The laws must be fulfilled without questioning.

At a party conference held in 1920 several leading Bolsheviks complained and protested against the lack of the communist spirit in the Soviet bureaucratic institution, and sometimes even of elementary justice. Lenin hotly answered the critics:

"But not one of those who complained here has stated what the wronged persons have done to combat this manifestation of bureaucracy and injustice. Did they try to call the attention of the proper authorities or persons whose function it is to take care of such cases? And if nothing could be done there, was an attempt made to carry the case to the highest Soviet or party tribunal?"

"Lenin is not altogether right," remarked caustically one of the members of the conference to another. "Strictly speaking, what is the meaning of his argument? It all comes down to a 'fight for the law.' But once we get on to that field, one might raise a great many objections. . . ."

Indeed, Lenin's "remedy" was as old as the ages. Since human society was formed, kings and judges have tried to cure bureaucracy with more bureaucracy, to correct injustice arising out of the law by more laws. Few people in the world in 1917 dreamed that one of Lenin's strong characteristics was respect for the law.

Perhaps next to the law, Lenin's greatest respect was for the famous Munich beer. Whenever any of his friends arrived from Germany, Lenin inquired with an envious smile: "How is the *Muenchener* over there? Is it still

as good as it used to be?" Finally, a diplomatic courier in the Soviet service, having heard of this fancy of Lenin's conceived the happy idea of bringing Lenin a gift. This courier might have been observed on one of his regular trips from Berlin to Moscow carrying once, in addition to his sacks of mail, a keg of beer, not ordinary beer, but genuine *Muenchener*. The German customs officials were a bit surprised at this diplomatic baggage, but having convinced themselves that it was not gold but good old German beer, they made no objection. Needless to add, the keg of beer found its way into the Kremlin, and Lenin's delight would have dismayed any Prohibition agent.

Lenin did not take strong spirits. There is only one case on record of Lenin getting drunk, and that happened long before he became Prime Minister. After the Bloody Sunday, in January, 1905, which marked the beginning of the first Russian revolution, the political emigrants in Switzerland buried their hatchets at first. The Bolsheviks and Mensheviks fraternized. It seemed that conciliation and peace would be restored among the Russian socialists. The Mensheviks suggested that a common meeting of protest be held in commemoration of the event. Lenin objected, but his followers argued that it would be disgraceful before Europe for the Russian revolutionaries to show themselves incapable of common action against Czarism. Lenin then suggested that a written agreement be made between the Mensheviks and Bolsheviks that the

meeting should not be turned into factional dispute and wrangling. The agreement was signed. At the meeting the Bolshevist speaker, Lunacharsky, by his extraordinary eloquence made an impression which the Mensheviks felt should be counteracted. One of the leaders of the latter, Dan, climbed upon the platform and began to criticize and attack the Bolshevist party. The Bolsheviks were furious. Lenin, unable to stand the nagging of the speaker, rose and bitterly called to his followers:

"Let us go, comrades! We have nothing to do here!"

Full of chagrin and indignation the Bolshevik chiefs repaired to a café, at Lenin's behest. Here Lenin ordered and emptied one jug of beer after another. "He became noisy, talkative and gay," Lepeshinsky writes without however disclosing whether Lenin confined himself to beer, "but so gay as I should not want him ever again to be. For the first and only time in my life I saw this man of iron will resorting to such an artificial and dubious medium as alcohol in order to deaden his shaken nerves."

Lenin's personal life was such a small part of him that he probably never lost his temper because of any unpleasant incident in it. But he would fly into a rage over some miscarriage of an affair concerning his party or cause. At the time when Lenin got drunk the Bolsheviks were the minority faction in the Russian Social Democratic Party. The Olympian God of this party was then Plekhanov, a man of vast knowledge and a brilliant and

profound writer. Both the Bolsheviks and Mensheviks respected him, but his sympathies were with the latter. All of Lenin's proposals at the supreme party council were regularly voted down, and yet Lenin always attended them in order to be able to publish the records and thereby show the rank and file his viewpoint, in the hope of gaining the majority at the next congress of the party. Both the Bolshevist and Menshevist faction kept separate records of the sessions of the supreme council.

Once Lenin sent Lepeshinsky with a set of these reports to the Menshevist chief, Martov, for endorsement of their authenticity after comparison with his own records. Martov asked the messenger to leave the papers with him for a day to look over.

"With a heavy heart," Lepeshinsky describes this interesting episode, "I returned to Lenin. Learning that I had left the papers with Martov 'until to-morrow' he flew into such a rage as I have never seen him in before or since. He paced the room back and forth, like an infuriated lion, and in a monologue, replete with extreme exasperation, subjected me to the most cruel castigation."

"If you have such a pure soul," Lenin shot at Lepeshinsky, "why do you undertake a serious political mission?"

"But Martov gave me his word of honor that he would return them," pleaded Lepeshinsky with a sunken voice and tears in his eyes.

"Oh, shut your mouth, please. . . . What saintly in-

noçence!" Lenin hissed through his teeth with unspeakable contempt.

Martov of course never returned the papers.

In those days Lenin was still under the influence of the personality of Plekhanov, whose enormous authority he even feared. But within the depths of his soul there was fermenting already a revolt against the high priest of the party. Lenin very seldom poured out his intimate thoughts to any one, but one day, alone with Lepeshinsky, he seemed deeply absorbed and an unfamiliar smile appeared on his face. In half voice, as if speaking to himself, Lenin said:

"You know, Plekanov is really a man of colossal stature, before whom one must sometimes shrivel up. . . . And yet for some reason it seems to me that he is already a corpse and not a living human being."

While Lenin's slow rebellion against the supreme party deity was due to his mental growth, the revolt of his own followers against Lenin was due to his dictatorial temper. It all began with a quarrel of two couples eminent in the Bolshevist family in Geneva. The party council considered the dispute and in the name of party discipline, than which there was nothing more sacred, rendered a decision in favor of one of the couples. Then the other couple took the matter to Lenin himself.

Lenin, using sharp language, ordered the whole group not to waste time on private nonsense. The leaders were

insulted by such treatment at the hands of their captain and there followed a common protest and a rupture of diplomatic relations which lasted for a period of several weeks. Whether Lenin felt the pangs of remorse or simply could not stand the lonely siege, is not recorded. But the long-drawn-out conflict ended in an unforeseen manner. One evening an unexpected visitor appeared in the house of Lepeshinsky. It was Lenin himself, and he looked as meek as a lamb.

"Shall we not play a little game of chess?" gently suggested the sudden guest.

"With joy," answered the host, pleasantly shocked at this form of settling a grave conflict. The following day the insurgent flock reconsidered its former decision and raised the siege. Thus ended the only revolt against Lenin's authority previous to his becoming the head of the Soviet State.

CHAPTER XIII

LENINISM: A CRITICAL STUDY

LENIN was Bolshevism personified. Not only was Bolshevism as an organized party movement an outgrowth of Lenin's personality, a gravitation of human particles to the magnetic field of Lenin's ego, but Bolshevism as an idea was a child of Lenin's brain, steeped in his mentality, reared in his ethics, its thoughts and emotions coursing along the grooves of Lenin's mind and heart. Bolshevism in its pure form is Leninism. But what is Leninism?

Leninism is of course a combination of a certain distinct state of mind or mentality and a certain type of temperament. An inquiry into the nature of Lenin's mentality and psychology will resolve the muddled solution of Bolshevism into its main elements.

Lenin's mentality was that of a person who upon adolescence, at the very threshold of mature life, adopts an idea, be it of a universal character in the field of religious, scientific or humanitarian activity, or of a selfish character, such as the acquisition of wealth or the achievement of high rank, and whose entire conduct through life afterwards is guided by this supreme idea. Lenin embraced

the faith of Marxism when he was twenty-three. Subsequently he had never had any doubts about it and was indeed incapable of having them. All his abilities were devoted to extending the influence of his faith. Like the medieval Jesuit who never questioned the Church but its rites, or the alchemist who doubted not the possibility of the transmutation of metals but his own methods, or the proverbial inventor of perpetual motion who starts out with the belief which he never surrenders that perpetual motion can be achieved, or the chief of a general staff conducting a campaign for his emperor without stopping to inquire into the why and wherefore of the campaign, so Lenin reacted to his supreme Marxian faith, not theory. His mentality, like that of any of the described persons, may have been extraordinarily agile and pliant as to methods, his erudition may have been vast and his capacity to back up his contentions brilliant, his character may have been such as to readily acknowledge tactical mistakes and defeats, but these he never would have ascribed to the possible invalidity of his great idea.

Lenin's mind was closed on the subject of Marxism. Having once adopted the Marxian theory of the class struggle as the form of the transition of the capitalist society into a socialist one, Lenin had dedicated all his keen controversial powers and exhaustive knowledge of Marx to refute his critics among the Marxians by means of innumerable quotations from the works of his master

stretching over a period of forty years and which Marx himself, were he alive, would probably find somewhat contradictory.

The extraordinary phenomenon about Lenin is that he combined this unshakable, almost fanatic, faith with a total absence of personal ambition, arrogance or pride. Unselfish and irreproachable in his character, of a retiring disposition, almost ascetic in his habits, extremely modest and gentle in his direct contact with people, although peremptory and derisive in his treatment of political enemies, Lenin could be daring and provocative in his policies, inflexible in the execution of his principles, unscrupulous in his methods of government and crafty and pitiless in his handling of men and affairs. Lenin combined the qualities of a politician and a statesman, of a generalissimo and a private, of a dictator and a plain comrade. A philosopher who despised philosophy, an intellectual who scorned intellectuals, a thinker who deified action, Lenin was a rebel against force by means of force, a general who adopted and perfected the strategy of his enemies in an attempt to destroy them.

Essentially a man of brain and not of poetic flights, Lenin had set in motion a tremendous religious upheaval in the name of a materialism which he himself loathed. Possessed of a keen sense of mass psychology, Lenin as the champion of the dark toiling masses had no delusions as to their ignorance and submissiveness.

So much for Lenin's mentality. Emotionally, Lenin was a man of action. Energetic, efficient, indefatigable in his work, he belonged to the type of man who sets big tasks before him primarily because his nature thirsts for action and enjoys the process of quenching this thirst by arduous labor. He belonged to the dynamic species of the human animal. He had a deep abhorrence of phraseology and a natural contempt for visionaries. But the realm of pure thought, of introspective contemplation, was foreign to his nature. He was incapable of spiritual self-torment and self-analysis. He knew not the world of artistic visions, of creative imagination. He could never find the ultimate in ideas. He sought it in matter.

It is this mentality and psychology of Lenin's which forms the solution of Leninism. It might be a very happy mixture were the faith which is the corner-stone of Leninism sound. But will Marxism stand the test?

Marxism cannot stand the test for the reason that its foundation, the theory of the class struggle, is untenable in the light of the developments of recent years. With the purpose of Marxism to attain a just and equal distribution of the wealth of this planet among its inhabitants there is no quarrel. It is a purpose which Marx did not originate and which has been expressed in a thousand different ways since human society was born. The Marxian theory foresees the concentration of the wealth of the world in the hands of a few and the industrialization of

civilized human society to an extent rendering the majority of its members proletarian, at the end of which process the world should be ripe for social revolution and socialism should replace capitalism. This process assumes the development of a struggle of the two dominant classes, the capitalist and proletarian, the victory going to the latter. While Marx elaborated this theory, he also taught the necessity for the enlightenment of the proletariat and the development in it of a consciousness of its own class interests. Marx himself was emotionally a rebel and took an active part in the revolutionary movement of his day. However, it is noteworthy that nowhere in Marx, as Riazanov, one of the foremost Bolshevist Marxians has pointed out, is there any mention of a proletarian dictatorship, i.e., of the idea of the seizure of power by a small minority of class-conscious proletarians for the purpose of setting up a socialist society.

It is obvious that there is a curious paradox in Marxism which lies in its assumption, on the one hand, of an historical evolution of capitalism into socialism through democratic, parliamentary stages and, on the other hand, of the idea of social revolution. Now, there are all kinds of revolutions. The Russian Revolution of March, 1917, was the painless ripening of a long historical process which ended feudalism in Russia. The bone of contention among the Marxians of the world is whether Marx intended an elemental social revolution which would have

come inevitably or such a seizure of power as Lenin perpetrated with a view to the slow development of socialism. We shall let the Marxians fight this little question out, and only beg Providence to allow us to live long enough to see who will finally emerge as the true Marxians.

The contradiction in Marx, broadly speaking, is then between evolution and revolution, between education and force. It is this which has divided the Marxian socialists of the world into two main camps, which are at present known as Communist and Socialist, but which should be designated as Bolshevist and Menshevist. The interesting phenomenon about this division is that it is almost entirely along psychological, temperamental lines. The Mensheviks, Kautsky, Adler, Martov, Branting, McDonald, Vandevelde, Spargo, Longuet are emotionally democrats, parliamentarists, educators, but not revolutionists endowed with adventurous spirits. The Bolsheviks are the very opposite of that. Menshevism is pacifist, Bolshevism is militant. Menshevism is sentimental, Bolshevism is practical. Menshevism is Christian, Bolshevism is pagan. If Menshevism is a manifestation of the degeneracy of the physiological man, then Bolshevism is an indication of the recrudescence of the virility of the human race. But if Menshevism is a step forward in the intellectual development of the human animal, then Bolshevism is a step backward to the primitive civilization of brutal force.

However, the paradox which has given rise to the two

Marxian schools does not yet invalidate Marxism. One of the two may be right. What does invalidate it is that the industrialization theory of Marx is not working out in the way he predicted. The expected proletarianization of the peasant class is not occurring. While a certain fraction of the peasantry had been forced to become wage workers, the majority of the peasants of the last century have developed into farmers, into a distinct class with a rapidly developing class consciousness of its own. In the United States, perhaps the most highly developed capitalistic country in the world, this farmer class is already organized and is entering the arena far more swiftly than the industrial class. In Europe the very war which Lenin hailed as the commencement of the world revolution has arrested the partial process of the proletarianization of the peasants and has thrown back onto the land a large number of semi-proletarians, not only increasing appreciably the product of the soil in the most advanced countries, such as England, but also forging a conservative class consciousness among the farmers of the Old World which is as hostile to the big financier as to the proletarian workingman of socialist tendencies. The decay of the existing social and economic order in Europe, the dissolution of the cities, will only further augment the ranks of the farmers from amidst the urban middle class and will develop and strengthen even more the class consciousness of the farmer. This is strikingly illustrated by the conditions in

the Russian village during the years of 1919 and 1920 when the Russian city was at its lowest.

Here then is the rock on which Marxism is hopelessly wrecked. The class struggle between the proletariat and the capitalist is radically changed by the emergence of a potent farmer class. There are three main classes, instead of two, in modern human society. And two of these classes form the majority and are actuated by the motive of self-preservation. Those Marxians of the Menshevist school who prefer to wait for the gradual industrialization of society until the proletariat forms the majority may naturally do so, providing themselves first with astronomical instruments to calculate the year of our Lord when this event will be consummated. To them the fact that in England and America, the most advanced countries economically, the industrial classes form a decided minority proves nothing. But the Marxians of the Leninist school, although favoring the immediate seizure of power by a minority, are blind to the same condition. They take it for granted that the peasant or farmer class is doomed, that in the capitalist countries by means of a concentration of the ownership of the land in the hands of a few financiers and in the countries of proletarian rule by means of nationalization, the farmer class will simply disappear.

This forecast is dictated by the Marxian theory and therefore its inevitability is not to be questioned. The

process of persuading a couple of hundred million peasants and farmers to give up their property to a sovereign state controlled by the vanguard of the proletarians is a mere nothing after all. According to the Bolsheviks, there is no such thing as human nature. It is yet to be scientifically proved that human nature is acquisitive. But there is such a thing as class consciousness, class interests. There is such a thing as depriving the capitalists of their possessions. Naturally, only naïve people would imagine that this appropriation has anything to do with human instincts, with human nature. The Bolshevist revolution of 1917 and 1918 was of course perpetrated in a highly scientific Marxian sense, and without the slightest symptoms or display of any acquisitive instincts in our carnal beings.

As a super-strategist Lenin very early discerned the doubtful rôle of the Russian peasant in a socialist revolution. But together with the other Marxians he ascribed it to the backward condition of Russia industrially and held than when Russia developed a high state of capitalism, its peasantry would become proletarian. Everybody knows the series of strategic retreats which Lenin as the head of the Bolshevist dictatorship made in deference to the Russian peasant. The whole course of the Bolshevist Revolution has been deflected by the peasant. Lenin's scheme to plant "communes" on the land as a forerunner of communism ended dismally. The Soviet decree of

nationalization of the land remained a dead letter. Lenin's campaign for the organization of the "poor" proletarian peasants against the middle and upper peasant classes proved a failure. Next he retreated to the so-called "sredniak" or middle peasant and tried to build on him as against the "kulak" or village capitalist. But that failed too. The Russian peasant is already an American farmer in embryo. He is shaping the economic structure of Russia today, and not the Bolshevist Party. Lenin knew it, but he did not doubt the theory of Marx on the subject. He blamed it on the delay of the Western proletariat to come to the aid of Russia by means of a general European social revolution.

But why could not such a self-sufficient country as Russia, geographically impregnable, if and when actually ripe for a socialist revolution, accomplish it without the aid of her neighbors? Lenin answered that Russia was not ripe for socialism but his Bolshevist dictatorship should be maintained until the time when universal social revolution is attained. Why the social revolution must be universal and in a large measure simultaneous has never been satisfactorily explained. The fact that the interests of the proletariat all over the world are common does not yet place the economic conditions of the various countries in the same stage of development. How can such economically distant countries as Italy and Germany, Russia and England, France and Hungary be put on the same

level and be expected to ripen for socialism about the same time? They are at different stages of their growth and are bound to mature their present economic system at far removed periods, even as their transition from feudalism to capitalism took place in the course of centuries.

Marxism is a failure, not only in Russia because that country is economically backward, but also in the rest of the world because its theory of the class struggle has been exploded by the development of human society along different lines. The rising farmer class keeps in its stranglehold both the proletariat and the capitalists, and it will dictate the next phase of our social and economic order. Marx was right in his analysis of the evolution of feudalism into capitalism, but he was wrong in assuming that capitalism would be followed by socialism. This assumption is the cancer of Leninism.

The forces at work in human society are not merely economic. Lenin himself was a negation of the theory that economics alone determine the course of history. Lenin as a source of will energy has proved what will-power can achieve. By raising a following of self-sacrificing men Lenin demonstrated the value of spiritual force in history. The Bolshevist Party, stripped of its big and little parasites, must still be objectively regarded as a remarkable social phenomenon. It is true, Lenin did only what other great personalities had done before him. Napoleon in the name of nationalism and Lincoln in the

name of humanity had raised generations of crusaders. But Lenin was the first to create such a body in the name of a social cause, of the great ideal of economic equality, and build it not on hero-worship but on the tenets of his faith.

That this faith has failed does not alter the service that Lenin has rendered to mankind. Leninism is bankrupt only in so far as Marxism is bankrupt. It is the mentality of Leninism which is wrecked, not its psychology, its philosophy but not its soul. Emotional Leninism is a success. The best proof of the validity of Lenin's methods is furnished by Mussolini. Leninism has shown that it is possible to seize and hold power by means of an organized minority in our democratic age in the name of anything, be it Communism, Fascism, or any other "ism." There is nothing new in the idea of the dictatorship. History knows no end of precedents. What is new is that we had been accustomed to think that the word "democracy" barred such accidents. Lenin proved that it does not. The world war having crucified this anemic creature Democracy, Lenin was the first to discover it and proceeded to remove the remains of the smelling corpse. Mussolini studied Lenin and successfully copied his methods. Any aspiring future dictator will do well to penetrate into this phase of Leninism.

Lenin was a master strategist, a great tactician, but not an infallible one. He guided the Soviet ark and the Bol-

shevist Party through difficult waters with eminent success. He knew when to retreat but he never departed from his supreme purpose. His enemies often hailed his retreats as surrender, as proof of "moderation," as renunciation of his basic faith, but nothing can be more removed from the truth. Lenin was further from surrendering to the enemy than any member of his party.

As Probrajensky, the Secretary of the Bolshevist Party, has pointed out, Lenin's mistakes were always towards the "Left." When in 1906 Lenin advocated boycotting the Duma, he was true to his inveterate hatred of the capitalist society. Later he acknowledged his mistake on tactical grounds, and changed his policy. When, upon arriving in Russia from Switzerland after the overthrow of the Czar, Lenin, out of touch with the popular psychology, called for immediate revolt against the Provisional Government, it was his emotional side temporarily triumphant over his strategic mind. When in August, 1917, he suggested that the watchword "all power to the Soviets" should be discarded and the Bolshevist dictatorship inscribed on the party's banners, he again erred in the extremist direction and would have committed a tactical mistake of the first magnitude had not his comrades overruled him. Not that the Soviets are actally more than sham bureaucratic institutions, but that it would have been poor policy, especially for the naïve outside world. But Lenin's greatest mistake as a strategist was his insistence

on the invasion of Poland in 1920. Its disastrous end and the Riga Peace Conference are well known. The Bolshevist chief of staff, governed by the Marxian theory of the class struggle, wanted to set up a Bolshevist dictatorship in Poland and thereby throw a bridge of social revolution to Western Europe. Lenin simply failed to take into full consideration such a non-Marxian, "human nature" factor as nationalism, ignoring the inevitable reaction of the Polish people to any invader of their country. But such mistakes are not rare in the annals of Lenin's life. It is enough to recall his famous bet with Zinoviev on the eve of the outbreak of the war as to the attitude of the German Social Democrats on the question of war credits. It seems difficult to comprehend how a man who had lived abroad so long and knew the German mentality so well could have expected anything but the support by the Social Democrats of their Kaiser in the war. But then Lenin did not recognize national mentalities.

However, Lenin's errors are far outbalanced by his sound moves. Lenin's greatness as a strategist lay in his elasticity and intuitive understanding of the Russian people, and in his amorality when he fought the bourgeoisie which to him was an outlaw class. Lenin was right when against the opinion of most of his colleagues, including Trotzky, he decided to accept the Brest-Litovsk peace terms and not to wage a revolutionary war against

capitalistic, monarchistic Germany. He thereby rendered the greatest service to the Russian Revolution which otherwise would have perished and given way to a czarist government restored by the Hohenzollerns. No Bolshevik will ever forget this service of Lenin's, nor his vision and courage in the face of the utterly demoralized Bolshevist Party at the time.

Again Lenin was eminently right when he came forward early in 1921 with his proposal of the New Economic Policy. At that time the Bolshevist Party was torn by strife over the secondary question of the status of the trade unions, Lenin and Trotzky heading opposite groups. But Lenin's ear was to the ground. In private and public conversations and conferences he repeatedly warned of the alarming mood of the country. "And the alarming spring came," writes Preobrajensky, "and the village spoke its mind. It spoke with the tongue of the Kronstadt guns and the Tambov uprising." It must be remembered that Lenin and his lieutenants never deceived themselves as to the real nature of the Kronstadt revolt and the peasant rebellion headed by Antonov in the Tambov province, both of which were an intelligent expression of the articulate minority of the Russian peasantry. It was then that Lenin pulled out his old drafts of the New Economic Policy sketched already in 1918 and postponed by the intervention and civil war, and developed them into the present policy of the Government.

Yes, Lenin was a great political strategist on a national but not international scale. His retreats proved that beyond doubt. It may be the fact that whenever Lenin advanced since his seizure of power he erred and whenever he retreated he was right is in itself an indication that the development of the social structure of our time is not at all on the side of Lenin's fixed idea, Marxism. Cynics might even inquire if there ever will be any advance towards the "Left" which will appreciably bring the socialist revolution nearer. Nevertheless it must be acknowledged that Lenin was an outstanding political strategist. Some even call him a genius.

Now there are innumerable definitions of genius. If we accept the definition of a genius to describe an original thinker, a person who made a new contribution to the fundamentals of our civilization, then Lenin was not a genius. He did not introduce a new idea into the character of our social structure, he did not give us a new conception of the state, he did not show us how to build modern human society on new bases. Had Lenin produced an idea of a civilization other than that of physical force which characterizes the European civilization and of introspective spiritual force which underlies the disappearing oriental civilization, he would have indeed deserved the name of genius. One might have expected such a thing from Lenin because of the unusual qualities in his character. But Lenin invented nothing. He only per-

fected. He removed the corroding veneer of the Hebrew-Christian ideology masking the doubtful ethics of our state and exposed its naked nature. He demonstrated once more the fallacy and emptiness of political democracy in a world of economic serfdom and thus revealed the real essence of our civilization, which is that of power and domination. But he did not change the inner character of the state. He did not discard the instruments of domination exercised by the capitalist state, but sharpened them. His spiritual weapons were not new, they were as ancient as human society, namely violence, benevolent despotism. In doing this Lenin made use of the decayed material of the old civilization. How can one build a new edifice with rotten and valueless material?

INDEX

Abramovitch, 34.

Brest-Litovsk, 121, 130-155, 204.

Chernov, 30, 70.

Democratic Congress, 80.
Dukhonin, General, 121.

Emelianov, 79.

Kalinan, 95.
Kaminev, 68, 72, 98, 127.
Kammerer, Herr, 31.
Kerensky, 42, 69.
Koltshak, 30.

Lafargue, 12.
Liebknecht, 30, 152.
Lunacharsky, 111.
Lvov, 41.

Martens, L., 12.
Martov, 13, 21, 30, 163.
Marxism, Lenin and, 12, 59, 96, 172, 192.
Miliukov, 41, 59.
Minsky, N. M., 18.

Petrov, A., 1.

Radek, Karl, 30, 154.

Sukhanov, 54, 62, 76.

Trotzky, 19, 70, 72, 98, 120, 137.

Ulianov, Alexander, 7.

Young Men's Communist Association, The, 167.

Zimmerwald Conference, The, 30.
Zinoviev, 28, 30, 68, 70, 72, 77, 97, 128, 137, 179.